Table of Contents

4 About the Asan Institute

5 About the Asan Plenum

The Program

Day 1: Monday, June 13, 2011

6 Opening Ceremony
   • Opening Remarks
   • Welcoming Remarks
   • Keynote Speech

12 Plenary Session 1
   • A World Free Of Nuclear Weapons:
     A Bold Dream v. A Reality in the Making

14 Session 1
   • Nuclear and Missile Commerce: The Cases of Iran,
     Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria
   • Safety of Nuclear Facilities on the Korean Peninsula
   • Reprocessing and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
   • Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Japan

22 Session 2
   • Japan’s Nuclear Program after Fukushima
   • Nuclear Weapons States v. Non-Nuclear Weapons States
   • Intersection between Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security
   • Missile Defense

30 Opening Dinner

Day 2: Tuesday, June 14, 2011

36 Session 3
   • Spent Nuclear Fuel Issues in Korea
   • Fissile Material
   • NATO and Extended Deterrence

42 Session 4
   • The Six Party Talks as Viable Mechanism for Denuclearization
   • Japan’s Nuclear Disaster and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
   • Europe’s Response to Fukushima
   • China’s Nuclear Weapons

50 Session 5
   • Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
   • Disarmament
   • Nuclear Deterrence and Conventional Deterrence
   • Nuclear Programs: Iran and Pakistan

58 Networking Lunch

62 Session 6
   • Japan’s Nuclear Crisis
   • Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Korea
   • Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
   • Europe and Nuclear Security

70 Session 7
   • Prospects for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit
   • New START II
   • Treaty of Tlatelolco: Evaluating the Establishment
     and the Efficacy of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
   • Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament

78 Session 8
   • Evaluating the 2010 NPT Review Conference
   • Russia’s Nuclear Energy
   • Nuclear Safeguards System

84 Dinner

88 Plenary Session 2
   • Crisis Management on the Korea Peninsula

Day 3: Wednesday, June 15, 2011

92 Session 9
   • North Korea’s Nuclear Program
   • U.S. Nuclear Posture Review
   • New START I

98 Plenary Session 3
   • Nuclear Energy and Our Green Future

100 Closing Ceremony

104 Reception at the Institute

108 Participants

116 Asan Plenum Young Experts

118 Asan People

120 Comments
About the Asan Institute

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies is an independent, non-partisan think tank with the mission to undertake policy-relevant research to foster a domestic, regional, and international environment conducive to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and Korean reunification.

The Institute was founded by Dr. Chung Mong Joon, a six-term member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, chairman of the board of trustees of Ulsan University, and Chairman of the Asan Foundation, the largest philanthropic organization in Korea. The Institute is named after Dr. Chung’s late father, “Asan” Chung Ju-Yung, a global entrepreneur who founded the Hyundai Group and dedicated his life to Korea’s prosperity and welfare, as well as the nation’s peace and reunification.

The Institute focuses on three major areas of research, “foreign affairs and national security,” “governance,” and “philosophy & public policy.”

About the Asan Plenum

The Asan Plenum is a yearly gathering of the world’s leading think tanks in Seoul, Korea to discuss the challenges facing the world. The Plenum is a multi-day, multi-session conference with each panel organized by a global think tank. This division of labor capitalizes on the differing areas of expertise of each think tank, as well as ensuring diversity of opinion and perspective so as to bring together as wide and as deep a knowledge-base as possible. The Asan Plenum thereby aims to impact the policy making process enabling the global community to better address the challenges it faces.

About the Asan Plenum 2011

Asan Plenum 2011: “Our Nuclear Future,” brought together 350 leading nuclear scientists, engineers, policy experts, and public intellectuals from around the world for a 3-day meeting. The Plenum focused on five major themes — nonproliferation, disarmament, peaceful use, nuclear security, and deterrence. With South Korea set to host the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012, and with the Fukushima nuclear crisis in neighboring Japan as well as North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons providing the immediate backdrop, the Plenum initiated a much needed comprehensive reassessment of myriad issues which have crucial implications for our nuclear future.
Opening Ceremony

**Date**  Monday, June 13, 2011

**Time**  13:30~14:00

**Place**  Grand Ballroom
We are living in a world where the ability to understand, communicate, and sympathize with people who belong to different cultures is becoming just as critical as expert analysis of particular issues.

Welcoming Remarks by Lee In-ho, Chairperson of the Asan Institute

By providing a format to connect those insights, we hope to come up with some real solutions to some of the most intractable and difficult issues that confront us and that will deeply affect our nuclear future.

Opening Remarks by Hahm Chaibong, President of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies

On the Korean Peninsula, there are two very different countries: the Republic of Korea, a model country in its peaceful use of nuclear energy and an active participant in international nonproliferation efforts; and the DPRK, which undermines the very basis of the NPT regime by developing nuclear weapons. I believe this stark contrast clearly illuminates the direction in which we need to be heading in ‘Our Nuclear Future’.

Keynote Speech by Kim Sung-Hwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
The opening plenary session focused on the goal of global nuclear disarmament and brought it into relief against the backdrop of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula poses a unique challenge to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, which hopes to derive much-needed strength from the disarmament vision. Discussants took note of the crucial role that South Korea has to play in shaping the future nuclear landscape, observing the country’s role as host to the 2010 G-20 Summit and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, as well as its growing importance in the global economy and in the nuclear industry specifically. Moreover, the goal of global nuclear disarmament, while embraced and officially supported by South Korea, faces one of its most acute challenges in the “grim reality” presented by a divided Korean Peninsula with a nuclear-armed North.

-Mark Jansson, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Nuclear and Missile Commerce: The Cases of Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria

Moderator: Leonard Spector, Monterey Institute
Panelists: Jeffrey Lewis, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute
Joshua Pollack, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

Examining an issue straight from the headlines, the panel took an in-depth look at trafficking and commerce in nuclear and ballistic missile technologies. It focused on a number of countries that operate outside the bounds of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), operate in violation of the NPT, or act in ways that are inconsistent with the NPT. These states have capitalized on outside assistance to advance their programs in addition to their history of collaboration amongst themselves. Despite some successes in blocking dual-use items, export controls have not kept pace with the tactics of traffickers, and it was predicted that further constraints on shipping, the expansion of UN Security Council designations, and other strategies would likely be employed in the future.

-Melissa Hanham, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
-Brian Rose, U.S. Institute of Peace
Safety of Nuclear Facilities on the Korean Peninsula

Moderator: Chang Soon Heung, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
Panelists: Baek Won Pil, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI)
Fujie Yoichi, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Kang Ki-Sig, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Lee Jong In, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS)

The goal of nuclear safety is to protect individuals, society, and the environment from the potential dangers of nuclear facilities. There are two levels of safety: a minimum required level and a desirable safety level. South Korea has satisfied the minimum required level, but further improvement is necessary to achieve the desired safety level. Areas of improvement that can further enhance nuclear-facility safety are advanced reactors with high levels of safety standards, design basis revision for natural and man-made hazards, and greater understanding of cooling mechanisms. It was argued that although Korea currently has a relatively good operating history, this does not ensure the future safety of a nuclear facility. Emphasis was placed on the need to review off-site emergency management alongside better communication between stakeholders and command chains.

-Lee Jeong Ik, Khalifa University
Reprocessing and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Moderator: Sharon Squassoni, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Panelists: Alan Hanson, Stanford University
Andrew Orrell, Sandia National Laboratory
Charles McCombie, Association for Regional International Underground Storage (Arius)
Juhani Vira, Posiva Oy

Decisions to reprocess spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and/or directly dispose of SNF from once-through fuel cycles require states to confront oft-mischaracterized tradeoffs between hard and soft factors related to proliferation risk, repository performance, economics, safety, energy security, and resource sustainability over the short and long term. Though reprocessing may simplify waste management, improve repository performance, and increase stakeholder acceptance, reprocessing does not obviate the need to site a long-term disposal facility. Given the cost premium and scaling issues with typical reprocessing technologies, the why, how, when, and where of closing the fuel cycle will likely require a confluence of rationales that will be state specific and context dependent. As a case in point, resource-poor states with large nuclear programs may be more willing to accept the cost premium of reprocessing in exchange for the energy-security benefits of utilizing plutonium in SNF.

-Lance Kim, UC Berkeley
Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Japan

Moderator: Andrew Oros, Washington College
Panelists: Martin Fackler, The New York Times
Takahashi Sugio, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS)
Victoria Tuke, University of Warwick

The concept of extended nuclear deterrence is being challenged in the current era of nuclear arms reduction, constrained defense budgets, and steps toward a nuclear-free world. This session focused on issues of deterrent capability and credibility related to Japan’s evolving security and defense posture in response to the rise of China and the changing security environment in Northeast Asia. Japan’s perception of extended deterrence continues to rely on the United States. The United States has repeatedly stated its defense commitments to Japan after the occurrences of security incidents in the region, reconfirming its commitment to Japan and the region. There remains an important aspect of assurance for further alliance consultation and regional confidence-building measures with respect to nuclear and non-nuclear threat perception and deterrence effectiveness.

-Daniel Gearin, Center for a New American Security
-Gordon Wyn Jones, King’s College, London
Japan’s Nuclear Program after Fukushima

Moderator: Ahn Chak-hee, jTBC
Panelists: Iwata Shuichi, University of Tokyo
Furukawa Katsuhisa, Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX)
Hwang Il Soon, Seoul National University
Suzuki Tatsujiro, Japan Atomic Energy Commission

The aftermath of the Fukushima disaster presented several lessons learned by Japan, such as the fact that manuals created for emergency situations were not sufficient for real-case scenarios. Particularly, emergency manuals were based on the premise that emergency diesel engines would continue to provide power after reactors shut down. To avoid repeating such unfortunate events, risk assessment must be rethought.

International cooperation is vital to the prevention of a catastrophe of such magnitude, and Japan should take a leading role in creating such a mechanism. A major shift has taken place in Japan’s energy security strategy, which includes expanding its nuclear energy dependency, enhancing the safety standards of the present nuclear power plants, and increasing renewable energy power usage and efficiency overall.

-Yuma Kuwata, Keio University
Nuclear Weapons States v. Non-Nuclear Weapons States

Moderator: Lee Jung Hoon, Yonsei University
Panelists: Etel Solingen, University of California, Irvine
Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)
James Walsh, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Nuclear weapons exhibit a significant amount of attractiveness as instruments for regime survival. The pitting of states with nuclear weapons versus states without nuclear weapons is in some ways a misnomer, for only a select group of states without nuclear weapons—those with inward-looking economic tendencies—are likely to pursue nuclear weapons. The points of greatest contention between non-nuclear and nuclear-weapons states, such as the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, were in fact a divergence from the original intent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The peaceful use of nuclear energy is not an inalienable right, but rather conditional to the state’s nonproliferation commitments. The debates that continue to keep the NPT in deadlock should be redefined to focus on what states could agree on, while continuing to build institutions and norms.

-Melissa Hanham, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
-Wilfred Wan, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Intersection between Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security

Based on the primary perception that security is bounded by a state, focus tends to be placed on safety issues, especially after significant disasters, including Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. However, it was deemed futile to test nuclear safety without addressing nuclear security. Therefore, efforts to facilitate interactions between governments on a national and international level are needed, alongside nuclear-energy companies that operate in multiple states. Nuclear safety and nuclear security can oftentimes be in opposition due to differing objectives in cases of nuclear emergency. In accident-related emergencies, respondents are tasked with saving lives, while man-made emergencies call for law enforcement to preserve the scene for forensic evidence. Increasing training activities would allow each field to gain awareness of the unique challenges faced during any nuclear crisis, be it accidental or man-made.

—Dawn Verdugo, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
—Mwita Chacha, Center for International Trade and Security
Presumptions exist regarding the close connection between missile defense and the delivery of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. There are, however, several methods to deliver a nuclear weapon without a ballistic missile. Some have argued that missile defense has little applicability for South Korea due to the primary threat of short-range rockets with the capability of reaching Seoul. While short-range missile defense systems such as PAC-3 and AEGIS could provide some defense, they cannot be considered a panacea. An invasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is deemed unlikely, but as the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents have demonstrated, the DPRK continues to commit provocations without fear of retaliation. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) could reinforce this by incentivizing tolerance of such attacks among South Koreans. By moving away from BMD towards a mutual vulnerability posture, the Republic of Korea would be able to focus on its ability to retaliate and deter attacks on its territory.

- Crispin Rovere, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre
- Christopher Jones, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Opening Dinner

Date: Monday, June 13, 2011
Time: 18:30~21:30
Place: Crystal Ballroom, Lotte Hotel

All the challenges posed by our nuclear future seem to come to a head around the Korean peninsula, and we now have an unprecedented opportunity to find a collective solution.

Welcoming Remarks by Dr. Chung Mong Joon, Honorary Chairman of the Asan Institute
Artists

ARIRANG
Soul of Korea

Performances

Opening Dinner

Dr. Chung Mong Joon, B.B. Bell
OUR FUTURE
Spent Nuclear Fuel Issues in Korea

Even though other countries have given up on nuclear energy, this proves to be impractical in Korea’s case. Nuclear energy in Korea is inevitable for maintaining a sustainable and secure energy supply. Thus, without a practical solution for spent fuel in Korea, a sustainable nuclear energy solution will be impossible to attain. Korea is moving towards a role as a world leader in nuclear technology due to its increasing establishment of domestic nuclear reactors and technology exports to other countries. In this sense, Korea must take responsibility for spent-fuel issues. Historically, dealing with the spent-fuel issue involved multinational participation based on increased potential transparency in relation to the number of countries involved. The United States has not shown support for reprocessing technology and subsequently pyro-processing. However, with expansion in its nuclear fleet, Korea must face this growing domestic problem of spent fuel.

-Jeong Ik Lee, Khalifa University
Fissile Material

Moderator: William Tobey, Belfer Center, Harvard University
Panelists: John Carlson, Lowy Institute
       Chaim Braun, Stanford University
       Tom LaTourrette, The RAND Corporation

Plutonium proves to be a necessary source for future energy security, but it is also a potential danger as a fuel for nuclear weapons. Thus, the careful management of plutonium production is of prime importance. It can be accomplished through close coordination and cooperation on an international level. Two fields exist: technology and international cooperation. As for the technology field, there is increasing concern over a fast reactor system that has the capability to burn uranium and plutonium. However, this process of manufacturing a fast reactor fuel requires several steps, leading to the risk of proliferation. Therefore, it is necessary to have an advanced methodology for safely handling plutonium and collaboration for the maintenance of security and safety. The international enrichment center has the ability to lead such advanced technology as well as clear management of enrichment facilities. It has been argued that policy and management regulation should more closely follow the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

-Seung Min Woo, KAIST
Throughout NATO’s history, the U.S. nuclear deterrent has represented a strategic guarantee to European NATO allies against a Soviet threat. Tensions ebbed and flowed with the threat level, reaching a high point with the decision to deploy INF missiles in Europe in response to the Soviet Union placing similar missiles targeting Europe. A turning point occurred when President Reagan and President Gorbachev agreed to the INF Treaty in 1987, eliminating U.S. and Soviet INF missiles. This ushered in a period in which NATO allies began to consider the relevance of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War world. Although many activists see the role of deterrence as eliminated in the post-Cold War era, allies have different strategic cultures that influence their willingness to eliminate nuclear weapons. The NATO experience proves that the size and unity of an alliance adds to deterrence but also makes decisions more difficult.

- Jason Portner, Northeastern University
The Six-Party Talks as a Viable Mechanism for Denuclearization

Moderator: Bruce Klingner, The Heritage Foundation
Panelists: Burwell B. Bell, Former Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK
          Larry M. Wortzel, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
          Sue Mi Terry, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)

While the vision of the Six-Party Talks is admirable, they are not considered viable for achieving denuclearization. Since inception, they have been hampered by three broad, fundamental flaws. First, North Korea has been disingenuous throughout the process; second, the other five parties have divergent objectives; and third, there have been instances of insincerity on all sides. Based on these flaws, no mutual agreement has existed on process, objectives, or outcomes. The Obama administration must at least tactically demonstrate that dialogue is possible with North Korea. Talking to North Korea should be part of the policy approach to denuclearization, and the Six-Party Talks are the “least bad” option amongst others with worse potential outcomes. Dialogue with North Korea is just one tool of national power, but it must be implemented with instruments of national power, including tougher sanctions, better military cooperation with allies, and a missile defense system for South Korea and Japan.

-Nicholas Hamisevic, Korea Economic Institute
-Amy Greer Meisels, Harvard University
Session 4

Japan’s Nuclear Disaster and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Moderator: Patrick Cronin, Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Panelists: Chaim Braun, Stanford University
Zachary Hosford, Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Kotani Tetsuo, The Okazaki Institute
Yamaguchi Noboru, National Defense Academy of Japan

In the wake of Japan’s triple disaster, this panel session addressed the impact of the nuclear disaster on the U.S.-Japan alliance, including a breadth of issues intersected by the recent nuclear crisis, such as nuclear safety and crisis response, energy strategy, and economic and political implications. Emphasis was placed on the U.S. crisis support and three aspects of the “Operation Tomodachi” coordinated military response: the rapid deployment of sea- and land-based forces, the importance and significant impact of U.S. military assistance, and the overall effectiveness of Japan-U.S. coordination. The actions and the impact of “Operation Tomodachi” for the U.S.-Japan alliance were observed, highlighting the positive implications of alliance visibility and contribution in terms of rapid response and positive public awareness.

-Gordon Wyn Jones, King’s College, London
Europe's Response to Fukushima

Moderator: Dominique Grenêche, Nuclear Consulting
Panelists: Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Pacific Regional Institute Frankfurt/M (PRIF)
Barthélémy Courmont, Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS)

Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, France, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic defended respective civilian nuclear programs by stating that safety lessons should be learned from Fukushima. In contrast, Germany made the decision to immediately shut down eight of its plants and phase out nuclear power by 2022. If Germany’s transition is successful, it will serve as a good example for other European nations and other regions of the world, showing that it is possible to renounce nuclear energy without major economic costs. The European Union reached a technical consensus regarding the safety of power plants, but reaching a similar consensus is nearly impossible within the political side of the nuclear energy issue and several differences between countries remain.

- Eduardo Diez, Salvador University & Rotary University
- Tamara Spitzer-Hobeika, Center for Strategic and International Studies
China’s nuclear posture is unique in that it is small and vulnerable, due to the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal consists primarily of land-based, immobile ICBMs. Yet China still embraces a no-first-use policy. This doctrine was deemed to be a result of cultural belief, historical background, and, in particular, Mao’s belief in the utility of China’s nuclear weapons. China has consistently embraced a small nuclear arsenal with very concentrated command and control that has not been integrated into a warfighting doctrine. While analysts increasingly question the credibility of China’s no-first-use pledge, it makes sense for China to continue to adhere to this commitment. China would not need nuclear weapons to defeat conventional attacks from non-nuclear states, and a nuclear response to a conventional attack by the United States would only prompt a U.S. nuclear response.

- Chris Jones, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- He Yun, Tsinghua University
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Moderator: Miles Pomper, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute
Panelists: Trevor Findlay, Carleton University, The Center for International Governance Innovation
Tom LaTourrette, The RAND Corporation
Leonard Spector, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute
Sharon Squassoni, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Panelists reviewed various aspects for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Based on the current nuclear energy expansion and statistics, three main drivers for expansion exist: electricity growth, climate change, and energy security. There is a tendency to strengthen global governance following a crisis; thus the Fukushima accident is an opportunity to improve global governance on safety, such as by creating a mandatory system for safety checks. Emphasis was placed on the importance of international consensus on major rules among core groups to implement both approaches. It was argued that political and social decisions are much more important than technical differences for choosing an appropriate option for spent-fuel management.

-Kenta Horio, University of Tokyo
Disarmament

Moderator: Bruce MacDonald, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
Panelists: Corey Hinderstein, Nuclear Threat Initiative
           Masood Khan, Pakistani Ambassador to China
           Andrew Pierre, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
           John Park, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

This is a time of renewed interest in disarmament, not only due to the situations in North Korea and Iran, but also due to the ratification of the New START Treaty. The panel on disarmament identified and discussed the next steps beyond the New START Treaty and how to move closer to achieving Global Zero. Getting to Global Zero will ultimately require a transformation in the atmosphere of international relations. There are two difficult issues in the arms-control field that will need to be dealt with: theater missile defense in Europe (and how it fits into the next round of arms-control negotiations) and multilateral strategic arms control. The United States and its European allies distinguish theater missile defense as one potential way to counter the growing missile threat from Iran. However, Russians are deeply concerned about any new system deployed in Europe that undermines their own security.

-Sarah Bessell, U.S. Institute of Peace
Nuclear Deterrence and Conventional Deterrence

Moderator: Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Panelists: Elaine Bunn, National Defense University (NDU)
          Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum CSIS
          Clark Murdock, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Broadly revolving around the contemporary division between conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities, the three panelists’ remarks focused on the real and potential effects of both nuclear and conventional prompt global strike capabilities on the ability of the United States to deter threats and assure its allies. Conventional prompt global strike, a concept that remains only in research and development, seeks to develop an arms capability that is able to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in under an hour. It has been argued that strategic assets for extended deterrence must be more broadly defined. In short, the United States must employ a wider array of tools for extended deterrence and assurance than simply military capabilities.

-Chad Peltier, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Nuclear Programs: Iran and Pakistan

Moderator: Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center
Panelists: Emile Hokayem, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Feroz Khan, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
Jeffrey Lewis, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute

Uncertainty exists regarding Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions of reaching a nuclear status. For Pakistan, it has been argued that the calculation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is connected to the country’s dynamics with India. Pakistan’s overall nuclear program has to balance the need for energy with the need for deterrence; however, Pakistan is the only country that pursued nuclear technology for the purpose of building nuclear weapons. Based on these actions, the international community should not make exceptions or pardon countries for building nuclear weapons due to geopolitical concerns. Some believe that the international community made a mistake by allowing Pakistan to build nuclear weapons because of its geopolitical rivalry with India. Excusing countries allows for greater exceptions and leads to more countries developing weapons rather than eliminating them.

- Nicholas Hamisevicz, Korea Economic Institute
Networking Lunch

Date: Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Time: 12:15~15:00
Place: Various restaurants
OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE
Panelists broadly outlined the current situation in Japan, lessons learned from the crisis, and implications for Japan’s nuclear future. It was reported that Japan is still at the stage of cooling down its reactors, and failures exist where the government could have taken preventive measures, in particular to mitigate crisis-management issues. As for the impact the crisis has had on the U.S. nuclear posture, President Obama reiterated the U.S. commitment to nuclear energy and reasserted that U.S. reactors are safe. On the congressional front, legislation was introduced for a nuclear power licensing act, which stipulated high standards when renewing licenses for building new reactors. In the Northeast Asia context, China perceives safety issues without distinguishing them from security issues, while Japan differentiates them as separate concepts. Since mutual reliance is key in preserving nuclear security and safety, there is a need to address these differences between China, Japan, and South Korea.

-Kee Hoon Chung, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Korea

Moderator: Ralph Cossa, Pacific Forum CSIS
Panelists: Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum CSIS
Cheon Seong-Whun, Korea Institute for National Unification

This panel focused on South Korean concerns about extended deterrence and especially on issues regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. There is a growing sense of threat in South Korea after recent North Korean provocations, which leads to general concern about the rise of a “new Cold War structure” in East Asia. There was argument for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil, as well as for the decline in the U.S. extended deterrence commitment since the end of the Cold War. In retrospect, the United States needs to provide reassurance for the Republic of Korea, as the alliance goes back to the early days following the Korean War and North Korea continues to be a security threat.

-Leif-Eric Easley, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty remains an important piece of the legal architecture that provides structure to global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. However, continuing debates about whether or not the treaty’s stringent entry-into-force protocol and extensive verification requirements can be met have led to prolonged debates in some states whose ratification is needed for the treaty to enter into force. Panelists focused primarily on the verification issue, specifically the capacity of the International Monitoring System (IMS) that was developed to provide the data necessary to detect possible violations of the treaty. It was observed that many concerns about potential shortcomings of the IMS’s capacity to detect nuclear explosive tests may be addressed through a variety of other technical means that states are able to employ as well as through “precision monitoring” of particular areas of concern.

-Mark Jansson, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Europe and Nuclear Security

Panelists discussed a wide range of issues, including nuclear terrorism, tactical nuclear weapons, NATO alliance dynamics, and the Fukushima accident. Discussants addressed the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the progress of Spain as a regional leader for implementing accounting and physical protection systems, the rise of the practice of nuclear forensics, and combating nuclear terrorism. For the case of deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, despite the general unity among NATO members, perceptions of challenges to security in Europe vary because of different historical experiences. Thus, it was brought to light that European nuclear security is incomplete without focusing on events that have unfolded over the past six months, including the Fukushima incident in Japan and the Arab Spring and the Stuxnet computer attacks in Iran, which all have security implications for Europeans.

- Kelsey Hartigan, National Security Network
Prospects for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit

Moderator: Jun Bong-Geun, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS)
Panelists: Hahn Choong-hee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea (MOFAT)
Alexandra Toma, Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG)
Yoo Hosik, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC)

Next March, the Republic of Korea (ROK) will host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. The summit is expected to bring together more than fifty world leaders to discuss how their countries can work to improve the global nuclear security regime. The summit will cover several major issues, including the intersection of nuclear safety and security. The recent crisis in Japan may have provoked increasing interest among terrorist groups in attacking civilian nuclear facilities in order to spread havoc and fear. Experts need to identify the common ground between nuclear safety and security. Furthermore, nuclear experts need to communicate clearly with the public regarding nuclear safety, particularly if civilian nuclear power is to continue its renaissance. ROK officials hope that the summit will bring increasing attention to North Korea and the challenges of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

-Ryan Costello, Connect U.S. Fund
Session 7

New START II

Moderator: Paul Hughes, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
Panelists: Leonid Ryabikhin, Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Arms Control
Elbridge Colby, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
Feroz Khan, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

The panel focused on the Russian, American, and Pakistani viewpoints on the New START process and arms control more broadly, as well as its accomplishments, limitations, and future prospects. From a Russian perspective, New START was a great achievement in a “modern era of stagnation” for arms control as a process and a step forward for the U.S.-Russian relationship. Questions exist regarding whether New START actually represented a sharp change from the policies of previous administrations in which New START is distinguished as a reinvigoration of traditional U.S. approaches to nuclear policy by pursuing “practical, modest arms control efforts while maintaining a firm and modern deterrent”. There are reactions to U.S.-Russian bilateral reductions with particular attention to arms-control dynamics between India and Pakistan. A panelist argued that India’s problem is actually two tiered and India must direct a credible deterrent to both Pakistan and China.

-Brian Rose, U.S. Institute of Peace
Treaty of Tlatelolco: Evaluating the Establishment and the Efficacy of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

Moderator: Ricardo Lagorio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Argentina; Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)

Panelists: John Carlson, The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Lowy Institute
Sonia Fernández Moreno, CARI-Caribbean Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CARI-ARN)
Leonardo Sobehart, Nuclear Group, Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)

The adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the first regional nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) treaty in history. Tlatelolco represents a common will to solve disputes by peaceful means and to limit the degree of mutual aggression. The relationship between Argentina and Brazil reinforces Tlatelolco, emphasizing the importance of integration and the significance of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Both countries provided mutual transparency to their nuclear programs and established bilateral safeguards to control and verify their nuclear activities. Tlatelolco was soon followed by similar efforts in the South Pacific (Raratonga), Southeast Asia (Bangkok), Africa (Pelindaba), and Central Asia (Semipalatinsk). These NWFZ treaties, all subscribed to by non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, serve an important purpose by prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons and have an important transparency and confidence-building function that can provide a substantial body of experience to draw on for potential new NWFZ treaties in other regions.

- Tomas Pico, National Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Argentina
Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament

Moderator: Patrick Cronin, Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Panelists: Alexey Fenenko, Institute of International Security Studies (IISS)
Jeffrey Lewis, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute
Lora Saalman, Carnegie Endowment and Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

There has been a consistent position in Russian perception of disarmament and what constitutes “strategic stability”. Russia regards arms control with China as being in the Russian national interest, in consideration of China’s great potential for mobilizing strategic military systems. China regards ballistic missile defense and prompt global strike as major problems, as these systems can undermine the strategic balance. China believes Americans want to lock China into a permanent state of strategic inferiority, in which Russians and Chinese fear that missile defense might serve as a “mopping up” capability in the aftermath of a surprise U.S. first strike.

-Hayoun Jessie Ryou, George Washington University
Evaluating the 2010 NPT Review Conference

Moderator: Sharon Squassoni, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Panelists: Abe Nobuyasu, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
          Hossam Eldeen Aly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
          Scott Davis, U.S. Department of State
          Peter Crail, Arms Control Association (ACA)

The 2010 NPT Review Conference was widely perceived as a success but raised the question of whether this perception was largely due to the dismal failure of the 2005 conference. A consensus document was successfully prepared, and the nuclear disarmament action plan explicitly identified a nuclear-free world as the end goal of disarmament. From another perspective, it can be argued that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) represented a modest success and much work towards the goals of the NPT can be done outside the framework of the NPT. Looking forward to 2015, progress on disarmament, detecting and dealing with non-compliance, and a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East are critical challenges.

-Mark Bell, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Russia’s Nuclear Energy

Moderator: Leonid Ryabikhin, Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Arms Control
Panelists: Mikhail Kobrinskiy, Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE)
Viacheslav Amirov, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
Jonathan George, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

Russia has been a pioneer in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, recent events, such as the accident at Fukushima and the renewed interest in nuclear energy, raise the need to assess the current state of Russia’s nuclear energy sector. A revival in nuclear energy is apparent in Russia, and Russia is now considered to be a pioneer in technological innovation for the production and supply of nuclear energy. Through training of those who manage nuclear and radiological materials, security culture could be improved. This has been the case in Russia, where the government and industry have developed safety mechanisms that address both group and individual perceptions of nuclear safety. One premise of the resetting of relations between the United States and Russia is to enhance cooperation in a variety of policy areas, including global nonproliferation efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism while promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

-Mwita Chacha, Center for International Trade and Security
Nuclear Safeguards System

Moderator: Kim Byung Koo, Konyang University
Panelists: Ahn June Ho, Seoul National University (SNU)
John Carlson, Lowy Institute
Chaim Braun, Stanford University
Min Gyungsik, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC)

The system of nuclear safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency in cooperation with member states has evolved to improve its efficacy and efficiency in response to several global and regional challenges. Independent verification of states’ declarations of nuclear activities was largely based on nuclear-material accountancy with containment and surveillance as complementary measures. After operating for decades with minimal difficulties, several challenges to this quantitative, classical safeguard approach focused on verifying the correctness of a state’s declaration emerged following the discovery of the clandestine Iraqi and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Regional approaches to safeguards provide important benefits by building strong partnerships, improving transparency, and building confidence. The Fukushima accident highlighted the regional and global repercussions of a major accident, possibly opening a window of opportunity and providing the momentum to promote regional cooperation on nuclear issues, possibly resurrecting the ASIATOM concept.

-Lance Kim, University of California, Berkeley
Date: Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Time: 19:40~20:40
Place: The Westin Chosun Hotel
Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula

Moderator: David Sanger, The New York Times
Panelists: Burwell B. Bell, Former Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK
Gary Samore, Special Assistant to the President, WMD
Larry Welch, Former President, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
Hahm Chaibong, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

A nuclear North Korea is unacceptable as it poses a direct threat to allies and the United States, destabilizes Asia, and weakens international treaties and regimes. It is thus necessary to achieve complete denuclearization according to the Six-Party Talks agreements and UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. While the United States believes that the North Korean regime will eventually collapse, it cannot state with high confidence when that will occur. Two possible types of crises are the economic and political collapse of North Korea and North Korean military aggression. It is necessary to have detailed contingency plans in place that coordinate international and South Korean actors. The United States and the Republic of Korea must find a way to deal with North Korean behavior for the foreseeable future while also planning for the difficulties of eventual Korean unification.

-Leif-Eric Easley, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
-John Warden, Center for Strategic and International Studies
North Korea’s Nuclear Program

Moderator: Alan D. Romberg, Stimson Center
Panelists: Kim Sung-han, Korea University
           Liu Ming, Shanghai Academy of Social Science (SASS)
           Yuki Tatsumi, Stimson Center

North Korea is facing a triangular dilemma: concerns about Kim Jong-il’s health, the power succession question, and the need to maintain a military-first policy, especially during a succession scenario. The weakness of the Six-Party Talks is apparent due to their gradualist “salami tactics” approach. Observers have noted that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are more symbolically important than tactically important and are a sign of prestige. Based on North Korea’s situation, China craves stability in North Korea. For Japan, the North Korean nuclear issue represents the most tangible short-term security threat. North Korea only seems to engage with Japan in an effort to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan. In this context, the United States has outlined several goals for the North Korean nuclear issue: preventing proliferation, maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and coordinating closely with allies.

-Greer Meisels, Harvard University
The Obama administration has shown that it is serious about both the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and the need to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. Although the rhetoric has softened, Chinese analysts remain concerned that their country is an implicit target of U.S. nuclear weapons. They also believe that the United States is locked in a Cold War mindset and fears China is becoming the next Soviet Union. In terms of the Russian reaction to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Russian strategic thinkers observe an enduring role for nuclear weapons, which they see as both a key symbol of their superpower status and an important instrument of military power, while many in Russia fear U.S. advantages in missile defenses and precision-strike weapons.

- John Warden, Center for Strategic and International Studies
The New START Treaty demonstrates an evolution of Russian strategic military thinking beyond a posture of mutually assured destruction. This evolution is based on a growing gap between the capabilities of the United States, the NATO countries, and the Russian Federation. During negotiations, Russia discussed this and other important concerns. It was postulated that the new treaty is more symbolic than substantive. In consideration of future arms-control negotiations, there was consensus that near-term negotiations will continue to be bilateral, as multilateral candidates are not yet ready for this discussion. Continued reductions, rather than nuclear abolition, should drive future arms control. The goals of strategic stability and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials should also be important objectives.

-Dawn Verdugo, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
Nuclear Energy and Our Green Future

Moderator: Simon Long, The Economist
Panelists: Abdelmajid Mahjoub, Arab Atomic Energy Agency
Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center
Chang Soon Heung, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
Suzuki Tatsujiro, Japan Atomic Energy Commission

In a post-Fukushima environment, Japan must review regulations and safeguards and implement a new cost assessment of nuclear energy to include environmental costs. The Fukushima accident can serve as a great opportunity to move toward a green future and can provide a goal for Japan to build an eco-friendly area in the earthquake-devastated region. Beyond Japan, Middle Eastern countries have experienced a delay in the development of nuclear energy. The interest in nuclear energy is driven by industrial levels that have led to improvement of living standards but more pollution, water scarcity, high levels of urbanization, health problems, and possible oil depletion. Cost performance and availability of renewable technologies will determine the green future in the Middle East and North Africa.

-Javier Serrat, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
-Jason Portner, Northeastern University
OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE
## Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abe Nobuyasu</td>
<td>Director, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; Director, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabinda Acharya</td>
<td>Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naeem Ahmed</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahn Chak-hee</td>
<td>Deputy General Manager, TBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahn June Ho</td>
<td>Research Professor, Seoul National University (SNU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hossam Eldeen Aly</td>
<td>Counselor, Disarmament and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viacheslav Amirov</td>
<td>Director for Research, Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beak Won Pil</td>
<td>Vice President, Department of Nuclear Safety Research, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Beck</td>
<td>Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations-Hitachi Fellowship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burwell B. Bell</td>
<td>Former Commanding General, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/US Forces, Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Blandford</td>
<td>Postdoctoral Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szymon Bochenksi</td>
<td>Sous Sherpa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bong Youngshik</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bonomo</td>
<td>Senior Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaim Braun</td>
<td>Consulting Professor, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Briza</td>
<td>Sous Sherpa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elaine Bunn</td>
<td>Distinguished Research Fellow, National Defense University (NDU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Carlson</td>
<td>Director, The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Lowy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Soon Heung</td>
<td>Professor, Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAEST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheon Seong-Whun</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alvin Chew</td>
<td>Adjunct Fellow, Center for Non-Traditional Security Studies S. Rajaratnam School of Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cho Sungmin</td>
<td>Kelly Fellow, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorshon Choi</td>
<td>Former Professor, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elbridge Colby</td>
<td>Research Analyst, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Cossa</td>
<td>President, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barthélemy Courmont</td>
<td>Research Fellow, Institute for International and Strategic Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Crail</td>
<td>Nonproliferation Analyst, Arms Control Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Cronin</td>
<td>Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia Program, Center for a New American Security (CNAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Curzon-Price</td>
<td>Professor of Economics, University of Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ola Dahlman</td>
<td>Chair, Verification Group, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress</td>
<td>Research Scientist, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CSS), Monterey Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Davis</td>
<td>Senior Principal Researcher, The RAND Corporation, Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Davis</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Fackler</td>
<td>Chief, Tokyo Bureau, The New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Kuo Wei (Nicholas)</td>
<td>Director, Singapore Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rick Fawn</td>
<td>Senior Lecturer, University of St. Andrews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexey Fenenko</td>
<td>Leading Research Fellow, Institute of International Security Studies (IISS), Russian Academy of Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Feulner</td>
<td>President &amp; CEO, The Heritage Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor Findlay</td>
<td>Professor, Carleton University, Center for International Governance Innovation (CIG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuck Freilich</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furukawa Katsuhisa</td>
<td>Fellow, Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society, Japan Science and Technology Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan D. George</td>
<td>CS-NGO-Strategy and Policy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Gerson</td>
<td>Research Analyst, Strategic Studies Division, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Brad Glosserman  
Executive Director, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Dominique Grenêche  
Manager, Nuclear Consulting (Marcoussis); Consultant, AREVA

Dimo Gyaurov  
Former Director, National Intelligence Service and current National Assemblyman (Bulgaria)

Hahm Chaibong  
President, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Hahn Choong-hee  
Sous-Sherpa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Republic of Korea

Han Sung Joo  
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Professor Emeritus, Korea University

Alan Hanson  
Visiting Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CSIS), Stanford University

Benjamin Hautecouverture  
Research Fellow, Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)

Corey Hinderstein  
Director, Special Projects, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Emile Hakayem  
Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies-Middle East (IISS)

Zachary Hosford  
Research Associate, Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

Athanasios Hristoulas  
Professor, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico

Paul Hughes  
Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

Tarek Hussein  
Professor of Nuclear and High Energy Physics, Cairo University

Hwang Ji Soon  
Seoul National University

Hwang Yongsoo  
Principal Researcher, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Alekssand Iltchev  
Senior Officer, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

Vladimir Ivanov  
Assistant Professor, EastWest Institute Moscow Branch

Iwata Shuichi  
Professor, University of Tokyo

Jang Ji-Hyang  
Research Fellow, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Jun Bong-Geun  
Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS)

Kang Ki-Sig  
Technical Head, Nuclear Power Engineering Section, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Tadahiro Katsuta  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Meiji University

Feroz Khan  
Senior Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

Massoud Khan  
Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Igor Khripunov  
Professor, University of Georgia

Kim Byung Koo  
Visiting Professor, Konyang University

Kim Jiyoon  
Research Fellow, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Kim Sung-han  
Professor & Director, Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University

Kim Sung-Hwan  
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), Republic of Korea

Kim Taewoo  
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)

Bruce Klingner  
Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, The Heritage Foundation

Mikhail Kobrinskiy  
Head, Laboratory, Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE)

Katani Tetsuo  
Special Research Fellow, The Okazaki Institute

Ricardo Lagorio  
Director, Multilateral Environmental Accords, Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)

Ellen Laipson  
President & CEO, Stimson Center

Tom LaTourrette  
Senior Physical Scientist, The RAND Corporation

Jennifer Laurendeau  
Deputy Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs, U.S. State Department

Le Dung Chi  
Deputy Director General, Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety; Sous Sherpa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam

Lee Dong Myung  
Former Prime Minister, Republic of Korea; Chairman, Seoul Forum for International Affairs

Lee In-ho  
Chiefperson, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Lee Jong In  
Senior Advisor, Nuclear Safety, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety

Lee Jung Hoon  
Director, Institute of Modern Korean Studies, Yonsei University

Michael Leikson  
Deputy Provost, Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace-building, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

Jeffrey Lewis  
Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute
Simon Long
Journalist, The Economist

Bruce MacDonald
Senior Director, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

Jennifer Mackby
Adjunct Fellow, International Security Program/Consultant, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Abdelmajid Mahjoub
Director General, Arab Atomic Energy Agency

Charles McCombie
Executive Director, Association for Regional International Underground Storage (Arius)

David McCormack
Senior Technical Advisor, Canadian Delegation to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission

James McGann
Senior Fellow and Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute

James McNally
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Min Gyungsik
Senior Researcher, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC)

Liu Ming
Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS)

Krishna Moorthy
Professor, Pondicherry University

Sonia Fernández Moreno
Senior Consultant and Advisor, CARI-Argentina Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CARI-ARN)

Clark Murdock
Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Nakagome, Yoshihiro
Vice President, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)

David Nazé
Conference Coordinator, Institute for International and Strategic Relations

William Newcomb
Former Senior Economic Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Treasury Department

David Nokes
Former Vice President, National Security and Arms Control, Sandia National Laboratory

James Nolt
Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute

Ivan Oelrich
Vice President, Federation of American Scientists

Christopher Ogden
Assistant Professor, University of St. Andrews

Okamoto Tomohiro
Chief Analyst for Military Affairs, Eurasia 21 Research Institute

Andrew Orrell
Director, Nuclear Energy Programs, Sandia National Laboratory

Ota Masakatsu
Senior/Editorial Writer, Kyodo News

John Park
Senior Research Associate, Northeast Asia, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

Andrew Pierre
Jennings Randolph Fellow, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

Mohanab B. Pillai
Professor, Pondicherry University

Joshua Pollack
Senior Analyst, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

Miles Pomper
Senior Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute

Vicente Garrido Rebolledo
Professor, Institute for International Law and International Relations, King Juan Carlos University, Spain; Director, International Affairs and Foreign Policy Foundation; Senior Advisor, Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Nuclear Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spain

Leonid Ryabikhin
Executive Secretary, Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Arms Control

Alan D. Romberg
Distinguished Fellow and Director, East Asia Program, Stimson Center

Lora Saalman
Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment and Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Gary Samore
Special Assistant to the President and White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism

David Sanger
Journalist, The New York Times

Hans-Joachim Schmidt
Senior Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt/M (PRIF)

Paul Schulte
Nonresident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment

Ken Sheffer
Asian Policy Expert, The Heritage Foundation

Shin Chang-Hoon
Research Fellow, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Norachi Sinhaseni
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand

Walt Slocombe
Senior Counsel, Caplin & Drysdale

Scott Snyder
Director, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, The Asia Foundation, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)

Leonardo Sobehart
Professor, Nuclear Engineering, Balseiro Institute, National University of Cuyo, Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soeya Yoshihide</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Keio University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Sokolski</td>
<td>Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etel Solingen</td>
<td>Chancellor’s Professor, University of California at Irvine; President-elect, International Studies Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard Spector</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharon Squassoni</td>
<td>Director &amp; Senior Fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Stewart-Ingersoll</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, American University of Sharjah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuki Tatsujiro</td>
<td>Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaista Tabassum</td>
<td>Chairperson, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takahashi Sugio</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuki Tatsumi</td>
<td>Senior Associate, Stimson Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sue Mi Terry</td>
<td>National Intelligence Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Tobey</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akira Tokuhare</td>
<td>Professor of Nuclear and Mechanical Engineering, University of Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra Toma</td>
<td>Co-Chairperson, Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), Executive Director, Connect U.S. Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Tuke</td>
<td>Ph.D. Candidate, University of Warwick, Visiting Researcher, Waseda University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jitendra Uttam</td>
<td>Professor, Korean Studies Program, Jawaharlal Nehru University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juhani Vira</td>
<td>Senior Vice President, Posiva Oy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama Kyoichi</td>
<td>Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Walsh</td>
<td>Research Associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Jun</td>
<td>Chinese Head of Delegation, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Junsheng</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Weitz</td>
<td>Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Welch</td>
<td>Former President, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woo Jung-Yeop</td>
<td>Research Fellow, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amy Woolf</td>
<td>Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry M. Wortzel</td>
<td>Commissioner, U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Shahrul Yaakob</td>
<td>Ambassador to the Republic of Austria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Tobey</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akira Tokuhare</td>
<td>Professor of Nuclear and Mechanical Engineering, University of Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra Toma</td>
<td>Co-Chairperson, Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), Executive Director, Connect U.S. Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Tuke</td>
<td>Ph.D. Candidate, University of Warwick, Visiting Researcher, Waseda University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jitendra Uttam</td>
<td>Professor, Korean Studies Program, Jawaharlal Nehru University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juhani Vira</td>
<td>Senior Vice President, Posiva Oy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama Kyoichi</td>
<td>Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Walsh</td>
<td>Research Associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Jun</td>
<td>Chinese Head of Delegation, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Junsheng</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Weitz</td>
<td>Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Welch</td>
<td>Former President, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woo Jung-Yeop</td>
<td>Research Fellow, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amy Woolf</td>
<td>Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry M. Wortzel</td>
<td>Commissioner, U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Shahrul Yaakob</td>
<td>Ambassador to the Republic of Austria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Tobey</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akira Tokuhare</td>
<td>Professor of Nuclear and Mechanical Engineering, University of Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra Toma</td>
<td>Co-Chairperson, Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), Executive Director, Connect U.S. Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Tuke</td>
<td>Ph.D. Candidate, University of Warwick, Visiting Researcher, Waseda University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jitendra Uttam</td>
<td>Professor, Korean Studies Program, Jawaharlal Nehru University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juhani Vira</td>
<td>Senior Vice President, Posiva Oy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakayama Kyoichi</td>
<td>Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Walsh</td>
<td>Research Associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Jun</td>
<td>Chinese Head of Delegation, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Junsheng</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Weitz</td>
<td>Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Welch</td>
<td>Former President, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Jiadong</td>
<td>Associate Prof &amp; Assistant Director, Program on Arms Control and Regional Security, Center for American Studies, Fudan University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Yanbing</td>
<td>Professor, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Quansheng</td>
<td>Professor of International Relations, Director of Center for Asian Studies, American University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi Noboru</td>
<td>Special Advisor to the Cabinet of Japan, Lieutenant General, Japan Ground Self Defense Force (Ret); Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiehlin Yen</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Director, MacArthur Center for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoichi Fujiie</td>
<td>Professor Emeritus, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Nuclear Salon Fujise, Tokyo Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoo Hosik</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuan Jingdong</td>
<td>Associate Professor, Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Zepeda</td>
<td>Director, Human and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role and Affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Bell</td>
<td>Presidential Fellow and Ph.D Candidate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Bessell</td>
<td>Program Assistant, Center for Conflict Management, The U.S. Institute for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwita Chacha</td>
<td>Graduate Research Associate, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chung Kee Hoon</td>
<td>Research Intern, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryan Costello</td>
<td>Fissile Materials Working Group Coordinator, The Connect U.S. Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Diez</td>
<td>Coordinator of Nuclear Committee, Argentine Council for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talitha Dowds</td>
<td>Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leif-Eric Easley</td>
<td>Northeast Asian History Fellow, Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Hamisevicz</td>
<td>Director of Research and Academic Affairs, Korea Economic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melissa Hanham</td>
<td>Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelsey Hartigan</td>
<td>Policy Analyst, National Security Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenta Horio</td>
<td>Ph.D Candidate, Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management, University of Tokyo, Nonproliferation Information Analyst, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Jansson</td>
<td>Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Jones</td>
<td>Program Coordinator, International Security Program, Center for Security and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Wyn Jones</td>
<td>Ph.D Candidate, King’s College London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duyeon Kim</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance Kim</td>
<td>National Science Foundation Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Fellow, Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of California at Berkeley, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, The RAND Corporation (Fall 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuma Kuwata</td>
<td>Graduate Student, Policy Management Department, Keio University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadja Larsen</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeong Ik Lee</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greer Meisels</td>
<td>Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, James A. Kelly, Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS, Former Assistant Project Director, Asia-Pacific Security, National Committee on American Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad Pelletier</td>
<td>Research Intern, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Defense University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomas Pico</td>
<td>Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Culture, Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Portner</td>
<td>Communications Intern, Natural Resources Defense Council, former intern, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Reilly</td>
<td>Ph.D. Candidate, Princeton University, Member of the Next Generation Working Group on U.S.-Russian Arms Control, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Rose</td>
<td>Program Specialist, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crispin Roeve</td>
<td>Ph.D. Candidate, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessie Ryou</td>
<td>Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, George Washington University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javier Serrat</td>
<td>Scowill Fellow, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamara Splitzer-Hobeika</td>
<td>Research Assistant, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawn Verdugo</td>
<td>Adjunct Professor and Research Associate, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilfred Wan</td>
<td>Stanton Nuclear Security Pre-doctor Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Warden</td>
<td>Program Coordinator, Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seung Min Woo</td>
<td>Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of California at Berkeley (Fall 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He Yun</td>
<td>Ph.D Candidate, Joint Tsinghua-Cambridge University Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“What a great conference... I was delighted to have participated in it. Congratulations and a particular word of thanks to [Asan] staff who did such a marvelous job in pulling it all together.”
Edwin J. Feulner, The Heritage Foundation

“The first Asan Plenum has been a great success and a very important contribution for debating one of the most sensitive issues of our 21 century.”
Ricardo E. Lagorio, Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)

“... My sincere gratitude for affording me the opportunity to participate in what proved to be a cutting edge conference.”
James G. McGann, Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania

“It was a very well-run and informative conference, an amazing start to what promises to become a great tradition.”
William Tobey, Belfer Center, Harvard University

“Panel subjects were very timely and well balanced.”
Iwata Shuichi, University of Tokyo

“I was very much impressed by the tremendous organizational work in preparing the Asan Plenum.”
Chaim Braun, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), IISS/Stanford University

“I was one of the young scholars. I thought the conference was excellent... a great opportunity to meet established experts in the field as well as younger scholars. I got a huge amount out of the conference, and would love to be involved in future Asan events.”
Mark Bell, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

“Thank you for a most well organized and interesting conference. The overall impression was simply; excellent.”
Ola Dahlman, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

“The substance discussed was very high level and informative; the individuals at the conference were also appropriate and interesting.”
Elbridge Colby, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)

“The Asan Plenum experience was an exceptional one. Both the selection of the panelists as well as the topics raised were at the highest level. It is remarkable to put together such a good conference on such a short notice.”
Szymon Bochenksi, Polish Sous–Sherpa for the Nuclear Security Summit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland

“The exceptional breadth of backgrounds and experience represented by the attendees expanded my understanding of the issues that were the plenum's focus, Our Nuclear Future.”
David Nokes, Sandia National Laboratory

“Asan has put itself on the international map of leading think tanks, an institute all should be interested in ongoing contact with. It was also deeply rewarding to have the opportunity to see a bit of your beautiful country. Keep up the excellent work and looking forward to future conferences and work together.”
Chuck Freiliich, Former Deputy National Security Advisor, Israel

“Outreach to the future through the Asan Plenum Young Experts program hit a very positive personal chord. Providing such a young experts program should benefit us all.”
James H. McNally, Los Alamos National Laboratory

I'd like to express my appreciation of the mission of the Asan Institute. It is really a center of think tank for policy studies in different disciplines of knowledge and sciences
Tarek Hussein, Cairo University and the Council of Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority

“It seems the consensus is that this is an incredible event, one that will become quite an annual institution as you go along.”
Ken Sheffer, The Heritage Foundation