

**Panel:** A Nuclear North Korea: Nonproliferation Issues and Beyond (Regency Room)

**Date/Time:** Tuesday, February 19, 2013 / 14:00-15:15

**Talking Points for:** Alexander Vorontsov, Head of Korean and Mongolian Studies Department, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

### **A Nuclear North Korea: Nonproliferation Issues and Beyond**

More than three decades of attempts by the United States and the entire international community to prevent North Korea from developing its military nuclear program offer a number of conclusions.

Strong-arm tactics and sanctions alone have failed to bring positive results. Successful satellite launch (December 12, 2012) and the third nuclear test (February 12, 2013) clearly demonstrated that the recent the USA conception of “strategic patience» that some American experts call as a “containment policy” variant also failed to reach its goals. Contrarily a policy of engagement and strategic compromise, on the other hand, has proven quite successful. Talks placing the parties on an equal footing and taking into account their legitimate mutual concerns have succeeded in delaying or freezing the situation at different points in the development of North Korea’s nuclear program, and in some cases have even resulted in a cessation of nuclear activities.

But today, Washington appears to have no plans to back down from its line of isolating and weakening North Korea, even at the cost of resolving the nuclear issue. Although it looks today as though all the factions in the U.S. leadership agree that a military solution is unacceptable, the policy of economic blockade and continuing to weaken the North Korean regime remains firmly in place.

However we should underline that some professionals in Washington now reasonably appeal to “focus on non-proliferation – not disarmament-in North Korea”.

In this context, the most rational, albeit long and difficult, road to reaching the goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear program would be a return to a renewed policy of updated engagement.

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