October 16th marked the third time in President Park Geun-hye’s five-year term that she has held a bilateral summit with President Obama and the second time that she has done so in Washington. This meeting, coming on the heels of the August 25th Inter-Korean Agreement followed shortly thereafter by President Park’s attendance at the victory day parade in Beijing and US-China summit in September, is significant to the extent that it preceded the coming trilateral summit between South Korea, China, and Japan in November as well as the scheduled South-North family reunion in October. Aside from tending to the usual business of managing the North Korean security threat, the two leaders discussed a wide range of issues including regional relations with China and Japan, South Korea’s membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and cooperation in the so-called “New Frontier” matters (i.e. global health, cybersecurity, and space cooperation). The timing also takes on an added significance as this may very well be the last meeting between the two leaders before President Obama’s term draws to a close in 2017. So how did the two leaders do?

Even before the dust has settled, pundits in Washington are on overdrive to provide various assessments about the results from the most recent summit. A broad survey of these analyses reveals at least two contrasting takes. One paints a rather bright picture by emphasizing new areas of cooperation, and highlighting the unity among two countries on policy matters related to North Korea and China. The less favorable assessments lament the lack of creativity or major deliverables with regards to the common regional security challenges. In particular, this view traces a rather frustrating tone about the lack of concrete action plan while recognizing the difficulty in finding novel solutions to age old problems (e.g. North Korea, Korea-Japan relations, and China).
The general public, however, appears less fragmented. In the most recent public opinion poll conducted by the Chicago Council leading up to the summit, an overwhelming percentage (83%) of Americans consider relations between the US and South Korea to be important. While more than half (55%) of those surveyed cite North Korea’s nuclear program as a critical threat, 70% or more prefer using diplomacy and/or sanctions to manage this problem. In the event that the US Forces in Korea (USFK) is called upon to deal with an invasion by North Korea, an all-time high 47% of the American public stated that they would support the use of US military capability.

All seems well with the alliance in Washington. But how does it fare from this side of the Pacific? This paper seeks to provide an assessment of the substantive results from the most recent US-ROK summit buttressed by our analysis of media coverage as well as the most recent Korean public opinion following the summit.

The Substance

Overall, the three summits have produced several documents, most notably the 2013 Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance which lays out a broad statement about the state of the alliance outlining areas of cooperation between the US and South Korea on issues such as extended deterrence, North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threat, Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), climate change, energy, human rights, overseas developmental assistance (ODA), counter-terrorism, nuclear safety and non-proliferation, cybersecurity, and counter-piracy. The two joint statements on global climate change (2013) and North Korea (2015) emphasize the priority that the two leaders have placed on these issues. Finally, the three fact sheets from each summit highlight the various areas of cooperation, including wartime operational control (OPCON), military-to-military cooperation, FTA, partnerships in science and technology, cooperation in Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan, people-to-people ties, climate change, ODA, cyber, health, and space.

Analysis of the transcripts from the three joint press conferences by the two leaders reveals interesting patterns about the focal point of interest (Figure 1). Not surprisingly, there is strong resilience and sustained concentration on key issues, such as North Korea, nuclear security, alliance, and China. At times, however, other issues might require more discussion, such as Russia in 2014. This was largely due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 which preceded President Obama’s visit to Seoul in April 2014.
In general, however, criticisms about the lack of new initiatives by the two countries should be less than surprising given how little movement there has been on these issues of mutual interest.

Korean media coverage also suggests that reporting about the summit were generally positive or neutral. This is not to suggest that there were no negative reporting. In fact, much of the negative press coverage were focused on the Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo’s inability to secure export license rights for crucial technology deployed in the F-35 for application in the KF-X development program also referred to as the “Boaramae Project.” Much of the criticism stems from the fact that one of the conditions for the decision to allocate $6.4 billion for purchasing 40 units of F-35s from Lockheed Martin was the understanding that the Ministry of Defense will be able to secure...
key jet fighter technologies. It is not entirely clear what the basis for this understanding was but this was always going to be a difficult proposition for the US. Some papers also criticized the summit for not producing a path forward for the North Korean nuclear and security dilemma. It is also interesting to note that the major media outlets, including *Chosun Ilbo*, *Joongang Ilbo*, *DongA Ilbo* as well as *Hangyoreh* did not provide any positive coverage about the summit. Much of their reporting was either value neutral or negative with *Hangyoreh* and *Kyunghyang Shinmun* making up about 43% of all negative articles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Korean Media Coverage of the Summit (October 16-20, 2015)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Public View**

In terms of substance, there appears to be little daylight in the ROK-US alliance following the most recent summit. Barring minor diplomatic gaffes (e.g. KF-X), the re-
lations between the two countries appear robust with sustained focus on key issues of mutual interest. But what does the most recent summit look like in the eyes of the Korean public? To answer this question, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies conducted a survey about the summit during October 19–20, 2015. We explore the results of this analysis below.

From the public’s point of view, the most recent summit was a success with over 55 percent of all Koreans expressing their approval of the meeting between Presidents Park and Obama. Not surprisingly, the overall favorability ratings for the United States and President Obama are running high. While the favorability ratings for China and President Xi Jinping have also been rising steadily, the respective scores for the two leaders are greater than two standard deviations from each other (See Figure 2).

The percentage of people who characterize the Korea-US relationship as being cooperative is about 84 percent, but the most notable change is a recent sharp uptick in the number of people who see relations between Korea and China to be cooperative following President Park’s visit to Beijing in September (Figure 3).
However, we do not expect to see a sustained rise in the level of positive sentiments about Korea-China relations for two reasons. One is that the public is quite supportive of the Park administration’s balanced approach to its foreign policy with respect to the US and China, which necessarily implies some ceiling on public tolerance for strength-
ened relations with China. This is more the case in 2015 than 2014. When we look into the source of this increase in support for a balancing approach to relations with China and the US, we notice a visible increase in bias among the 50s and older by about 17-21 percent (Figure 4).

Second is that the percentage of those surveyed expressing the need for strengthening cooperation with China has consistently been half that of those individuals who support greater cooperation with the United States (Figure 5). The significant finding here is that these trends are apparent in the wake of President Park’s recent visits to Beijing and Washington.

With regards to regional security, an overwhelming majority agree that it should be based on the Korea-US-Japan trilateral cooperation (58.7%) rather than the Korea-China bilateral framework (32.5%). Both figures are an increase from March 2014 (Figure 6).
This is less than surprising given that the majority (52%) supports the Obama administration’s the Asia Re-balance and also views the necessity of the US-ROK alliance (95%) even after reunification (82%). Part of this trend may be motivated by the perception that China is seen more as a future economic and/or security threat to South Korea.

Figure 6. Framework for Security Cooperation\(^\text{15}\) (%)

![Figure 6: Framework for Security Cooperation](image)

Figure 7. Perceptions about Future Threat to South Korea\(^\text{16}\) (%)

![Figure 7: Perceptions about Future Threat to South Korea](image)
Korea than any other countries in the region. It is also worth noting that this is also more likely to be the case among under-50 year olds by a factor of about 22%.

**Potential Areas of Improvement**

The survey results also indicate some potential areas of improvement. Taking a look at the present and future threat perception, Japan looms large as a continuing source of worry for the South Korean public (Figures 7 and 8). The threat perception has actually increased from last year and this may correspond to the recent passage of new legislation in Japan enabling the military to pursue collective self-defense. Whatever may be driving these patterns, an increase in the Korean public’s perception about the Japanese threat will remain as a significant obstacle for US foreign policy and security posture in the region given the centrality of its alliances with both South Korea and Japan.

![Figure 8. Perceptions about Present Threat to South Korea (%)](image)

An interesting within-sample variation is the threat perception among different age groups. Comparison of the difference in the perceived future versus present threat suggests that individuals aged 50 and older tend to view Japan as more of a future (rather than present) threat by a factor of 9.3% while those 40 and under tend to see Japan as more of a present (than future) threat by a factor of 3.3%.
On the issue of North Korea’s nuclear problem, the plurality of those surveyed sees China as a major obstacle but an increasing number of people also see the US as a contributing factor. As we can see from Figure 9, the percentage of individuals identifying the US as an obstacle to solving the North Korean problem has increased from about 16% to 21% over the past year. While the recent Joint Statement on North Korea may have addressed some of these concerns, the fact that there has not been any significant progress on this issue suggests that the two countries must find some way to break through the impasse on the talks or get the Kim Jong-un regime to change its calculus on this issue.

![Figure 9. Main Obstacle to Solving North Korea’s Nuclear Problem](image)

Although expert opinion is that the recent summit will not lead to major changes in North Korea’s behavior, there is hope among the public at least that there may be an improvement in inter-Korean relations (Figure 10).\(^{19}\)
Finally, there is also strong public support for South Korea’s membership in the TPP for the time being (Figure 11). Given that South Korea has yet to finish its bilateral consultations with the inaugural members and the agreement has yet to be ratified in the respective member countries, this issue will remain as something that requires continuing dialogue in the future.

**Conclusion**

In general, the recent Obama-Park summit can be summarized as a glass half-full or half-empty in the sense that there were notable accomplishments but no important
milestones. On the one hand, the overall mood and state of the alliance are as strong as ever. The two leaders have cultivated good relations and deepened the level of cooperation among the two countries. From this standpoint, the most recent summit can be deemed a success. However, the two countries must not lose sight of the difficult challenges that remain as the backdrop of this alliance – namely the North Korean nuclear program, Korea-Japan relations, and an emboldened China. The difficulty here is that these problems are deeply rooted in the structural foundation of the region. Undoing this Gordian knot will not be easy. This explains the lack of major breakthroughs.

For the time being, the approach that both leaders seem to favor is one that seeks to sharpen the message to China that friendly engagement, while favored, must occur within the broader context of acceptable international norms and laws. With respect to North Korea, the joint statement is unequivocal: both the US and ROK are ready to support and assist North Korea’s economic development under the condition that North Korea must demonstrate a genuine willingness to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. On Japan, the US would like Japan and South Korea to find a way forward. While it is unclear what this “way” may be, one thing is certain: Prime Minister Abe’s last statement on this matter has been less than satisfactory from South Korea’s point of view. The crux of the problem lies less in what South Korea will require in order to be made whole on this issue than in the political willingness and courage of the leaders to take the necessary steps to begin the next chapter in their history. Finally, as the two leaders have shown, the inability to make significant progress on these age old problems does not mean that there are no areas of measurable achievements moving forward. Both countries seek to continue deepening involvement in those areas of converging interests while looking for the opportune moment to move ahead on more challenging policy problems.
Survey Methodology

Asan Poll

Sample size: 1,000 respondents over the age of 19
Margin of error: ±3.1% at the 95% confidence level
Survey method: RDD for mobile and landline telephones
Period: See report for specific dates of surveys cited
Organization: Research & Research
Appendix

Media Content Analysis

Methodology

All major print media reports and articles on the ROK-US summit were collected during October 16-20, 2015. While we could have surveyed and collected more articles after October 20th, our analysis indicate that much of this data would have a strong bias towards more negative reporting. Clearly, as the time horizon gets further away from the summit, we see a strong negative bias in the data that we show below.

Our scoring or valuation of these articles depend largely on at least two readings of the same article with a third reading by a second reader if it was not clear whether article can be categorized as negative, positive, or neutral. The article was categorized as positive if the writing provided an overtly favorable interpretation of the summit or included quotes from individuals that only supported favorable interpretation of the summit. Word choice that hinted positive interpretation, such as “success” or “gain,” was also determined to be a positive reporting. Neutral reporting used quotes from official government statements or simple reporting of the facts without any interpretation. For instance, if the summit was determined to be a success according to the Blue House Press Secretary with the usage of quotes from the Blue House or Ministry of Foreign Affairs without any value bias in the choice of words or presentation of an opinion, we categorized it as neutral. Articles that used quotes which do not suggest a bias towards either the positive or negative interpretation of the summit was also determined to be neutral. Negative reporting depended on usage of both words and quotes as well as opinion editorials. We list below the articles by outlets and titles as we have categorized them in chronological order.
Positive

15.10.16  ‘한미 제조업 신 르네상스’ 박 대통령 제안 주목한다  
Seoul Kyungje
15.10.19  <연합시론> 북핵 해결 새 흐름 형성, 남북 관계에 달려있다  
Yonhap News
15.10.19  북핵 해법 TPP 가입 교감 넓혔다 차 대통령의 방미  
Maeil Business News Korea
15.10.19  기대 이상의 성과를 낸 박 대통령의 방미외교  
Asia Today
15.10.19  중국정사론 불식시킨 박 대통령 방미  
Seoul Shinmnun
15.10.19  박 대통령 귀국…주변국 북핵 공조 성과  
KBS
15.10.19  박 대통령 귀국…‘북핵 공론화’ 성공  
MBN
15.10.19  북핵·통일·한·미·중 협력의 틀 냉다  
Kookmin Ilbo
15.10.19  미·중 사이 균형서 주도로 공간 넓힌 박근혜·新외교  
Seoul Shinmmun
15.10.19  오바마 “한·中 좋은 관계, 올해 완화 노력한다”  
Seoul Shinmmun
15.10.19  “미국의 북핵문제 별도 성명 이례적 비핵화 프로세스 유인책 없어 한계”  
Segye Ilbo
15.10.19  중국 정상론 불식…북, 동북아 조정역 발휘할 호기  
Asia Today
15.10.19  오바마 “한·중 강력한 관계 원해”  
Maeil Business News Korea
15.10.19  中·러 방어 장비의 보급 사각지대  
Segye Ilbo
15.10.19  한국 TPP 참여 토대 마련  
Aju Business Daily
15.10.19  中 정상론 불식…북 비핵화 재확인…한·미 동맹의 ‘진화’  
Aju Business Daily

Neutral

15.10.19  中·러 사이에서 선택 강요당하는 상황 대비해야 한다  
Chosun Ilbo
15.10.19  “중국에 할 말 하라”는 중지적, ‘박근혜 외교’ 중간평가다  
DongA Ilbo
15.10.19  한미 정상회담 남은 과제, 박근혜-아베 회담으로 넘어가  
The Korea Economic Daily
15.10.19  북한 변화 이끌어낸 ‘3각 대화’ 강화해야  
Seoul Shinmmun
15.10.19  progress 가야 할 한·미 동맹에 몰입 훨 없어야  
Segye Ilbo
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<td>한미정상, 한반도 통일 주요 의제…“구체적 준비” 공감</td>
<td>Yonhap News</td>
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<td>오바마 ‘아시아 재균형’ 정상외교 마무리…“한국이 중심적 역할”</td>
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<td>15.10.19</td>
<td>농 대통령·오바마, 백악관 나란히 산책하며 ‘우의’ 다져</td>
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한반도 미래에 대해서도 깊이 논의 “비핵화 진정성있으면 북한과 대화”
비핵화 진정성있으면 북한과 대화 사이버·우주·기후변화 분야도 협력 연내 ‘고위급 경제 협의회’ 개최기로
“한·미 공통성은 북한 억지 중과 연합 의지”
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여러분이 진정한 영웅입니다

NASA가 궁금했던 朴대통령 깨알 질문

윤병세는 소나무 선물
박 대통령, 흥남철수 주역 루니 제 독에게 “진정한 영웅”

“영원한친구” …한·미동맹 9차례 언급

“한미동맹이 亞재균형정책 핵심축” 흥남철수 항해사에 “True hero”

“우주협력을 동맹의 뉴프런티어로”

싸 영빈관에 朴 대통령 사진 전시
케리 “한국인과 함께하면 좋은일 생겨”

美, 국빈영빈관에 朴대통령 액자사진 전시

朴 “한·미동맹은 미국의 亞·太 재균형 정책 핵심축”

케리·헤이글 등 화 외교안보 총출동 흥남철수 이끈 장군의 손자 등 소개

朴 대통령 “한국도 무인 달탐사 나설것”

朴 “한미 동맹, 아태 재균형 정책의 중심축”

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싸 “한미 우정은 어떤 바람에도 안 혼들릴 것”

싸 “한·미 동맹 뿌리는 전고”…美 고위직 총출동 환영

“한미동맹, imeo·太 재균형 정책의 촉”

50년전 부모처럼 NASA 간 朴대통령 “한·미, 우주도 손잡자”

NASA 찾은 싸, 달 탐사 등 계약 길문 쏟아내 케리 “양국, 어느때나 늘 서로의 편이 돼 왔다”

우주산업 개발 의지 강조… 달탐사 함께 하자

한·미 우정, 혼들림 없을 것

한국전 기념비·나사 찾아 안보·경제 ‘한·미 동맹’ 행보
Park reaffirms US is Korea’s best ally
Prominent U.S. figures flock to Park’s dinner
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1. The authors wish to thank Scott Snyder, Nicholas Eberstadt, Choi Kang, Peter Beck, and Robert Manning for their comments and feedbacks on earlier versions of this paper. Standard caveats apply.


9. Note that we are not suggesting here that the substance of these meetings can be summed up with the frequency of topic or issues that are highlighted in these press conferences. But these data points do provide some comparative reference points for determining which issues received more or less attention across each meeting.

10. See Appendix I for data and methodology.


19. It is not clear that the recent ROK-US summit had any role in contributing to a positive outlook on inter-Korean relations. We base this conclusion on a comparison with another survey that the Asan Institute for Policy Studies conducted during September 9-11, 2015. In this survey, we asked the respondents to state whether they thought inter-Korean relations would improve, get worse, or not change. 45.8 percent of the respondents agreed that they expected the relations to improve. 35.7 percent were pessimistic and 9.6 percent did not think that there would be major changes. Given that the figure for a favorable outlook is comparable to the 47.8% that we observed immediately after the summit, we can conclude with reasonable certainty that the
summit has had little to no impact on the overall outlook about relations with North Korea.


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