

**Panel:** Bolstering Counter-proliferation Regime (Regency Room)

**Date/Time:** Wednesday, February 20, 2013 / 15:30-16:45

**Talking Points for:** Pierce Corden, Visiting Scholar, Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science

A spectrum of initiatives can support the objective of strengthened international security and stability in a nuclear-weapon free world. Regrettably, they may also need to address new nuclear-weapon powers prior to definitive reversal of proliferation.

Consider confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) along the lines of those in the series of Vienna Documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe. Such measures apply to a “limited group;” they are not legally binding. They are, however, negotiated by the group’s members. Beyond single-state initiatives they have the attraction of being accepted in detail from the outset.

For example, for radiological and nuclear materials, any state or group of states can commit to securing such materials --in a nuclear reactor, spent fuel storage site, medical facility or elsewhere – against theft, and to protecting facilities against radioactivity dispersal. A group can adopt agreed standards, including with a view to their global adaptability.

While not the ideal end-point of a treaty, an agreement among members of a group not to develop or use radiological weapons – a defined weapon of mass destruction – would be an earnest of willingness to take even more important steps.

Advance notification of military maneuvers, ballistic or cruise missile tests or space launches can reduce the probability of miscommunication and overreaction.

A dedicated communications network between governments, building on the OSCE and hot-line experience, is a means for rapid contact when speed can avert misinterpretation of a state’s actions or intentions.

Engaging states of especial concern should be a priority objective in establishing CSBMs.

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**\* The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.**