### **Global Nuclear Security Governance**

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# Building on the NSS Foundation

- The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) were successful both in generating political commitments and substantive achievement in the fight to prevent nuclear terrorism.
- But, they did not push the boundaries of the current nuclear material security regime.
- Nuclear security governance must be improved to protect the global expansion of nuclear power, growing fissile material stockpiles, and radiological materials against evolving threats.
- The two years leading up to the 2014 summit in the Netherlands offer an opportunity to significantly strengthen the regime's capabilities and requirements.







# 2012 Nuclear Security Summit

- The achievements announced at the Seoul NSS are important, concrete actions that strengthen global nuclear security.
- They have produced steady progress in the global effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and prevent nuclear terrorism.

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- Some notable achievements include:
  - Cleaning out all HEU from Ukraine and Chile and eliminating all plutonium from Sweden
  - Removing approximately 480kg of HEU from eight countries
  - Downblending thousands of weapons worth of material
  - Growing the number of countries ratifying key international treaties and conventions
  - Creating new nuclear security centers of excellence and other workshops and training opportunities
  - Increasing contributions to IAEA




# 2012 Summit Accomplishments

 The Seoul Communique included two important objectives with deadlines to drive their implementation:

 Bringing the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials into force by 2014

 Encouraging states to announce specific actions to minimize the use of HEU by the end of 2013



- Twelve joint statements were issued, including:
  - Counter Nuclear Smuggling: 19 countries recognized
  - HEU Minimization and Medical Isotopes: 4 countries
  - LEU Fuel Production and R&D: 4 countries
  - NSS Outreach Efforts: 7 countries
  - Nuclear Information Security: 31 countries
  - Radioactive Transport Security: 5 countries
  - Radiological Source Security: 23 countries
- Indonesia's national legislation implementation kit is a new and interesting proposal from a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country.





### The Need for Governance Evolution

- The nuclear security regime is not as developed as the nuclear safety, nonproliferation, or arms control regimes.
- Today the regime is almost entirely nationally-focused, voluntary, and non-transparent. It is composed of three major elements:
  - Domestic laws and regulations
  - International agreements, institutions, and UN resolutions
  - Ad hoc, voluntary cooperative measures
- This set of tools does not offer the cohesion, transparency, and confidence that is needed to address 21<sup>st</sup> century nuclear challenges.
- The UN Sec. Gen. and IAEA Dir. Gen. have said: "nuclear crises do not respect borders".
- National approaches and regulations <u>alone</u> are insufficient to protect the global community.
- However, any improvement in the nuclear material security regime will have to balance the principles of sovereignty with international responsibilities and obligations.





### Nuclear Security Regime Gaps

- The gaps in the current nuclear material security regime include the lack of:
  - Regularized peer-reviews of security
  - Transnational transparency
  - Regularized peer interactions (regulators and security managers)
  - Uniformity of standards and regulations
  - International confidence building actions
  - Prioritization of radiological source security
- The impediments to regime evolution are primarily political, not technical.







# A New Architecture for Nuclear Security

The new architecture needs to be built on three objectives:

- 1. Promoting transparency of action
- 2. Improving regime cohesion and shared standards
- 3. Building international confidence and responsibilities in security worldwide







### A New Architecture for Nuclear Security

#### Promoting Transparency of Action

- Integrating key provisions of the Nuclear Safety Convention, including information sharing, regularized assessments, and peer review into nuclear security
- Creating a culture of continuous improvement
- Incentivizing information sharing while protecting sensitive data
- Demonstration of concepts and principles by a few nations

#### Improving Cohesion and Standards

- Harmonizing the nuclear security regime under a robust, flexible, and comprehensive international framework agreement
- Creating uniform security standards across borders
- Universalizing and confirming the implementation of IAEA INFCIRC 225 Rev5

#### Building International Confidence and Responsibilities

- Raising the level of international confidence that there are few, if any, weak links in the implementation of nuclear security
- Balancing sovereignty and international responsibility
- Addressing the transnational implications of a nuclear incident (intentional or accidental)

### Action Plan (2012-2020)

A two-track approach – governmental and nongovernmental – should be used to evolve nuclear security governance in two phases: 2012-2016 and 2017-2020.

- Near-term Objective (2012-16)
  - Official Process: Continue the NSS process while working to universalize international conventions; evaluate elements of the nuclear safety regime for use in the security area; develop the activities of new centers of excellence; and strengthen industry-focused organizations. Introduce more far reaching nuclear security governance concepts and identify key nations willing to demonstrate key concepts and principles.
  - Expert Process: Create a geographically diverse, nongovernmental experts group to make governance recommendations in the three key areas; develop draft text of a framework agreement for government review; and initiate work on creating actionable protocols.

### Action Plan (2012-2020)

- Long-term Objective (2017-2020): Establish a new nuclear governance performance-based architecture codified in a Nuclear Material Security Framework Convention followed by actionable protocols. This performance-based architecture would:
  - Confirm the importance of national responsibility
  - Call for regularized information sharing and peer-reviews
  - Better integrate all stakeholders and define responsibilities
  - Mandate international nuclear security standards that reflect
    - a minimum performance criteria
  - Establish effective response and communication methods for crises
  - Establish long-term technical, bureaucratic, and financial support for the new system
  - Provide the IAEA with responsibility for helping all nations meet the new governance structures





### Where Do We Go From Here

- The NSS process offers an opportunity for making progress on a scale that otherwise would not exist because of the large number of countries involved and the attendance by national leaders.
  - It is an extremely unique opportunity for high-level attention that would be very difficult to recreate if terminated prematurely.
- A policy evolution was initiated in Seoul. It needs to be built upon at the Netherlands NSS in 2014 and continued (regardless of the future of the NSS process) until real progress is achieved.
- Commitment to a dual track approach could yield substantial nuclear security improvements over the next decade.









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