

Session 6: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

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Summary

1. **Jennifer Mackby**, Introduction:

- International Monitoring System (IMS) has high credibility. The data is routinely analyzed and provided by the standard format by countries all over the world. Data analyses and data mining have been recently introduced to IMS.
- U.S. has a large and wide discussion on the scope of the CTBT. P5 states agreed that CTBT should be “zero yield”.
- Book “Detect and Deter” recently published focus on what countries can do in detection mechanism.

2. **Ola Dahlaam**:

- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) does not specify any verification measures. There are 3 steps of verification in CTBT which are proven to be effective.
- CTBT allows international community to focus on specific issue. This helps with both detection and location capabilities.

3. **David McCormack**:

- Significant progress has been made in detection system among states (various types of detection capabilities). There are however some challenges in data flow from some large countries.
- The challenge is to keep the focus of the organization and avoid movement into other areas of society’s concerns. It is also a challenge to keep the organization moving with all the challenges of the international community. Also, CTBT is democratized. It created a

second generation CTBT from a broad spectrum of scientists' term-limits in Vienna contributed to this shift from the original treaty).

4. **Lee Dong Myung:**

- Japan cooperates with its counterparts in developing new detection capabilities.
- There is a proposal to create local centers that will be a point for regional cooperation.
- The focus of CTBT discussions should be on regional cooperation to strengthen regional cooperation.

5. **Hossam Eldeen Aly:**

- There should be a promotion of regional centers, training centers, scientific approaches etc.

We should be careful in the approach of promotion the treaty considering the current world developments.

- CTBT by definition is a regime/instrument to consolidate NPT. It is not only nonproliferation, but also a disarmament tool.
- International community needs to use the success from the 2010 NPT Review Conference into moving forward with CTBT process.
- Conference on Disarmament should be activated and led by CTBT which will bring the progress in regional cooperation.

6. **Wang Jun** (Chinese Perspective):

- Problem is that the treaty is not enforced but it does institutionalize international norms. On the regional cooperation side, there is a financial concern. Some local stations are not a part of CTBT, which means there is a big gap between regional view of CTBT and CTBT in general.
- Outside inspections mechanisms have some progress (Case study of Kazakhstan).
- There are some possibilities for the productive exchanges among NDC (National Data Centers) which should be further developed.

Q & A Session:

1. Russian participant's Question and comment on CTBT:

Q: During the discussions between U.S. and Russia in 2000, there was opposition against CTBT because of the geographical issue as U.S. placed its stations on the territories of its allies such as Australia, Japan, Europe and not Russia or China. CTBT is also considered a problem among Russian military officials when it comes to Russian military modernization. There are speculations that Russia might withdraw from CTBT. What will be the response?

A: Three nuclear states ratified CTBT (France, Great Britain and Russia). There is no difference in monitoring among countries as the treaty has not been into force.

2. Pakistan participant's Q on CTBT:

Q: How do you see the future of CTBT?

A: It depends on the states concerned. It is a false assumption that the U.S. should take a leading position and if it does so, other states will follow. There should be a mutual interest in the success and future of the treaty.

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