



Proceedings
April 23-24, 2019

THE ASAN INSTITUTE
for POLICY STUDIES

A S A N
PLENUM
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PROCEEDINGS

APRIL 23 - 24, 2019

GRAND HYATT SEOUL

THE ASAN INSTITUTE
for POLICY STUDIES

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GREETINGS FROM THE PRESIDENT


Welcome to the *Asan Plenum 2019*.

The theme of this year's *Asan Plenum* is "Korea's Choice." As you know, so many of us are struggling to find direction, meaning, and coherence in a part of the world where the major pillars, institutional and otherwise, of an order that brought us peace, stability, and prosperity are being undermined. Korea, at the epicenter of all this, faces fundamental choices, ideational, institutional, and moral. How Korea chooses will have consequences for the future of the peninsula, the region, and beyond.

Korea and this region are going through another gut-wrenching transition. We are in need of a moral and strategic compass more than ever. That is what we hope to search for during the two days of the Plenum. Your presence adds immeasurably to that effort.

As in previous years, the *Asan Plenum 2019* gathers leading scholars from around the world to engage in intensive discussions pertaining to this year's theme. Thank you for joining us as we seek answers to these challenges.

Sincerely



Hahm Chaibong
President
The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

ABOUT THE ASAN PLENUM



The *Asan Plenum* is a yearly gathering of the world's leading experts and scholars. In addressing the most pressing problems facing the world with expertise from around the globe, the *Asan Plenum* aims to impact the policy-making process and enable the global community to better deal with the challenges it faces. The *Asan Plenum* is a two-day, multi-session conference organized by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

Plenum Format

The 'conversational' format of the Plenum is intended to maximize interaction among panelists and participants. Parallel break-out sessions will provide further opportunities for in-depth discussion and networking. The Plenum features 4 plenary sessions and 11 parallel break-out sessions. Each session is 1 hour and 30 minutes.



ABOUT THE ASAN INSTITUTE

As an independent, non-partisan think tank, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies is dedicated to undertaking policy-relevant research to foster domestic, regional, and international environments conducive to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The Asan Institute was established in commemoration of the late Founder and Honorary Chairman of Hyundai Group, Chung Ju-yung, who left an indelible mark on South Korea's modernization and inter-Korean exchanges towards peace.



Name after Chung Ju-yung's pen name, "Asan," Dr. Chung Mong Joon founded the Asan Institute on February 11, 2008, in an effort to build a world-class think tank that mirrors South Korea's place on the world stage.

DAY 1

April 23, 2019

Opening Ceremony	Welcoming Remarks Keynote Address
Plenary Session I	G1 or G2?
Session 1	ROK-U.S. Alliance U.S.-Japan Alliance NATO
Plenary Session II	Collective Memory or Collective Future?
Book Launch	<i>Born of This Land: My Life Story</i>
Night Sessions	North Korea's Choice: Nuclear Issue North Korea's Choice: Economic Reform

OPENING CEREMONY

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 09:30-10:25
Place | Grand Ballroom I+II



Welcoming Remarks

Hahm Chaibong

President

The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Good morning! Welcome everyone to the Asan Plenum 2019. Thank you all and some of you for making very long trips. You are a sight for sore eyes. This is the eighth iteration and some of you are repeat offenders who keep coming back. Thank you so much for staying with us and continuing this conversation with us.

This year we chose the theme “Korea’s Choice.” Until this time, we had a pretty broad topic like “Illiberal International Order” or “New World Disorder.” But this time we decided to focus on Korea, Korea’s choice. The reason for doing this is because we feel that history, geopolitics, and the recent change in the international order are forcing Korea to make some fundamental choices in terms of values, norms, security architecture, trade regime and policy directions. Being forced to make a choice is not necessarily a good thing. As we try to show in the film, South Korea chose democracy and free market economy. I think that choice has led to this remarkable prosperity and freedom that we enjoy today. I don’t think there’s any doubt. Also, there were limitations. We weren’t perfect in the way we practice democracy or the free market economy. Certainly, there’s much room for improvement and maybe even room for reform.

The direction had already been set right from the very beginning. Whatever improvements, whatever reforms that we want to do, this is to perfect the choice that we made to improve liberal democracy and free market economy. Of course, sustaining liberal democracy and free market economy can’t do it without the liberal international order. It was our alliance with the United States that gave us the kind of confidence in our security, which then enabled us to go headlong into economic development. And that’s probably true with a lot of other countries in this region and the rest of the world. So, it’s really thanks to this open multilateral global trading order that Korea was able to achieve the so-called Miracle on the Han River.

Why are we being forced to make choices? It is because the liberal international order with its openness and independence, multilateralism, is being challenged. The United States, the architect of this global order, and the EU, the best practitioner of this order, are having serious doubts about the very order

that represent them and they embody. The U.S. is increasingly calling for “America First,” as the principle to guide its security as well as economic policies. The EU seems to be in danger of disintegration. China has been one of the greatest beneficiaries like South Korea of the liberal international order ever since it adopted the open and reform policy in the late 1970s. However, in recent years, China has been displaying what many describe as increasingly revisionist, or even hegemonic tendencies regarding the very global order from which it has benefited. In its own way, China is also calling for a China-first policy. I think North Korea’s Juche ideology is the very antithesis of the liberal international order. Using its nuclear weapons as leverage, it is trying to undermine the very security structure in and around the Korean Peninsula that has brought all of us in this region, freedom and prosperity, not just for South Korea.

So, it is becoming increasingly difficult for South Korea to make the right policy choice in the face of this breakdown of the liberal international order with an ally that seems to have a different orientation than the one that we are used to. Also, we are suffering from an inability to come up with a domestic consensus on the direction in which we need to go. Increasing rivalry and friction between the United States and China and of course, the complex dynamics surrounding the effort to denuclearize North Korea. Now, we pose the question about Korea’s choice. Of course, the answer is obvious right from the beginning. Korea’s choice is clear. The moment we abandon the liberal democracy, free market economy, or the liberal international order, our freedom and prosperity will come to an end.

So, our challenge is how we can apply the principles of liberal democracy, free market economy, and the liberal international order to the real concrete policy issues that we confront every day, such as inter-Korean relations, ROK-U.S. relations, ROK-China relations, ROK-Japan relations, and our trade policies. I really hope that the conversation of the next two days will enable us to help us better articulate the choice that we face and really give us a clear sense of the direction in which we need to go in order to continue to secure freedom and prosperity.

As the founder of our Institute and our chairman Dr. Mong Joon Chung always emphasizes the fact that on this very far eastern tip of this great Eurasian continent that there is this liberal democracy and free market economy is a miracle in itself. And how do we sustain that miracle? I think that is the big challenge. So again, we chose this topic because we want all your wisdom and we really want to talk about what it is that we need to choose, what are the choices that we face and what are the fundamental choices we need to make as we go forward.

Now, let me introduce to you our keynote speaker, James Steinberg. Dr. Steinberg was Deputy National Security Adviser to President Clinton. He had an incredible career both in academia and public service in the government. He was vice president and director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. He was Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas. He was Deputy Secretary of State from 2009 to 2011 and he served as Dean of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. Currently, he is the professor of Social Science, International Affairs and Law at Syracuse University. We thought we couldn't find a better person to address this particular topic and help us launch two days of the conference. So please join me in welcoming Dr. James Steinberg.



Keynote Address

James B. Steinberg
Professor
Syracuse University

Chairman MJ Chung, distinguished friends and colleagues. Thank you for the honor of addressing the Opening of this year's Asan Plenum. It's always a great privilege to come to Seoul for this meeting. Over the past decade, the Asan Plenum has become the go-to place for informed and candid dialogue among thoughtful experts on East Asia security, politics and economics. I always come back from these meetings with a much richer appreciation of the unfolding events in the region and look forward to our conversations over the next two days.

This year's conference is entitled "Korea's choice" — and it is a fitting topic for a number of very powerful reasons. To begin with, it is an opportunity to celebrate the choices which South Korea has made over the past 30 years. Back in the 1980s, Korea made the choice to become a democracy — empowering your citizens to take charge of their own destiny, and to demonstrate to the world that democracy is the right choice of people everywhere — irrespective of their previous political history, ethnic or religious background or geography. The vibrancy and resilience of the democracy you have built deserve to be celebrated. South Korea also chose to build an economic model which has transformed your country into one of the great economic and technological powerhouses of the world, lifting millions out of poverty. While

you still face important choices on your economic future — a topic I'll come back to shortly, your economic achievements too deserve to be celebrated. You also made a choice to be a contributor to global peace and prosperity, through your contributions to development assistance, peacekeeping and building regional and global multilateral institutions. You have transformed Korea from a country that looked to others for assistance to one that generously provides it to others, creating much-needed public goods.

All of these choices have served the interests of the people of South Korea, the region and the world. But in today's dynamic environment, South Korea faces a number of new choices, each of which will prove as consequential as the choices you have made in the past. This morning I want to discuss four choices facing Korea and the implications of those choices not just for Korea, but for all of us gathered here today. In making these remarks, I want to pay tribute to the many here who have contributed to our collective understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing South Korea as we enter the third decade of the twentieth century. I want to give a special shout-out to Scott Snyder for his indispensable book — *South Korea at the Cross-Roads* which is a required reading for my graduate students.

The first choice — a familiar one from these meetings, is what to do about North Korea. Since we last met, we have witnessed two meetings between the U.S. and the DPRK, including the inconclusive — I won't say "failed" — summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un. We all know the important role that President Moon has played in facilitating the two meetings between the U.S. and the DPRK, and the hopes — as well as fears — that these two summits have engendered here in Korea and around the region. I needn't tell this audience that the North Korea issue is multi-dimensional, and though all of the countries in the region share a desire to see an end to North Korea's nuclear program, there is much more at stake here — not just for the two Koreas, but for Japan, China, Russia and of course the United States. And it is stating the obvious to say that the interests of the key actors are not fully aligned.

"The development of North Korea's nuclear and especially its long-range missile program has created a new sense of urgency in Washington to address this problem. At the same time, it has complicated South Korea's own choice about how to proceed. No country has a greater stake in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and bringing a modicum of hope to the people of North Korea for a better life. For this reason, President Moon's efforts to reach across the DMZ are both understandable and welcome. At the same time, there is a critical need to assure that any arrangement with North Korea contributes to the long-term peace and stability of Northeast Asia. While immediate denuclearization of the North is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, South Korea's leaders must — and I believe do — recognize that ultimate denuclearization must remain a core objective. Similarly, while reducing inter-Korean tensions is critical, it is important to keep in mind the stabilizing role that the U.S.-ROK security ties have brought, and that maintaining those ties means the Alliance must be

more than a paper commitment — it must remain militarily credible. So South Korea's first choice is how to maintain the momentum for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula — without sweeping under the carpet the dangers posed by North Korea's nuclear program or sacrificing the benefits of strong U.S.-South Korean ties. Of course, your ability to do so also depends on the U.S. doing its part — Washington must recognize that it too benefits from the alliance and that policies that either end run South Korea, or pursue short-run burden-sharing gains at the expense of mutual respect, ultimately harm the U.S."

The second choice that South Korea must make concerns its relationship with Japan. As someone who has worked over several decades in and out of government to help foster constructive ties between your two countries, I know that the issues are complex, and deeply felt on both sides — and that ultimately there is a limit to what third parties can do to help foster reconciliation and cooperation. Yet I would be less than candid if I didn't express a degree of sadness that despite some valuable initiatives on both sides, the relationship remains deeply troubled. Having written a bit about the importance of history in this region, I am not one simply to counsel "get over it." We know from conflicts in other regions that coming to grips with historic injustice is critical to moving forward. I also recognize that some of the difficulties in the relationship stem from more contemporary disputes and that these issues have a powerful hold on domestic politics. At the same time, it is vital not to lose sight of the enormous stakes that both Japan and South Korea have in working together. As the two leading industrial democracies of East Asia, cooperation between your two countries is critical to your own security and prosperity — and to the long-term stability of the region as a whole. Korea's choice is to find a way to respect the legitimate concerns of your citizens with respect to both history and modern disagreements while recognizing that what should bring your two countries together her counsels both a willingness to explore creative new approaches, and in the meantime to work to try to limit the impact of these disagreements on your vital areas of cooperation.

This is particularly important in light of the third choice that South Korea faces — how to position South Korea in the face of the growing tensions and emerging rivalry between the United States and China. As someone who has also worked to try to foster constructive U.S.-China relations for twenty-five years, it is with a sense of dismay and foreboding that I see the direction this relationship is coming to take. Ten years ago, after President Obama took office and made his first trip to China, the two sides stated

"The two countries believe that to nurture and deepen bilateral strategic trust is essential to the U.S.-China relations in the new era. During their discussions, the Chinese side said that it resolutely follows the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening up, and is committed to promoting the building of a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. ... China welcomes the United

States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The two sides reiterated that they are committed to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century, and will take concrete actions to steadily build a partnership to address common challenges.”

Less than ten years later, these hopes appeared to be dashed, as the Trump Administration declared

“Although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security

agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.”

Elsewhere in the NSS, the Trump administration asserted that China along with Russia, “challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity” — a harsh indictment that leaves little room for cooperation, or even co-existence.

I don’t have the time today to examine how and why this came to pass — my current project will look at the evolution of the relationship — so maybe next year, if you invite me back, I’ll have

Keynote Address
James B. Steinberg



more to say on this. What I want to focus now is on the implications for the ROK.

A binary, zero-sum conflict between the United States poses some stark choices for South Korea. Although many commentators have adopted the term “competition” to soften the conflictual dimension of this emerging rivalry, sports fans know that in a competition, each of the competitors expects that the spectators will take sides. South Korea could, of course, choose to side with the United States — recreating the Cold War alignment against China. But this would come with obvious costs and risks for Korea — given the magnitude of Sino-Korea trade and investment ties and its geographic proximity. China has demonstrated that it is prepared to wield its economic clout against countries that cross it — as we have seen in the case of THAAD. And If Korea places all its eggs in the U.S. basket (excuse the Easter metaphor) — can Korea really count on the U.S. to protect the nest if push comes to shove in a confrontation with China? The Trump Administration’s prevarication on the values of alliance should give some pause to that choice.

Alternatively, of course, South Korea could bandwagon with China and hope that a friendly attitude towards the near-at-hand power would be reciprocated with generosity. But in a region where history looms large, the specter of a tributary state relationship with China is certain to give pause. Although China likes to tout the benign ways of the Ming Dynasty under Admiral Zheng. He is a harbinger of how it would treat its neighbors under a Pax Sinica, and the neighbors rightly are wary, to say the least. And public opinion here in Korea is rightly worried about too great a dependence on China.

Of course, Korea could seek to stay neutral and remain in good favor with both sides. But here too history is a caution — President Trump is not the first President to suggest that either you are with us or against us — and if there are any other fellow Texans in the audience, you will instantly recall Texas saying that the only thing in the middle of the road is a dead armadillo. The recent disputes between the U.S. and our allies over the adoption of China’s telecom technology are a harbinger of the growing either/or nature of the competition.

Korea might try to buttress this course of independence by trying to strengthen your own capacity for defense. I know that there continues to be vigorous debate there about whether, in light of uncertainty about the U.S. commitment, and anxiety about China’s increasing assertiveness, Korea should consider developing its own nuclear capability. But despite the arguments of some of my IR theory friends, more nuclear weapons in East Asia are not likely to produce more security for anyone and increase the risks of accidents or unintended escalation in a crisis.

Finally, Korea might seek to make common cause with other countries that fear being caught in the middle a between the U.S. and China. Most of Korea’s regional neighbors share the fear about the growing U.S.-China tensions and want to maintain good ties with each — a goal which might be more feasible if countries like Korea, Japan, Australia, Indonesia and India could work together



as a third force. But the Cold War itself is cautionary tale about the ability of the non-aligned to thrive when the elephants fight.

To my mind then, the best choice for South Korea is to help mitigate — potentially reverse, this growing, dangerous confrontation between the U.S. and China — and thus avoid the Hobson’s choices I’ve just outlined above. To do this, South Korea must leverage its relationship with both China and the United States. Vis-à-vis China, South Korea must make clear that bullying and intimidation will be met with resistance and resolve. In the spirit of our long-standing friendship, Korean leaders must encourage the U.S. to keep open the path to constructive cooperation with China, so long as China lives up to its rhetorical commitments to respect the sovereignty and independence of its neighbors and uphold the international rule of law.

There is a fourth and final choice related to the one I’ve just discussed, a choice which concerns the future of the Korean economy. Korea’s economic miracle has depended heavily on the triumph of globalization and economic interdependence. Exports represent more than 40% of Korea’s GDP. But this process has come under attack from all sides — from a China that seems ambivalent at best about open markets, pursues protectionist and mercantile economic policies, and restricts access to China’s own vast market. Now too, the U.S. is moving along the same path, eschewing multilateral trade openings in favor of more

protectionist policies and bilateral trade deals that seek to build on the U.S. asymmetric clout. There is increasing talk in both China and the U.S. about decoupling our two economies. China seeks to promote “indigenous innovation” by excluding foreign companies, subsidizing its own firms on the global stage, and resorting to illegal expropriation of foreign technology and intellectual property. The U.S. in turn, while rightly concerned about protecting U.S. technology and security interests, is increasingly turning to broad brush exclusion of China from the U.S. economy, imposing new restrictions on people-to-people exchanges, and unilateral trade measures that undermine the WTO and the global open trade regime.

South Korea has much to lose from this turn away from open markets and free exchange. As a beneficiary of globalization, Korea must now become its champion. This means standing up for multilateral trade and investment on the international stage and pushing forward the process of reform at home to better embody the values of fair competition, transparency and open trade to foster competition and innovation/entrepreneurship, greater opportunities for women and youth, and address endemic corruption.

These, then are four key choices for South Korea. But before I conclude I’d like to say a word about China’s choice — and the United States’ choice. As I noted earlier, relations between our two countries have changed dramatically over the past decade. More and more influential voices on both sides of the Pacific have come to see the relationship in zero-sum terms. Although the U.S. public is perhaps less pessimistic than the “blob,” public sentiment too has become warier.

It is fashionable in some circles to see this as an inevitable result of conflict between a dominant and a rising power. While such “parsimonious” explanations have a cachet in academia, this recourse to structural inevitability too easily lets policymakers off the hook. There is little doubt that changes in the economic and military distribution of power poses an enormous challenge to international stability. And that challenge is compounded by the stark differences in the philosophy of governance in our two

countries. I share the widespread concern over recent Chinese actions at home and abroad that appear to threaten the legitimate economic and security interests of others — actions I need not catalog at length here. But it is the height of responsibility simply to shrug our shoulders in the face of these difficulties and resign ourselves to an increasingly conflictual relationship. As Shakespeare wisely noted, “men are sometimes the masters of their fates; the fault ... is not in the stars — but in ourselves” if we resign ourselves to this dismal and dangerous future. We can sugarcoat the danger by calling our strategies “competitive.” It has a soothing ring — just as we see economic “competition” as a system that generates benefits for all, or extols the virtues of Schumpeterian destruction. But recall the Oxford Dictionary definition of competition as “the activity or condition of striving to gain or win something by defeating or establishing superiority over others.” Competition in international relations is not like kindergarten soccer — there are winners and losers — and neither side will easily or graciously accept losing. We can console ourselves by pointing to the end of the Cold War when the U.S. and our allies peacefully prevailed over the Soviet Union, but we should never forget how many times during that twilight struggle the two sides came to the brink of calamity.

I believe it is still not too late to change the direction of our relationship, but this will require some hard choices by the leaders of our two countries. For China, this means a fundamental and credible commitment to reassuring its neighbors and the world that China’s rise will not come at the expense of the security and prosperity of others. As I have written elsewhere, it is the special responsibility of the rising power — to provide this reassurance, especially given how much China has benefited from the U.S.-led order over the past decades. For the United States, it means a recognition that China too, like any other country, is entitled to a reasonable degree of security and a voice in the management of global affairs. As hard as these choices may now seem, we owe to our own people, and to people everywhere to make the right ones.

Thank you again for the privilege of speaking to you today.

PLENARY SESSION I

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 10:30-12:00

G1 or G2?

Moderator

Choi Kang

The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Speakers

Evelyn Goh

The Australian National
University

Douglas H. Paal

Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace

James B. Steinberg

Syracuse University

Zhang Tuosheng

China Foundation for
International and Strategic
Studies; Sejong Institute

Zhao Xiaozhuo

Academy of Military Sciences,
People's Liberation Army

Rapporteur

Peter Lee

Australian National University


Plenary Session 1, “G1 or G2?,” discussed the emerging regional order and how it would be shaped by U.S.-China relations. A key theme of the session was differing thoughts on what kind of leadership would unfold in the coming years. Dr. Choi Kang, Vice President of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, opened the session by asking the speakers to share their observations on the current state of U.S.-China relations and Korea’s choices between them.

Professor Evelyn Goh, Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, noted that this was the first Asian power transition in over two hundred years that involved more than just the great powers. Consequently, it involved more perspectives than just the United States and China. She then provided a regional perspective of how other states throughout the region, including Southeast Asia, had already been dealing with similar dilemmas between U.S. and China relations for some time. Professor Goh stated that in Southeast Asia, the assumption was that China had already risen and states were already in the process of managing that new relationship between themselves and the U.S. and China. She noted that the debate over U.S.-China relations and the future of the regional order was especially difficult among U.S. allies such as Korea precisely because they were only now facing this dilemma.

Mr. Douglas H. Paal, Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focused on how key officials and policymakers in both the U.S. and China seemed to be



Choi Kang



Evelyn Goh




Douglas H. Paal



James B. Steinberg



Zhang Tuosheng



Zhao Xiaozhuo

buying into a more conflictual and absolutist view of China in recent years. He pointed out that many of the fears about China’s rise had precedents in past U.S. concerns about growing Soviet, and later Japanese, power. Mr. Paal cautioned that policymakers should take care not to sacrifice key features of the liberal international order, including openness, in dealing with China’s rise. He attributed part of the problem to the bureaucratic perception of China in Washington among many younger U.S. officials who had been conditioned during the past decade to see the relationship

Plenary Session I
G1 or G2?



in more conflictual terms. He concluded by observing that openness remained the United States' greatest strength in dealing with challengers and that this should not be forgotten in relation to China.

Professor James B. Steinberg, Professor at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, cited two reasons why the U.S.-China relationship seemed to have deteriorated so badly in recent years. First, growing fears had led both sides to assume the worst about each other's intentions and created a security dilemma of mutual fear and suspicion. Second, there were growing U.S. perceptions that even as globalization had produced absolute benefits to all states, the United States was increasingly worse off itself than the past. Professor Steinberg suggested that it was easy for politicians to play to this sentiment.

At the same time, China seemed less willing to embrace a strategy of reassurance regarding its rise and was adopting a more nationalist view.

Professor Zhang Tuosheng, Senior Fellow and Chairman of Academic Committee and Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies, outlined two potential scenarios for U.S.-China relations. First, there was a small possibility of a new Cold War stemming from either a failure in trade negotiations and the ongoing trade war, a possible military crisis over Taiwan, or a security conflict in the South China Sea. Any of these contingencies would be disastrous for the U.S.-China relationship. However, Professor Zhang Tuosheng stated that the current frictions were more evident of benign competition and could be stabilized. He listed a number of ways to reduce tensions, including that China would make a long-term effort to stabilize its relationship with the U.S. and avoid defining it as strategic competition, progress on trade talks could lead to further economic reforms, the ongoing military cooperation and people-to-people exchanges between the two sides, as well as coordination on third party issues such as denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Together, this suggested that

a new model of cooperation relations was needed.

Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Director of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum Secretariat Office and Senior Fellow at the Institute of War Studies, Academy of Military Sciences, People's Liberation Army (PLA), observed that three developments seemed to indicate a change in U.S. policy towards China. First, recent U.S. government reports had all labeled China as a rival or competitor. Second, the ongoing trade war and growing restrictions on people-to-people ties were cause for concern. And finally, increased U.S. intervention in Taiwan all seemed to indicate that U.S. engagement and cooperation with China had been replaced by a new desire to force China to change. Together, this seemed to indicate that the U.S. policy of engagement and cooperation with China since their normalization of relations in 1972 was coming to an end. Senior Colonel Zhao suggested that some in the Trump administration seemed to want to force China to change in a direction set by the U.S. but that such an effort to pressure China would fail and lead to confrontation. He concluded that the only way forward for U.S.-China relations was to no repeat the old path of confrontation and conflict.

During the discussions, the speakers focused on areas where the U.S. and China could cooperate on regional public goods such as safeguarding sea lines of communication, unplanned encounters at sea, limiting militarization activities in the South China Sea, and potential participation in development projects. Professor Evelyn Goh stated that experts had become accustomed to thinking in terms of dichotomies of conflict and cooperation, but that, in fact, the grey area between the two had been where U.S.-China relations had focused since the end of the Cold War.



Another topic of discussion was the differing interpretations of the Indo-Pacific as both a geographic and strategic concept. Professor Zhang Tuosheng argued that the Trump administration's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy was distinguished by three features: a more explicit maritime focus, an attempt to balance against China's Belt and Road Initiative, and a desire to elevate India's role in the region. Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo also noted that the Indo-Pacific had taken on an explicitly political meaning in the U.S. as evidenced in the changing of the U.S. Pacific Command's name to the Indo-Pacific Command without any major operational changes. On the challenges in the relationship, Professor Steinberg observed that there were two broad approaches to deal with U.S.-China issues: first put aside differences and focus on common interests and areas for cooperation, or deal directly with the core problems. Citing how the U.S. and China had reached a basic understanding over Taiwan to even begin their relationship, he argued that all parties needed to deal with the key problems even if they were not able to solve them.

Speakers also focused on flashpoints in U.S.-China relations, especially Taiwan and the South China Sea, where the two sides' interests diverged and the differing perceptions of other states, including Korea. Senior Colonel Zhao claimed that China's actions in the South China Sea were largely responsive and that most of the islands were actually occupied by other countries. China's enlargement of its islands was intended for limited defense purposes. In contrast, Professor Steinberg argued that it was not credible to accept that there is a military threat to the Chinese-occupied islands from neighboring states. He added that there were many ways that China could have assured its neighbors that it did not have hostile intentions without military base construction on the island. During the question-and-answer session, a range of questions focused on possible confidence-building measures, the role of other regional powers besides the U.S. and China, and the future of alliances amidst U.S.-China competition.

SESSION 1

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 13:00-14:30

ROK-U.S. Alliance

Moderator

Sue Mi Terry

Center for Strategic and
International Studies

Speakers

Kim Sung-han

Korea University

Marc Knapper

U.S. Department of State

Sydney A. Seiler

U.S. Forces Korea

Soeya Yoshihide

Keio University

Zhu Feng

Nanjing University

Rapporteur

Troy Stangarone

Korea Economic Institute of
America

At a time when the ROK-U.S. alliance has seen the KORUS FTA renegotiated and a significant shift in the approach to handling North Korea, the Session 1 panel on the “ROK-U.S. Alliance” explored the current state of the alliance as it faces potential divergence on approaches to North Korea and South Korea finds itself possibly caught between great power rivalry between China and its ally the United States.

North Korea is the number one issue in the alliance from Dr. Kim Sung-han’s perspective. In the aftermath of the no-deal summit in Hanoi, he noted that U.S. President Donald Trump remains committed to reaching a “big deal” that would include a road map to the complete verified dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs. Trump realizes that sanctions have been working, but with the release of the Mueller report he may decide to focus on domestic issues that would aid his reelection rather than focus on international issues like North Korea.

If the United States remains committed to a “big deal,” Kim Jong Un has continued to insist on a phased approach to denuclearization, as well as maintaining the top-down negotiating strategy. Despite the failure of its strategy in Hanoi, Pyongyang is likely to continue with its current strategy. It will also continue to miniaturize its nuclear weapons until it is able to trade Yongbyon for sanctions relief, delay in providing a declaration, and will likely insist on some type of partial removal of U.S. troops from South Korea in exchange for the partial dismantlement of its programs. In light of the result in Hanoi, Moon needs to convince Kim to move towards more of a staged approach, but he needs to avoid

becoming a mediator between the United States and North Korea.

The ideal solution according to Dr. Kim would be for the United States and North Korea to agree to a staged approach where 75 percent of the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs are in the first stage to ensure dismantlement is irreversible, while issues such as a peace regime should wait until the second stage.

On the potential for South Korea to cooperate with the United States Indo-Pacific strategy, Dr. Kim noted that Japan is working with China on its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and that the broader Indo-Pacific strategy is likely compatible with the BRI. He also noted that South Korea should not have any opposition to the broader principles of the Indo-Pacific strategy, such as freedom of navigation, but that it may be challenged to take part due to its focus on relations with North Korea and China.



While acknowledging the important role that the security relationship has played in the alliance, Mr. Marc Knapper said that it would not be giving the alliance its due to if we did not acknowledge the other ways that the United States and South Korea cooperate. However, before talking about economic cooperation, Mr. Knapper pushed back on the narrative that there is a growing division between the United States and South Korea on North Korea. He noted that shortly after Hanoi, there were meetings at the senior leadership levels of defense ministers, foreign ministers, and between the two presidents, as well as almost daily coordination on the working levels.

In recent years, Mr. Knapper noted that the two countries have made a conscious choice to “take the alliance to the next level.” In this sense, economic security has played a significant role for both countries in developing the alliance. The KORUS FTA, along with its revisions, has helped to tie the two economies closer together, while the United States is South Korea’s top source of FDI and South Korea is a significant source of FDI in the United States. The two countries have also worked together on energy security with South Korea becoming the top importer of U.S. LNG and a significant importer of U.S. petroleum. The increased imports of U.S. fossil fuels have also helped to reduce South Korea’s trade surplus with the United States by 60 percent. Mr. Knapper likewise noted that as two major industrial economies the United States and South Korea were well placed to work together to help develop global standards for the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and that there are significant opportunities for overlap between the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy and South Korea’s New Southern Policy.



Mr. Sydney A. Seiler also pushed back on the idea that there is a separation between the United States and South Korea. He noted that the relationship has become one of equals and that during his time at the NSC the allies began talking about the alliance in terms of shared interests and values, as well the mutual respect each side shares. The goal has been to make the alliance one that is resistant to changes in political parties and ideologies in both countries. However, North Korea

does use its propaganda to sow division between the allies. He said that he does not share concerns about inter-Korean relations getting too far ahead of denuclearization talks, as it’s hard to envision North Korea pursuing inter-Korean relations without addressing the nuclear issue. The two issues go hand-in-hand. He also noted that the alliance has been able to maintain deterrence despite the changes in military exercises and suggested that pressure has produced the changes that we have seen in North Korea’s behavior.

While much of the focus during the session was on the ROK-U.S. alliance, Dr. Soeya Yoshihide noted that Japan remains an important part of the ROK-U.S. alliance framework because of the military support provided by U.S. rear bases in Japan. On North Korea, he suggested that he believes that Kim Jong Un is serious about economic reform. He noted that this is not a position that is shared in Japan and the United States, but that it’s time to realize that Kim is serious and that we should engage him. However, this will have to be in his preferred phased process. If we do engage it will be a long and difficult process, but eventually Kim will reach a point where it will be difficult to go either back out of reforms or go forward. That is where the real negotiations will begin. This will require significant cooperation and strategic thinking by South Korea and the United States, but he is concerned that at the moment the Blue House sees the United States and Japan as obstacles to its objectives.

On the potential for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, he also noted that Japan and China are having discussions about cooperation on the BRI and Japan’s Indo-Pacific initiative. The two countries could find common ground on economic cooperation. In the Indo-Pacific area, there could be both geostrategic and economic aspects to policy and there is no reason why South Korea could not cooperate on the economic aspect. Dr. Soeya also noted that finding common ground on economic aspects of the BRI and the Indo-Pacific initiative could be one way to engage a rising China in a positive fashion.

Professor Zhu Feng noted that the ROK-U.S. alliance has anchored peace on the Korean Peninsula and has been in China’s interest for the last four decades. He believes that it can continue to be so in the future. He noted that China has strategic anxiety about the relationship, but that unless the U.S. increases its deployments in South Korea that anxiety will not become overwrought. He also suggested that South Korea is sophisticated in its handling of relations with the United States and China, and therefore also helps to play a role in minimizing conflict between the two.

SESSION 1

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 13:00-14:30

U.S.-Japan Alliance

Moderator

Park Cheol Hee

Seoul National University

Speakers

Kent E. Calder

School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University

Richard McGregor

Lowy Institute

Tokuchi Hideshi

National Graduate Institute for
Policy Studies

Wang Dong

Peking University

Rapporteur

Ross Tokola

East-West Center in
Washington D.C.



Dr. Park Cheol Hee opened the session with praise for how the U.S.-Japan alliance has progressed, widened the scope of its coverage across the Indo-Pacific, and held frequent meetings between heads of state. He asked the panelists to consider the state of the alliance, its role given the rise of China, its place in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and the place of Korea in the evolving dynamics between the United States and Japan.

Professor Kent E. Calder began by outlining how the United States and Japan as the two largest liberal economies have shared interests in the stability of an open international system and in the values that they also share with the Republic of Korea. Japan's alliance with the United States, given strong U.S. maritime capabilities, is additionally in Japan's geopolitical interest, as it was with Britain in the 19th Century.

Professor Calder described how the circumstances of the alliance today are different from when the Treaty of San Francisco created the alliance in 1951. Japan and the United States were alone as major powers in the Pacific, China was in the midst of a revolution, Korea was in the midst of the Korean War, and Southeast Asia was under colonial rule. The regional context is now different and more complex. Changes in Japanese domestic politics have also altered over time how the alliance is perceived within Japan.

Nevertheless, the two countries continue to share fundamental interests as well as complementarily advanced technologies, such as in the fields of robotics, microelectronics, guidance systems, etc. that strengthen the alliance's defensive capabilities. Professor Calder highlighted Japan's ballistic missile defense, minesweeping, communications, and cyber capabilities as particularly effective strategic assets to the alliance.

Mr. Richard McGregor described how the U.S.-Japan alliance has developed deep and enduring habits of cooperation, and how Japan is the most important bilateral U.S. military partner, with more U.S. troops deployed to Japan than to any other country. Mr. Trump during his campaign raised the question of why "Asia cannot be run by Asians." The answer for many in the region is that if it were not for the United States, it would be "Asia run by China."

That said, while the Abe administration has deepened ties to the United States, Japanese politicians have also demonstrated interest in developing closer ties to the Asian continent and to China. If anything, it has been a strategic failure of China to take advantage of these elements within Japan to enhance trust and draw Japan away from the United States. Yet China is aware that the United States' presence in Asia is a geopolitical choice, whereas for China it is a geopolitical fact.

On economies and trade, President Trump has created distrust of the United States in Japan by threatening tariffs. At the same time, U.S. efforts to decouple economic ties to China that affect U.S. security interests have the potential to significantly impact

regional economies in terms of supply chains. On regional economic governance, Mr. McGregor praised Japan for its strategy of not signing onto China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but instead signing an agreement to cooperate with China in third countries while running their own programs at the same time.

Mr. Tokuchi Hideshi stressed that the U.S.-Japan alliance is part of the U.S.-centered alliance network across the Indo-Pacific, for which reason establishing a synergy with other countries in this network, especially with South Korea, is critical. He argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the central piece of this network for three reasons. First, Japan and the United States uniquely share the core threat-perception issues of China, Russia, North Korea, and international terrorism. Second, Japan is one of the few countries that can provide the U.S. with a dependable stationing environment for U.S. forces, to which Japan provides financial support and industrial capabilities. Also, whereas U.S. forces in Korea — the only U.S. military presence on the Asian continent — are largely from the army, U.S. forces in Japan are largely navy, Marines Corps, and air force, which possess the ability to be more mobile across the Indo-Pacific. Third, Mr. Tokuchi highlighted the importance of Japan as a democratic maritime power in the region.

On Japanese views of U.S. foreign policy, Mr. Tokuchi cited the late Professor Robert Scalapino's use of the imagery of the firefighter, the missionary, and the accountant, to describe how too much attention has been placed on the accountant aspect of U.S. foreign policy. While Mr. Tokuchi believes that the relative decline of the United States, though it remains at the pinnacle of the international power hierarchy, is a result of successful U.S. foreign policy to rehabilitate a post-WWII world, and that it is a mistake to underestimate U.S. resilience and creativity.

With respect to alliance management, Mr. Tokuchi observed that debates over burden-sharing and balancing economic versus security interests are nothing new. The fact that Japan and the United States have gotten past these challenges repeatedly over many years demonstrates both the robustness of the alliance and how it must be continuously managed. Increasing Japan's military role through collective self-defense will correct asymmetries in the alliance and further enhance its effectiveness.

Professor Wang Dong discussed how the purpose of the U.S.-Japan alliance was lost for a time in the early 1990s in the wake of the end of the Cold War. In the mid-90s, Joseph Nye redefined the purpose and nature of the alliance, developing an early version of a strategy that both integrates with and hedges against China. This strategy combined the logic of liberal hopes for China's future and cautious realist insurance against a rise of China that is less accepting of liberal norms. The geostrategic landscape since the 1990s has changed, and U.S. policy towards China appears to be undergoing a fundamental shift away from its engagement strategy. The question is whether the U.S.-Japan alliance will also undergo a shift vis-à-vis a more confrontational relationship between the United States and China.



There also appear to be discrepancies in the U.S.-Japan alliance, argued Professor Wang. First, the United States defines the Free and Open Indo-Pacific in more military and strategic terms, whereas Japan approaches it as an initiative that is more open, inclusive, and focused on economic cooperation. Second, Japan's rapprochement with China since 2012, including joining BRI through a third-party cooperation mechanism, stands in contrast to the approach towards BRI taken by the United States. Professor Wang concluded by posing questions as to what extent this will create a security dilemma in U.S.-Japan-China relations, and how these relations can be constructively improved.

The panelists concluded by considering the role of the U.S.-Korea alliance. Professor Calder highlighted how both Korea and Japan are valuable U.S. allies, but for different reasons, as discussed in this panel. Mr. McGregor anticipated Korea and Japan remaining within a U.S.-centered hub-and-spokes approach rather than forming a closer trilateral network given that the two countries are on different tracks. Mr. Tokuchi suggested that the alliance should expand its scope, thereby also making it more robust, and that Korea and Japan can improve their cooperation by distinguishing between emotion and strategy. Professor Wang warned against overemphasizing confrontation between the United States and China at the cost of cooperation.

SESSION 1

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 13:00-14:30

NATO

Moderator

Choi Jinwoo

Hanyang University

Speakers

Ian Anthony

*Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute*

Pascal Boniface

*French Institute for
International and Strategic
Affairs*

Kestutis Paulauskas

*North Atlantic Treaty
Organization*

Brooke A. Smith-Windsor

RAND Europe

Alexander Vershbow

Atlantic Council

Rapporteur

Karl Friedhoff

*Chicago Council on Global
Affairs*

This year marks the 70th anniversary of NATO, but the celebration of reaching such a milestone is clouded by the significant questions that have been raised about U.S. commitment to the alliance under Trump's presidency. Burden sharing has been at the top of President Trump's complaints when it comes to dealing with allies more broadly, but the challenges NATO faces are not only internal. The external challenges identified by the moderator, Dr. Choi Jinwoo, were the "Russia problem," counterterrorism, and cybersecurity, and NATO's ability to stay relevant at a time when China is fast on the rise.



Despite these internal and external challenges, opinions across the panel were optimistic about the future of NATO. According to Dr. Choi, the average length of a military alliance is 15 years, but NATO has already far surpassed that. In the short- to medium-term, the alliance looked set to continue, but changes might be in the offing. Its original purpose was to bring prosperity and security to Europe, and in that mission, it has been a resounding success. But as challenges mount, and changes are required, the flexibility of the alliance should allow it to adapt to a new environment, as pointed out by Dr. Ian Anthony.

That flexibility will be required too far into the future to continue to coordinate European military affairs. This need was highlighted by Russia in 2014 when it annexed Crimea. According to Dr. Anthony, such an action crossed the reddest of the red line in the European system. The resulting conflict had caused more than 10,000 deaths and showed that the countries in Europe were totally unprepared for such an event. But there was hope as NATO had adapted quickly since 2014. In fact, Dr. Anthony said this had reenergized the alliance with a new sense of purpose.

But as pointed out by Dr. Pascal Boniface, the irony of the Russia challenge is that NATO actually has less contact with Russia now than it did during the Cold War. This was partially a result of seeing Russia as the loser of the Cold War. Europe is still paying the price for this view. But while Russia is a challenge, it is not one that is insurmountable. Russia simply does not have the means to challenge Europe militarily. According to numbers laid out by Dr. Boniface, Russia's military budget is \$60 billion, while that of the European Union is a combined \$250 billion, and the U.S. alone spends more than \$700 billion. That said, Dr. Boniface noted that it was a pipe dream that Russia would give Crimea back.

Beyond Russia, the other serious challenges outlined by Dr. Anthony lie to the south and southeast of NATO. Finding a common approach to stabilizing the northern part of Africa is an important task, especially establishing agreement if this will require military actions. Also, the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are moving closer to European borders. Dr. Boniface would

later add NATO unity on Iran as a further challenge. To meet each of these, NATO needs to draw on its greatest strength — the practice of seeking common approaches — to meet these challenges.

Dr. Kestutis Paulauskas acknowledged the many challenges facing NATO but warned that the same complacencies that beset Europe today are parallel to those that existed in 1939. At that time, the complacencies came from the recent horrors of World War I, and many unable to imagine a repeat of those events. Thus, in the lead-up to World War II, there were efforts to appease Hitler. Today, Dr. Paulauskas noted, Russia's aggression is called hybrid warfare for the reason of political correctness. This is done because no one wants to assign aggression to Putin's actions. This is an important distinction due to the defensive nature of the NATO alliance. (This defensive nature would later be called into question by Dr. Boniface, citing the NATO intervention in Kosovo among others.)

Central to all views on the panel was the critical role played by the United States. President Trump has placed increased strain on the relationship, but Dr. Boniface pointed out that Trump was not the first to do so. Senator Mike Mansfield also suggested a U.S. withdrawal in the 1960s. But the role of U.S. leadership remains critical. Dr. Brooke Smith-Windsor laid out a detailed argument for three key points that make sustained U.S. leadership legitimate. The first key was that the United States continued to have principled legitimacy. This was derived from shared values and norms, and based on U.S. leadership that promotes, and the followers accept a moral vision. The second was output legitimacy. This type of legitimacy comes from the acceptance of leadership by other countries in exchange for gains made possible by the United States and for the gain of all. The final key is procedural legitimacy. This involves putting in place, and respecting, guidelines for decision-making. According to Dr. Smith-Windsor, the United States continues to satisfy all three elements.

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow sounded a cautionary note on the future of NATO. In his view, NATO was always more than

just a military alliance. It was also a political alliance that laid the foundation for the integration of Europe. But Russia presents a serious challenge to further integration. The long-term goal of NATO has always been to bring Russia into Europe as a partner, and that remains the goal today. That now seems much further away today, with Russia seeking to redivide Europe. It is unclear if NATO is up to that challenge.



To move forward, Ambassador Vershbow laid out 4 points that NATO needed to address to remain relevant. First, burden sharing had to be addressed. Spending is up on aggregate, he noted, but laggards remain. Germany and Italy, in particular, need to do more to increase their spending. Second, all members of NATO needed to contribute to increasing deterrence along the alliance's eastern flank. Third, there need to be greater contributions from NATO members to areas of shared defense. For example, precision strike capabilities and intelligence gathering. As of now, the United States pays roughly 75 percent of these costs. It needs to be roughly 50-50. Finally, there needed to be real work done to flesh out the alliance's Southern Strategy. This remains an empty shell.

PLENARY SESSION II

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 14:45-16:15

Collective Memory or Collective Future?

Moderator

Philip Stephens

Financial Times

Speakers

Hahm Chaibong

The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

David Harris

American Jewish Committee

Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias

Polish Academy of Sciences

Volker Stanzel

German Council on Foreign
Relations

Rapporteur

John Jihyung Lee

Yonsei University


Mr. Philip Stephens opened the session “Collective Memory or Collective Future?” by observing that nations are built around collective memories. In Germany, memories of the Holocaust are kept to inform the present and to remind the people just how dangerous fascism and dictatorship can turn out to be. One danger of collective memory, however, is that it can become an excuse to sustain past grievances into the present and become a source of nationalism and xenophobia. In today’s Europe, where people once thought that historical issues had been eradicated in the aftermath of World War II, there has been a rise in nationalism and a revival of historical issues that have opened up old wounds.

Dr. Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias, the first panelist to speak, addressed the situation in Poland as well as the trend currently taking shape in Europe. She noted that the recent wave of legislations enacted in Europe has revived painful memories of the past for the sake of ideology and nationalism. The Holocaust bill, a controversial legislation enacted in Poland in January 2018, epitomized this trend. This particular law outlawed any defamation of Poland and the Polish people for crimes committed by the German Nazis during World War II. Staunch oppositions from various organizations within Israel and the United States led to the bill’s eventual amendment, eliminating criminal penalties for violators. Even with this change, however, Dr. Gliszczynska-Grabias stressed that the law remains dangerous because it encroaches on the freedom of speech and expression. More importantly, she warned that the enactment of similar laws throughout Europe will only incite dangerous nationalist, religious,

and ethnic sentiments.

Ambassador Volker Stanzel attributed the recent rise of nationalist sentiments in Europe to the fundamental characteristic of memories. Mainly, he described memories as being fluid in nature because events, both euphoric and tragic, lose authenticity the very moment they occur. The more emotionally charged an event was, the stronger the impact that memories have on the narrative for both victims and perpetrators. He warned that the fluid nature of memory makes it particularly vulnerable to manipulation. There is a temptation for any leader, regardless of the political system, to utilize memories for his or her political gain since those who control the past, control the future, and those who control the present, control the past. He concluded optimistically by noting that human beings are ethically obligated to reconcile because of the hope for a better future. In that sense, he remained hopeful that Korea-Japan relations will improve.


Mr. David Harris echoed the sentiment of the previous speaker that collective memories are fluid and prone to manipulation. He provided three examples that have relevance for Korea-Japan relations. First is Germany’s reconciliation with the Jewish people in the post-World War II era. Germany provided the best example of public reckoning with its past. However, he noted




Philip Stephens



Hahm Chaibong



David Harris



Aleksandra Gliszczynska-Grabias



Volker Stanzel

that this effort required a strong, visionary, and pragmatic leader. In the case of Germany, that leader was Konrad Adenauer. In 1951, Adenauer took it upon himself to publicly acknowledge the “unspeakable crimes” committed by Germany against the Jewish people. Despite numerous disputes and disagreements within Germany, Adenauer was strong enough to stay the course. Mr. Harris added that Adenauer required an equally pragmatic leader on the other side. The first Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion saw pragmatic reasons for reconciling with Germany and was able to forge a relationship with Adenauer. The second example is Austria which, despite being complicit

in the crimes of the Nazi era, continued to hide until the 1990s behind the 1943 Moscow Declaration that had named Austria one of the first-victim nations. However, pragmatic leadership once again rose to the challenge and was able to steer Austria forward. Mr. Harris concluded with a more pessimistic example: the Armenian genocide. He cautioned against the popular belief that time cures old wounds. It does not. A case in point is the Turkish leadership that refuses to acknowledge the Armenian genocide even to this day.

Dr. Hahm Chaibong offered a policy-oriented analysis of the

Plenary Session II
Collective Memory or
Collective Future?





role of collective memories, especially in the Republic of Korea. International relations theories, the balance of power theories, and national security interests fail to fully explain the dynamics between Korea and other countries, including Japan, North Korea, China, and the United States. For Korea, collective memory directly informs its foreign policies. When the Republic of Korea was founded in 1948, two powerful ideologies dictated the Korean identity: anti-communist sentiments and anti-Japanese nationalist sentiments. These two ideologies did not seem to matter during the height of the Cold War. However, the end of the Cold War brought about the rise of Korean nationalism which led to the clash of anti-Japanese sentiments and anti-communist sentiments. In today's discussions on Korean identity and national unification, anti-communist sentiments have disappeared. Only anti-Japanese sentiments have remained, which explains why Korea-Japan relations have continued to deteriorate. Dr. Hahm agreed with the previous speakers that collective memories can be fluid and selective. A prime example can be seen in the way Koreans continue to demand apologies from Japan for the colonial period but not from China for

its intervention in the Korean War, which prevented the two Koreas from being united. He concluded by saying that accurate understandings of these complex set of issues will enable us to have a better grasp of the dynamics that dominate the Asian region.

During the question and answer session, panelists agreed that history issues tend to come back depending on the leadership. Dr. Gliszczynska-Grabias argued that the failure to engage in wider discussions regarding the past has led to patriotism being replaced by aggressive nationalist sentiments. Ambassador Stanzel outlined three crucial components of reconciliation. First, reconciliation works best when it involves the first generation of victims and perpetrators. Second, reconciliation requires courageous and pragmatic leaderships on both sides. Lastly, there have to be genuine interests on both sides to move forward. Mr. Harris examined the successful Franco-German cooperation and argued that cooperation was made possible because Germany was a defeated and an occupied nation, and there were efforts within France to avoid another Franco-German War. The latter eventually led to the development of the European Coal and Steel Community, after which people began to realize that the advantages of cooperation far transcended the points of conflict. Dr. Hahm opined that Korean President Park Chung-hee and Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi could be considered enlightened leaders, especially since their relationship led to the normalization of Korea-Japan relations. However, he stated that Koreans did not see Korea's normalization of relations with Japan as a major achievement of pragmatism. Rather, it was seen as a pro-Japanese collaboration that went against nationalist sentiments. This conflict between pragmatism and nationalism continues to dictate Korea-Japan relations today.

BOOK LAUNCH

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 17:00-18:00

Asan Chung Ju-yung's Autobiography *Born of This Land: My Life Story*

Moderator

Hahm Chaibong
The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Speakers

Chung Mong Joon
The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Edwin J. Feulner
The Heritage Foundation

Karen E. House
Harvard Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs

Lee Hong Koo
Seoul Forum for
International Affairs

Paul D. Wolfowitz
American Enterprise Institute

Rapporteur

Jeanne Choi
Johns Hopkins University SAIS

The book launch at this year's Asan Plenum celebrated the first-time publication of the English translation of Chung Ju-yung's autobiography, *Born of this Land: My Life Story*. Originally published in 1997, the book recollects the life of the founder of Hyundai in his own words. At the book launch session, panelists shared their own personal memories of Chairman Chung and what lessons from his life are applicable even today to Koreans as well as non-Koreans.

Dr. Hahm Chaibong began the session by introducing the book and the reasons behind the publication of the English translation. Working with researchers at the Asan Institute on the translation, Dr. Hahm believed that the autobiography was not just important for Koreans to read, but should be a resource for non-Koreans as it provides one of the best explanations of the Korean "miracle" of rapid industrialization. Dr. Chung Mong Joon welcomed the audience to the event and further explained the reasons for publishing an English translation of his father's book. He wanted to convey his father's core life message that success can come to even a boy from an impoverished background if he lives by the values of diligence and integrity. Dr. Chung shared that his most enduring memories of his father were not his accomplishments, but his work ethic and the legacy of the purity of work that he wished to leave to the next generations. Dr. Chung remembered his time as a young business school student in the U.S. in the 1970s studying the motivations of American businessmen, and linked it to the question of what drives today's businessmen. He argued that the social role of businessmen is an important one that needs to be asked, hoping that his father's book would incite discussion on this topic.



Dr. Edwin J. Feulner, the founder of the Heritage Foundation, a U.S. think tank upon which the Asan Institute was based, first met Chairman Chung in 1979 at his office in Seoul. He reiterated what he thought was one of the most important lessons gleaned from the book: the idea of opportunity for all. He argued that Chairman Chung's life demonstrated the importance of perseverance in the face of struggle. Dr. Feulner also shared highlights from his life, including Chairman Chung's meeting with President Reagan and his trip to North Korea to deliver 1001 cattle on Hyundai trucks. He described the successful disruption of the U.S. automobile market by the Hyundai Pony, and shared that he and his wife recently purchased a Hyundai Genesis car. Dr. Feulner's think tank, the Heritage Foundation, has honored Chairman Chung's legacy and support of the institution through the establishment of the Chung Ju-yung Fellowship.

The English translation was meant to benefit those like Ms. Karen E. House, who declared that she would not have been able to experience Chairman Chung's spirit and wisdom were it not for the translation. Having first met him in 1992 as a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, Ms. House recounted his many adventures and how he went from the son of a destitute farmer to a laborer in the harbor to a deliveryman for a rice merchant to



starting an auto repair shop. After that business burned down, he started Hyundai Motors after the Korean War and then Hyundai Construction soon after. Although the fledgling companies faced challenge after challenge, he refused to give up and pursued creative solutions. Ms. House recollected how struck she was as a Middle East correspondent to learn of Hyundai's winning bid for the Jubail project against more established U.S. and Japanese companies. She recommended that the one essential chapter everyone should read details his leadership in winning the hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympics for Seoul. Finally, Ms. House concluded by sharing her two favorites of Chairman Chung's philosophies: that time is the equity we all get equally, and that trustworthiness is the most important personal capital that can open doors for financial capital.

Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz first encountered Chairman Chung in 1994 at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he was Dean and Chairman Chung's son was a Ph.D. student at the time. He recounted several stories from Chairman Chung's life that illustrated his tenacity and determination despite challenges and even failures. Ambassador Wolfowitz argued that Chairman Chung represented the success of his country in the face of adversity, as South Korea was considered a basket case with no natural resources or prospects in the 1960s. The political and economic miracle of South Korean democracy and development was a miracle of human creation, and Chairman Chung was the embodiment of the drive, fearlessness, and risk-taking that underpinned South Korea's rise.

Finally, Dr. Lee Hong Koo equated Chairman Chung's life with the history of South Korea in the second half of the twentieth century. At this time, Korean political, economic, and cultural leaders shared the desire and determination to make the country better and to ensure that society cherished the values that Koreans inherited from previous generations. It was as part of this context that Chairman Chung's remarkable achievements should be viewed, as he is the most prominent figure who signifies this incredible achievement. Dr. Lee argued that Chairman Chung was a prime example of a Korean leader who tried to stand with others in business and other fields at the front lines to achieve something great and global together. In explaining his accomplishments, Dr. Lee stated that Chairman Chung relied upon his good common sense. This quality led him to establish the Asan Foundation for Social Welfare in 1977, as it was common sense to him that, in order to build a great nation and society, funding was needed for education and health care. Common sense was a trait that Chairman Chung passed on to his son, who followed in his father's footsteps by bringing the 2002 World Cup to South Korea and also establishing the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.



NIGHT SESSIONS

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 21:00-22:30

North Korea's Choice: Nuclear Issue

Moderator

Jung H. Pak
The Brookings Institution

Speakers

Chun Yungwoo
Korean Peninsula Future Forum

Bruce Klingner
The Heritage Foundation

Nishino Junya
Keio University

Jonathan Pollack
The Brookings Institution

Scott A. Snyder
Council on Foreign Relations

Rapporteur

Kathryn Botto
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The session on “North Korea’s Choice: Nuclear Issue” discussed whether or not North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is ready and willing to make the choice to denuclearize in order to prioritize economic development. Moderator Dr. Jung H. Pak of the Brookings Institution noted that around this time last year, Kim announced in a plenary session that North Korea no longer needed to continue nuclear and missile testing. This raised hopes that North Korea would make a strategic choice in favor of engagement and economic development. Despite this pronouncement, it appears Kim still believes there may be a way for him to avoid making a choice and to secure sanctions relief while maintaining his nuclear arsenal. However, all panelists agreed that these two courses are incompatible, and Kim must choose to denuclearize in order to procure the concessions he desires.

In this sense, as Mr. Scott A. Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations pointed out, North Korea seems to be making the wrong choice. According to Mr. Snyder, there are five changes that would signal North Korea is ready to make the right choice: (1) North Korea begins to honor rather than pocket concessions; (2) North Korea abandons its Uriminzokkiri nationalist approach; (3) North Korea stops placing the need for total deference to Kim Jong Un as a condition for engagement; (4) North Korea adopts less vertically structured diplomacy to include working-level talks; (5) and North Korea promotes flexible and problem-solving approach.

However, Mr. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation, Dr.

Nishino Junya of Keio University, and Dr. Jonathan Pollack of the Brookings Institution laid out reasons why evidence suggests Kim will not move in this direction. The question of North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize has been addressed by five U.S. presidents and seven South Korean presidents. In order to force North Korea to make a different choice, the international community will need to force North Korea to change its strategic calculus.

According to Dr. Pollack, Trump and Moon’s attempts to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program flies in the face of decades of experience negotiating with North Korea. Convincing Kim Jong Un to make a different choice on the nuclear issue would mean convincing



him to change the strategic calculus that has sustained North Korea for 70 years. This does not mean that the North is not interested in engagement, but rather that engagement serves different goals for North Korea. This is especially true at this moment in time when North Korea’s nuclear capability is far more advanced than previously. Now, North Korea is seeking recognition and legitimacy through its nuclear program.

Dr. Pollack also outlined three ways to look at North Korea’s behavior. The first is to assume that there are steps North Korea is prepared to take to dismantle its nuclear program provided there is requisite economic cooperation. The second perspective is that North Korea intimates an interest in discussions and engagement, but ultimately buys time, wins breathing space, and attempts at

progress are foundered at the verification stage. The third is that there are certain capabilities the North is never willing to forgo: it may close Yongbyon, but will never get rid of nuclear weapons. In terms of the way forward, Dr. Pollack stressed that the most important thing for the U.S. and South Korea is to avoid negotiating with ourselves.

Nishino focused his remarks on interpreting Kim Jong Un's April address to the Supreme People's Assembly. He highlighted four essential takeaways. First, North Korea still prioritizes economic development. But curiously, Kim did not mention economic development in his speech, perhaps because North Korea will need to revise its economic plan after the Hanoi failure. Second, North Korea still prefers the top-down approach in order to cultivate a relationship with the United States that Kim believes will lead to compromise. Third, in the parting words of his speech he mentioned that he is not tied to lifting sanctions, which is a difficult comment to interpret. Fourth, Kim said in his new year's address that he would pursue multilateral diplomacy for a peace treaty, and now is the time for him to do that. In Nishino's opinion, Kim needs to have a hedging strategy of diversification by engaging with partners besides China.

Nishino also pointed out that "Japan's choice" on this matter is to continue peaceful engagement despite growing pessimism about denuclearization. Japan sees the need for continued maximum economic pressure, enhanced trilateral deterrence between Japan, South Korea, and the United States, and Japanese engagement with North Korea.



Mr. Klingner commented that the most striking thing about the Hanoi summit was that it showed that below the surface, U.S. policy was already becoming firmer in response to North Korean intransigence. Continuing the panel's helpful listicle format, Mr. Klingner noted six more lessons learned from this process. First, the sanctions on North Korea are working. Mr. Klingner credits sanctions with bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. All efforts by the North to improve inter-Korean relations are peripheral, and sanctions relief remains the focus. Second, North Korea doesn't want to denuclearize. Kim Jong Un appears to be using the same game plan as his father. North Korea is not just looking for the right Rubix Cube of benefits. Third, canceling the exercises has not been part of the diplomatic process and instead was a unilateral decision by Trump, which North Korea has not reciprocated. Fourth, U.S. and South Korean claims of denuclearization have been inflated and false, and Kim has certainly not agreed to a common definition of denuclearization. Fifth, the top-down approach has so far not been more effective than the bottom-up approach. And lastly, personalizing foreign policy with North Korea as Trump has done has been counterproductive. Due to his personal affinity toward Kim, Trump has made decisions that have degraded readiness, needlessly reversed sanctions, and ignored human rights violations.

Ambassador Chun Yungwoo of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum noted that one way North Korea could avoid making a choice would be by agreeing to denuclearize while concealing key aspects of its nuclear program that would allow it to rebuild at any time. However, Ambassador Chun clarified that this does not necessarily mean that North Korea will not denuclearize under any circumstances. Rather, Kim Jong Un likely has terms and conditions for denuclearization, but they are inconsistent with what the international community is willing to accept.

NIGHT SESSIONS

Date | April 23, 2019
Time | 21:00-22:30

North Korea's Choice: Economic Reform

Moderator

Go Myong-Hyun

The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Speakers

Thomas J. Byrne

The Korea Society

Furukawa Katsuhisa

Private Consultant on Global
Sanctions Issues and National
Security

John Park

Harvard Kennedy School

Hazel A. Smith

School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London

Rapporteur

Ben Forney

Kialo

The session “North Korea’s Choice: Economic Reform” looked at how North Korea is dealing with the economic pressure of sanctions and their options for reform. The moderator, Dr. Go Myong-Hyun of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, opened the debate by discussing one tell-tale indicator of North Korea’s economy: it’s citizens’ health and nutrition. Still suffering from lingering effects of the famine in the 1990s, North Korean children continue to exhibit signs of stunting and wasting, although absolute numbers have decreased dramatically since the height of the famine. This illustrates the paradox of North Korea, that despite ever tightening sanctions, the state of its citizens’ health, and by extension, the economy in general, is improving. Dr. Go argued that Kim Jong Un is different from his father in that the younger Kim is less willing to allow another famine to decimate the North Korean people. In order to ensure this doesn’t happen again, the Kim regime has used state intervention measures to keep prices for food staples, such as rice, artificially low. As a result, this has mitigated some of the negative effects of sanctions. However, Dr. Go questioned whether this state intervention in markets is sustainable, or whether the regime is working on borrowed time.

Dr. Furukawa Katsuhisa analyzed the goals of the U.S. sanctions regime. Since 2016, the U.S. has broadened the scope of sanctions, and today, their policy is a de facto embargo against the regime, rather than a set of measures specifically targeting North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. While there is pain inflicted on the regime via these sanctions, the question is whether the Kim Jong Un regime has been destabilized as a result. Dr. Furukawa argued



that the existing data set does not support the hypothesis that Kim Jong Un is having difficulty maintaining regime stability. As evidence, Dr. Furukawa cited that in 2018, there were at least 263 tanker deliveries of petroleum to North Korea via ship-to-ship transfers, despite this being prohibited by international sanctions. This is equivalent to one transfer every 1.5 days and up to 3.78 million barrels of oil, or approximately 80% of their pre-sanction oil level consumption. North Korea pays for this oil by illegally exporting coal and other resources. At the same time, the regime is increasing the illegal activities by which it acquires foreign currency. Critically, their capabilities to launch cyber attacks are continually improving, although Dr. Furukawa admits that this is also inspiring other countries to boost their cyber defense mechanisms. As time goes on, the Kim regime will face increased pressure from sanctions and improved cyber defense technologies, but the regime can still maintain stability if they retain the support of the military. At the moment, both negligent UN member states and North Korea’s foreign collaborators allow Kim Jong Un to provide enough resources to influential military leaders to stay in power. In closing, Dr.



Furukawa stressed the importance of repeat offenders of sanction evasion who have continued to elude prosecution.

Dr. John Park explored the concept of “North Korea Inc.,” explaining how North Korea’s economy is centered around the 1% of the country’s elites. Because evading sanctions carries great risks for those involved, only individuals with the largest incentives take part, which, counterintuitively, sparks innovation and creative ideas to elude the authorities. As a result, North Korea’s procurers of illicit goods are increasingly innovative in their methods. North Korean state-owned companies continue to go abroad and embed their agents for several years in countries like China and Southeast Asia. Commercial entities such as these often deal in dual-use items that have allowed the regime to develop their nuclear weapons program. Dr. Park compared the use of sanctions to antibiotics, in that it has allowed a small number of illicit actors to become “superbugs,” immune to the risks of sanctions thanks to their specialized collaborators. Local business partners and embedded North Korean businessmen in foreign countries play a key role in all the regime’s efforts to keep the economy afloat. Dr. Park ended by endorsing intensified focus on these key players in order for sanctions to have greater impact.

Mr. Thomas J. Byrne emphasized North Korea’s “low-income trap” that has plagued its economy since the 1990s, long before

comprehensive sanctions were put in place. Confirmed by a variety of statistics, Mr. Byrne argued that there has been very little infrastructure or economic development in North Korea over the past twenty years. He argued that the byungjin policy doesn’t really mean anything, as it hasn’t translated into North Korea developing a market economy. The Kim regime is not at a point where they have decided to embrace real reform. He drew comparisons with China, Vietnam, and Russia, who all joined the IMF and WHO within a few years of opening their economy, but today, North Korea is nowhere near consideration of this. He argued that sanctions evasion is nothing more than a side story, resulting from North Korea’s lack of willingness to embrace real reform.

In the question and answer session, panelists discussed whether North Korea can muddle through with sanctions at the current level, agreeing that stability depends on the degree of support Kim Jong Un can maintain from the military and the continued ability to successfully acquire resources for the elites. Panelists debated the extent to which North Korea has begun to reallocate resources from the military to civilian sectors, with some arguing that it makes sense for North Korea to spend less on a large ground army, given their nuclear capabilities. The discussion then focused on North Korea’s overseas workers and the impact of the \$500 million acquired annually via this means. One audience member asked about the general lessons that can be applied from the North Korea sanctions regime. This sparked responses about the lessons that the West has learned over the years as sanctions were slowly implemented and how sanctions have become a major pillar of U.S. foreign policy. Other panelists argued that countries respond differently to sanctions, and so it is difficult to draw general lessons from the North Korean case. Dr. Furukawa stressed that sanctions are a tool for law enforcement to limit illicit activities, not a foreign policy strategy, and reiterated how the loose implementation of sanctions from member states weakens their effectiveness. The session concluded with a discussion of North Korea’s diplomatic missions abroad and their diplomats’ significant role as enablers of sanctions evasion.

DAY 2

April 24, 2019

Plenary Session III	Nationalism or Internationalism?
Session 2	Is Democracy in Crisis? Immigrants or Refugees? Values or Interests?
Session 3	Free Trade or Fair Trade? Arms Control Technology Competition or Cooperation?
Plenary Session IV	CVID or “Peaceful” Co-existence?

PLENARY SESSION III

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 09:00-10:30

Nationalism or Internationalism?

Moderator

Lee Chung Min

Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace

Speakers

Pascal Boniface

French Institute for
International and Strategic
Affairs

Edwin J. Feulner

The Heritage Foundation

G. John Ikenberry

Princeton University

Yuli Tamir

Shenkar College of Engineering
and Design

Paul D. Wolfowitz

American Enterprise Institute


Rapporteur

Kathryn Botto

Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace

The third plenary session of the Asan Plenum dealt with the dichotomy between “nationalism and internationalism.” Moderator Dr. Chung Min Lee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace set the scene for the discussion by putting nationalism and internationalism in the Korean context. As Dr. Lee described, South Korea’s worldview has historically been trapped by ideology and geography. While internationalism dominated from 1950–2000, nationalism has now become the foundation for legitimacy in South Korea. This pattern can be observed not only in South Korea, but in China, Europe, the United States, and other places.


As Dr. Pascal Boniface of the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, Professor G. John Ikenberry of Princeton University, and Professor Yuli Tamir of Shenkar College of Engineering and Design described, the relationship between the two principles of nationalism and internationalism has oscillated over history. Dr. Boniface pointed out that while President Donald Trump is symptomatic of this changing relationship, nationalism is also on the rise in Europe and the world over. While there is a lot of discourse around international communities, it is usually mentioned in reference to its failure rather than its success. He compared international communities and multilateralism to the Loch Ness monster: everyone is afraid of it, but no one has seen it. Hopes for a post-Cold War international order have been dashed, and there is no agreement on how to manage progress that has been made or what next steps should be. As the international community grapples with this issue, unilateralism fueled by nationalism has become an issue not only in the United



Lee Chung Min




Pascal Boniface




Edwin J. Feulner



G. John Ikenberry



Yuli Tamir



Paul D. Wolfowitz

States, but China and Russia. This is also a deep crisis in Europe, where 10 governments out of 28 have the far right in their governing coalition.

Dr. Edwin J. Feulner of the Heritage Foundation took the opportunity in his initial remarks to rebut some themes he found problematic at this year’s Plenum. First, Dr. Feulner defended Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA on the basis that it was not anti-internationalist, but a

Plenary Session III
Nationalism or
Internationalism?



decision made because President Obama did not seek to ratify the agreement as a treaty in the U.S. Congress. Dr. Feulner also commended Trump's Warsaw speech, in which he made the point that freedom, civilization, and survival depend on bonds of history, culture and memory.

Professor Ikenberry characterized the multilateral order as fragile and breaking down in various ways, as every corner of the world has democracies that are fragmented and polarized by nationalism. Because the post-Cold War liberal international moment is no longer celebrated, there is no longer consensus

about whether representative government and institutions, or trade and multilateralism, are models to aspire to.

However, Professor Ikenberry also cautions that the predominance of internationalism has ebbed and flowed over the past 200 years, and it's possible that it will make a comeback again. Internationalism arose initially as a system internal to the bipolar system of alliances, and subsequently became an external system encompassing these bilateral relationships. However, this created a larger and harder system to manage because free trade overran the priorities of the system and it was not necessarily organized

around countries unifying against or toward a common goal. Looking to the future, Professor Ikenberry sees an opportunity for a resurgence of internationalism in the backlash to nationalism. Countries that have a stake in the international order and see it eroding, such as Japan and South Korea, have an incentive to step up as leaders. Professor Ikenberry also postulated that internationalism can best survive when it is connected intimately with domestic priorities.

Professor Tamir built on this comment and characterized the current moment as one of rebalancing the relationship between the two concepts rather than one forcing the world to make a choice between one or the other. The two principles are not necessarily incompatible. Rather than one concept appearing and the other disappearing, Professor Tamir sees more internal policies impacting international policies rather than the other way around. This is important because it informs the way politicians approach the public to convince them to support international initiatives and foreign policy. In this sense, Professor Tamir is not sure that nationalism is necessarily the wrong approach. Professor Tamir made the important point that nationalists have raised valid issues, particularly in terms of economic concerns and the redistribution of power and wealth away from the middle class. Nationalism has illuminated a need to reevaluate foreign policy and to communicate internally the ways in which it benefits not only elites, but all classes within a nation. Professor Tamir believes, therefore, that the optimistic way to move forward is to try and understand what real issues nationalists are raising.

Like most panelists before him, Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz of the American Enterprise Institute also noted that the choice of internationalism or nationalism is a false dichotomy. He focused on an important middle ground between nationalism and internationalism: multilateralism. Rather than international organizations like the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, the remarkable peace post-WWII was the result of multilateralism. Coalition building is critical, and Ambassador Wolfowitz believes there is the reason for optimism in this regard. He also pointed out that there is some overlap between nationalism and patriotism,



which has led to achievements and inspired people to take risks.

A central question raised in this discussion was that given nationalism and internationalism are not mutually exclusive, is it possible for governments to find a healthy balance between the two principles? All panelists noted that it's possible for the two modes to coexist, but that the current relationship is imbalanced. Professor Tamir encouraged taking a more interactive approach to the two systems. In the past, it was commonly thought that national policies impact how a country is seen internationally. Now there is a view that what a government does internationally impacts how a government is seen internally. The attention lower socioeconomic classes are now paying to foreign policy and whether or not it serves them has created discomfort in the international system that should be viewed as a wake-up call.

The issue of who the international order serves was central to the discussion. Dr. Feulner maintained that the United States has borne a disproportionate cost of supporting internationalism, while Professor Ikenberry intimated that the tangible and intangible gains the U.S. receives from internationalism have far outweighed the costs. Ambassador Wolfowitz argued that it is very difficult to discern who wins and loses from internationalism, but that international institutions have not always had a positive impact. At a moment when certain countries are threatening the international order, multilateral coalition building may be more impactful than international institutions in promoting mutually beneficial national interests.

SESSION 2

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 10:45-12:15

Is Democracy in Crisis?

Moderator

Gilbert Rozman
The Asan Forum

Speakers

Ladan Boroumand
Abdollah Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran

Chu Yun-han
Academia Sinica

Martin Fackler
Ichigo Asset Management

Karen E. House
Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Philip Stephens
Financial Times

Rapporteur

Jeanne Choi
Johns Hopkins University SAIS



Session 2, “Is Democracy in Crisis?” explored the question of whether democracy and its institutions are being strengthened or weakened around the world. Panelists debated the definition of democracy, as well as crisis, and offered reasons for these recent developments. While some speakers shared their optimism for the future of democracy, others warned of the challenges that countries will need to address if democracy is to continue to flourish around the world. Finally, panelists brought the debate back to the overarching theme of this year’s plenum, Korea’s Choice.

The moderator, Professor Gilbert Rozman of the Asan Forum, began the discussion by provoking the panelists to consider whether democracy is in decline around the world. He argued that, broadly speaking, the pillars of democracy have been weakened substantially recently due to several reasons. First, politics has been evolving towards a system of no compromise, where politicians will do and say anything to achieve a political victory. The second reason is the rise of national identity extremism, often driven by religious fundamentalism. Other identities, such as civilization or culture, have become more important than that of democracy. The third reason is related to social justice: democracy has not delivered what it had promised, leading to disillusionment. Another reason is that the rise of China, and the alternative model it represents, has shown that rapid economic development, a strong country, and ties with other countries are possible even without following the democratic playbook. Finally, advances in technologies that have led to greater surveillance by the state and the increasing loss of privacy have also contributed to the rollback of democracy.

Using the case of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Dr. Ladan Boroumand of Abdollah Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran argued that Islamic radicalism is one of the greatest threats to liberal democracy, but has long been misunderstood and ignored. While Islamism in Iran targeted western democracy, its core liberal values, as well as its Muslim citizens, it was not considered a serious threat. Starting with the Iranian Revolution, Islamism first proved itself as a viable ideology in Iran and then started being exported abroad by Iran itself. She contended that

Islamism is closer to modern totalitarianism than Islam. Dr. Boroumand ended on a more optimistic note by observing failures of Islamism within Iran, including the recent development of secular Islamic theology that calls for a transition to greater democracy.

The optimistic outlook for democracy was short-lived as Professor Chu Yun-han of Academia Sinica began his remarks by describing the slew of recent bad news regarding the erosion of the norms and values of democracy. He declared that democracy was in a major crisis, and cited evidence from global and regional surveys. Professor Chu described four forces as the sources of the erosion of democracy. The first, the liberal revolution introduced more than thirty-five years ago, substantially reduced the capacity of democratic governments to do much to improve society and the economy. Under the auspices of the Washington Consensus, the balance was tipped in favor of the wealthy and corporate elite at the expense of labor and the middle class. The second force was the technological revolution, which led to greater digitization and automation, allowing corporations to eliminate middle management workers. This in turn eroded the middle class, the social foundation of liberal democracy. The third force was hyper globalization, which created the transfer of economic sovereignty from the capitalistic nation-state to powerful transnational actors, such as multinational corporations. Democracy had been designed for the nation-state, but governments were no longer able to address the demands of the masses while such transnational actors were not held accountable to society. Finally, social media has contributed to the fragmentation of society so populists can manipulate isolated groups and stoke prejudice and fears.

Mr. Martin Fackler of Ichigo Asset Management shared his perspective from Japan and drew parallels between nationalist, populist movements in Japan and his home state of Georgia. He made the distinction that, while democracy may not be in crisis, the post-war liberal order may be. He contended that the election of a disruptive outsider like Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency is in itself a testament to democracy. In both Georgia and Japan, Mr. Fackler described a sense that the post-war order has lost direction and leadership, and was no longer meeting people's needs. This has led to a deep feeling of disempowerment and has resulted in an angry, nationalistic, internet-based form of populism. There is a subset of the population in both countries that feels that the system is no longer working for them when it should be, and that the government has advantaged other minority groups at their expense. There is a fundamental pessimism at the root of this new populism in both Japan and Georgia with people in both countries believing that history is going in a bad direction and that, if nothing is done, things will be worsening rather than progress.

Presenting an alternative viewpoint, Ms. Karen E. House of Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Mr. Philip Stephens of *Financial Times* presented their opinions that democracy is not in crisis. Ms. House reminded the audience of the importance of perspective, contending that, while thirty-five years ago, most of the world was living under totalitarian regimes, there are many more established democracies now. While there are examples of countries moving

towards authoritarianism now, in the context of the long arc of history, Ms. House believes that democracy will continue to thrive as free markets and free people belong together. She argued that the concern should thus be for preserving the free market system rather than democracy. Using examples of previous moments in history when there was a supposed crisis of democracy, Ms. House contended that the very fact that people are worried about things going in the wrong direction is an indicator that democracy is still functioning. She concluded by dismissing the Chinese model as a viable alternative to free market liberal democracy, arguing that it has run its course and would face difficulties in the future.

Mr. Stephens also supported the argument that democracy is not in crisis, but does face threats. He pointed out that populists cannot be dismissed as they have valid grievances that must be addressed. Pinpointing the global financial crash as the moment when it was realized that the gains of globalization have been unequally distributed, Mr. Stephens argued that people were no longer confident that their children would be better off than them, and that this has led to the undermining of faith, not in democracy, but in established political elites. The recent backlash is against the political establishment rather than the concept of democracy itself. Mr. Stephens warned though that the true danger with populists is in their chipping away at the institutions of democracy in order to achieve their ends. He wrapped up by suggesting that the potential solution to this lies in fixing the market system to make it fair again.



SESSION 2

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 10:45-12:15

Immigrants or Refugees?

Moderator

Marie McAuliffe

International Organization for Migration

Speakers

Mely Caballero-Anthony

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

Gordon Flake

Perth USAsia Centre, University of Western Australia

Lee Jasmine

Korea Cultural Diversity Organization

Neil G. Ruiz

Pew Research Center

Jay Song

University of Melbourne

Rapporteur

Karl Friedhoff

Chicago Council on Global Affairs

This is the first time for a panel focusing on immigration to be included as part of the Asan Plenum. All panelists agreed that this was an important new topic as there is now greater awareness that this is becoming a strategic issue. It is especially important to begin to understand how this issue will change the region in the coming decades given that the demographic imbalances emerge in Asia. But it is not only demographic imbalances around the region that will be important. It is also important to understand how technology is impacting the flow of people around the region and the world.

To begin the panel, Dr. Marie McAuliffe laid out four key trends impacting immigration around the world. The first was how the processes and products of globalization are transforming how people connect. Migrants now have access to real-time information from an increasing number of locations and this is changing the migration process. Increased access to information, as well as products like mobile money applications and dramatically reduced transportation costs, have made it far easier for people around the world to realize their migration aspirations.

Second, the binary constructs of forced and voluntary migration are breaking down. There is no acknowledgment that self-agency operates throughout the migration cycle, making it a dynamic process. This means that even those with a claim for international protection under the Refugee Convention are increasingly able to actively engage in migration.

Third, while the regulation of migration remains at the level of the

state, there are advances at the global and city level. The former relates directly to UN member states recognizing and taking action on the need to address migration more comprehensively at the international level. The latter is a direct result of a strong trend toward urbanization globally and that many international migrants gravitate toward cities.

The fourth trend is demographic transformations. Advanced economies, especially in North Asia and Eastern Europe, are seeing significant population declines. At the same time, other parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, have young populations but will likely face increasing difficulty to support employment and income generation strategies for future generations.



Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony noted that there had also been a concurrent change in the language of immigration. The world illegal immigrant was now being less used in favor of irregular immigrants. This is important, she noted, to ensure that the personal stories of this group of people were not lost. Understanding those personal stories was important in disaggregating illegal immigration from those displaced by, for example, natural disasters. This is particularly important in Southeast Asia where there are 3 million displaced by earthquakes, tsunamis, and typhoons. The increasing movement of irregular

immigrants had highlighted grey areas in providing for their security. Low-skilled workers are exploited by agents, irregular immigrants are stigmatized and stereotyped, and human trafficking is also a present danger.

One effect of the increasing urbanization of migration, according to Professor Gordon Flake, is the distinct gap between the lived experience and the picture of immigration overall. Australia illustrates the point. In Australia as a whole, roughly 30 percent of the population are immigrants. These populations are primarily centered in cities, and those in that city have the picture that Australia already has sufficient levels of immigration. But in the western parts of the country, there is still an acute need for more manpower. However, just 31 percent of Australians now say the country needs more people compared to 46 percent in 2010.

Sentiment in Korea is headed in a similar way as that of Australia according to Ms. Lee Jasmine. When once there was an acceptance by the public that more immigration would be needed, there is now growing opposition. The focus in Korea is multiculturalism, and there are research findings that younger students are open to increased multiculturalism while adults are headed in the opposite direction. Even so, Dr. Neil G. Ruiz noted that there is a recognition in most countries

that immigrants make countries stronger rather than taking jobs and social benefits. There were a few notable exceptions to this — Greece, Hungary, and Italy. Ms. Lee also pointed out that, despite common understanding, immigrants in Korea are also concentrated in Seoul. Many think that immigrants are primarily in rural areas. That is not the case. By ratio, there are higher numbers in rural areas, but by absolute numbers, there are many more in and around Seoul.

South Korea also faces the unique challenge in accepting and settling North Koreans who have fled the country. Dr. Jay Song noted that North Koreans that enter South Korea cannot be considered as refugees by South Korean law. This is for several reasons. First, South Korean law already considers them citizens. Second, North Koreans are often called defectors, which is ultimately a political — and negative — label. To recognize North Koreans as refugees, then North and South Korea have to be separate states. They fundamentally are separate states, but they are technically still at war. Until this is resolved, treating North Koreans as refugees is difficult.

Those that do escape North Korea and subsequently enter South Korea face difficulties in competing in the South Korean economy. They enter the country with a lack of English-language skills and have relatively little experience with computers. Because of these difficulties, Dr. Song noted that a few had chosen to go back to North Korea, with the idea that it was better to be equally poor than to be left behind in South Korea.

With the ongoing uncertainty surrounding immigration, Professor Flake pointed out that leadership truly matters on these issues. The impact of Donald Trump's rhetoric on immigration has echoed around the globe. The fundamental challenge is that of high-trust vs. low-trust people and societies. Establishing multilateral standards and norms requires high trust. But there are others, and they now seem to be resurgent, that thrive in low-trust situations. They seek to sow chaos and uncertainty, and this is what Donald Trump has accomplished. The question remains about how to combat the low trust sentiment, but there are no easy answers.



SESSION 2

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 10:45-12:15

Values or Interests?

Moderator

J. James Kim

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Speakers

Kent E. Calder

School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Fujisaki Ichiro

Nakasone Peace Institute

Gao Fei

China Foreign Affairs University

Linda Jakobson

China Matters

T.J. Pempel

University of California, Berkeley

Rapporteur

Ross Tokola

East-West Center in Washington D.C.

Dr. J. James Kim opened the panel by asking from an academic perspective whether values or interests should be the principles that determine nations' foreign policy and security, a question faced by both Korea and other countries around the world. Dr. Kim also asked what kinds of values are discussed in terms of values-based diplomacy and foreign policy.

Professor Kent E. Calder began with the observation that this is a classic question in international relations theory in the distinction between realists, who look at foreign policy in terms of concrete national security and economic interests, and idealists, who think in terms of norms or values. This distinction reflects in British 19th Century focus on the balance of power versus Woodrow Wilson's "make the world safe for democracy" in which transcendent values should determine the structure and nature of how international affairs operate. Professor Calder stated that these two conceptions have warred back and forth over the past two centuries alongside the increasing salience of values.

Professor Calder explained that idealism in its stress on values has historically been insisted upon, both in terms of moral concerns and instrumentally, during times of extremity such as during wars. This has appeared in democratic societies since the French Revolution. Examples include Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address during the American Civil War, which was affected by the severity of the conflict and appealed to values that would bring people together.

Professor T.J. Pempel argued, first, that the bifurcation of interests and ideas is a false dichotomy. He argued that in most instances, countries define their interests based on their conception of who they are and who they want to become. That means grappling with fundamental balancing questions regarding the advancement and protection of their interests.

Second, Professor Pempel discussed how national domestic politics shape ideas and interests, which is often overlooked in discussions of 19th century politics where interests are defined in terms of sovereignty, balance of power, etc. as well as in the wake of the Cold War. Professor Pempel argued that the two sides of the Cold War defined their values and interests in overlapping and similar ways, such as promoting their ideologies, forming alliances, and clashing in economic and political interests.



In East Asia, Professor Pempel posited that there are few countries operating in terms of a grand strategy to which powerful domestic actors are committed. Definitions of national interest are rather a function of competing ideas at the domestic level, as seen in Taiwan, South Korea, Myanmar, and China. In the United States, new administrations reject the policies of past administrations from opposing political parties. As such, values and interests are competitive in a domestic arena and lead to countries swinging back and forth in a pendulum effect in how they perceive their values and interests.

Ambassador Fujisaki Ichiro began by defining values as long-term interests. He went on to contrast U.S. directness in foreign policy with the more indirect approach of Japan and other East Asian

countries, particularly with respect to Japanese support of the United States in the region as well as of multilateralism and international organizations.

The values that the American founding fathers gave to the United States, Ambassador Fujisaki argued, are assets that China cannot challenge, whereas China can challenge the United States militarily and economically. On China, Ambassador Fujisaki remarked that China has not changed over the years, citing the WTO as an example of how China, despite international expectations, was never a “top WTO student.” For the U.S. part, he observed that given the 2020 presidential election, President Trump is more likely to take a tougher stance.

Dr. Gao Fei opened his presentation by explaining how the debate between values and interests has been ongoing in China for a long time, such as in the emphasis on values-based diplomacy by Chairman Mao and in Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on national interest. The rise of China has led to a dual structure in the region, with East Asian countries relying on China for economics and on the United States for security and politics, for which reason the choice between values and interests has sometimes been framed as a choice between China and the United States.

Dr. Gao instead argued that values and interests are mixed. The United States and China are not in a cold war situation, and share many interests in terms of people-to-people relations, trade, and security including with respect to the Korean Peninsula and Afghanistan. Amidst the cooperation and competition between China and the United States, Dr. Gao argues that even competition can lead to positive outcomes.



On values, Dr. Gao stressed the ways in which many values are shared across the region, and how countries learn from one another. He highlighted China’s reform and opening as an example of how China learned from other countries, rather than pursuing an entirely Chinese development model. Multilateralism is another example of a value that Dr. Gao believes China shares and has used to address challenges such as de-globalization because rules-based international organizations are in China’s interest. Dr. Gao recommended that Korea act as a bridge between China and the United States, given its position as an Asian country with thousands of years of history with China and as an advanced modern country that has close relations with the United States.

Ms. Linda Jakobson began her remarks by stating that the China Dream is incompatible with the liberal international order if it follows Xi Jinping’s definition of a China that, among other things, has the Chinese Communist Party in an absolute leadership role. This will be so if authoritarian values remain the norm and if Beijing’s pick-and-choose approach to abiding by international law continues to prevail.

Ms. Jakobson argued that China would not overturn the liberal international order, but would rather more pragmatically edit, coauthor, and write new chapters on how the international order is structured. China would especially wish to influence the rules and norms that govern advanced new emerging technologies such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, and the Internet, at which China is at the forefront of scientific research.

With respect to the region, Ms. Jakobson highlighted that China’s tendency to ignore some liberal international norms and values makes it easier for other countries to accept authoritarian norms, illiberal policies and practices. She warned that democracies, in general, must be wary of this and that smaller and middle-sized democracies such as South Korea and Australia should band together in multilateral fora to insist boldly that regional norms are negotiated and not dictated.

During the question-and-answer session, a European representative comparatively observed that there is an article in the EU constitution that states that EU foreign policy must be based on the same values that the EU was founded upon, which impacts EU relations with non-EU countries. Policies must also be adjusted in the short term to not lose sight of long-term goals.

Professor Pempel concluded the panel by arguing that the question of values or interests relates to the fundamental question of what kind of world we want to live in, i.e., what the long-term vision is. Focusing solely on peace and prosperity and neglecting the rule of law and human rights risks leading to a very different kind of world.

SESSION 3

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 13:30-15:00

Free Trade or Fair Trade?

Moderator

Asif Hasan Qureshi
Korea University

Speakers

Ahn Dukgeun
Seoul National University

Fukagawa Yukiko
Waseda University

Patrick Messerlin
Science Po Paris

Tami E. Overby
McLarty Associates

Rapporteur

Troy Stangarone
Korea Economic Institute of
America

With the shift in U.S. trade policy, the Session 3 panel on “Free Trade or Fair Trade?” looked at whether there is a trend in the global community to move from free trade to fair trade. However, one key issue for the panel was how to define the current international trade system and how reflective free and fair trade were of the current international trading arrangements.

For Professor Patrick Messerlin, free and fair trade do not exist in the real world. The idea of free trade comes from economics and the writings of David Ricardo. However, Ricardo and other scholars have noted that there are obstacles in the trading system that will prevent countries from ever truly achieving free trade. As for fair trade, it is a polite way of saying a country desires to pursue protectionist trade policies. Instead of a world of free or fair trade, he argued that we are living in a world of liberal trade, of which there are many variants.

Among the challenges the international trading system faces, Prof. Messerlin suggested that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been unable to deal with subsidies in agriculture, industry, and services, as well as subsidies designed to promote exports. It has also failed to deal with State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), but that was not a significant issue before China’s economic development. Chinese SOEs are a challenge of a different order because of the size of China, the size of the SOEs, and their ties to the state. What the WTO did well was to reduce tariffs and maintain the trading order during the global financial crisis; however, the system is now under strain because U.S. President Donald Trump is targeting the successes of the WTO.

In regards to U.S. concerns over the WTO dispute settlement system, Prof. Messerlin suggested that countries that remain willing to use the system for disputes that do not involve the United States should be allowed to and the door should be left open for the United States to return to the system at a later date.

Professor Ahn Dukgeun concurred with Prof. Messerlin’s contention that free trade and fair trade are misunderstood concepts. He said that fair trade really means managed trade, which seems to be growing more prevalent, while free trade requires rigorous rules and institutions. When China says that it is supporting free trade with the United States giving up its mantle of trade leadership, this is not really the case as China does not follow the rules.

In regard to the current trade talks between the United States and China, Prof. Ahn is unsure if the U.S. will be happy with any deal it gets in the long run, but that in the short run it will be a winner. The losers will be the countries of East Asia who will see significant trade distortion from any deal. One feature that Prof. Ahn suggested could be an interesting outcome from the talks



will be whether the enforcement mechanism codifies the trade balance as a metric for determining compliance. If it does, the agreement will introduce the seeds of a new global trade rule.

The United States is also changing the paradigm of trade with the new rules in the United States, Mexico, Canada (USMCA) FTA. When Korea renegotiated the KORUS FTA with the United States, it was not asked to include these new rules which raise questions about whether Korea will now be outside the U.S. trading system. If so, the only way back in maybe for Korea to join the TPP-11.



Ms. Tami E. Overby argued that the issue of free trade vs. fair trade has received significant attention in the United States, as Americans feel that they have not received a fair deal. This is part of the reason that Trump was elected. Under Trump the United States is moving away from rules-based trade towards managed trade and Trump is using tariffs to bring countries to the negotiating table.

While Trump called for both the KORUS FTA and NAFTA to be updated, no one objected to the idea of updating NAFTA as it needed modernizing. However, that could have been done through the original TPP, which Trump withdrew from on his third day in office. In the long run, history will likely view this as one of Trump's greatest strategic mistakes.

To pursue his agenda, Trump has misused trade rules, specifically the national security exemptions more commonly known as Section 232. The former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis is on record saying that steel imports, Trump's first use of Section 232, are not a risk to national security, but placing tariffs on U.S. allies as the administration did is a national security risk. Now there is the threat of Trump using Section 232 on automotive imports. Even Trump has admitted this would just be used as leverage in negotiations with Japan and the EU.

The change in U.S. strategy on trade has damaged U.S. credibility globally, and the use of tools such as Section 232 could come back to haunt the U.S. in the future as it is teaching other countries how to break the rules.

Much of the anxiety over free trade has been caused by the bubble in the U.S. that led to the global financial crisis. Having gone through a bubble before, Japan has gone through the process and concluded that free trade benefits everyone according to Professor Fukagawa Yukiko. This is why Japan is trying to see how it can contribute to WTO reform as chair of the G20 and has worked to keep the TPP alive. Japan has also sought to keep the TPP alive so, if the WTO were to collapse, a U.S.-led block could join it at a later date.

She also noted that much of the innovation today is from digital trade. However, while goods trade can be managed behind borders, it is hard to contain services within borders. This is partially why China has been successful in developing a strong artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystem. For these reasons, there needs to be a set of rational rules in place to govern AI that China is interested in enforcing as well.

SESSION 3

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 13:30-15:00

Arms Control

Moderator

Kato Yoichi

Asia Pacific Initiative

Speakers

Abe Nobuyasu

Harvard Belfer Center for
Science and International
Affairs

Alexander Gabuev

Carnegie Moscow Center

Park Jiyoung

The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Nicolas Regaud

French Ministry of Defense

Rapporteur

John Jihyung Lee

Yonsei University

Mr. Kato Yoichi began the session titled “Arms Control” by proposing four guiding questions for the session. First, are we entering a new arms race? Second, what impact will the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty have in Northeast Asia? Third, will a new multilateral arms regime emerge in Asia? Lastly, what are the implications of the 2018 Inter-Korean Military Agreement on the Republic of Korea’s arms build-up?

Mr. Abe Nobuyasu, the first panelist to speak, was certain that Asia has already entered into an arms race with the inclusion of new players such as China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and potentially Iran. Furthermore, the development of nuclear and ballistic weapons, weapons in space, cyber weapons, hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence for warfare, and high-precision weapons have complicated the nature of the arms race. One of the major consequences of this arms race in the Asia Pacific has been the blurring of the border between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, which has increased the potential for nuclear confrontations. With regard to the United States’ intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty, Mr. Abe Nobuyasu explained that if the U.S. is no longer bounded by the treaty, it is free to deploy ground-based intermediate nuclear missiles in places like Guam, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. He did acknowledge that local resistance, especially in Korea and Japan, will be formidable. He remained skeptical that the United States’ withdrawal from the treaty was motivated by China’s military rise. His reasoning was that China could be countered with airborne and seaborne missiles. He was also pessimistic



about the prospect of a new arms regime in Asia simply because of the asymmetric balance between the American and Chinese military arsenal. The United States has predominantly long-range ballistic missiles while China has more intermediate and short-range ballistic missiles.

Mr. Alexander Gabuev provided a Russian angle on the issue of arms control. He stated that the U.S. intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty has rendered arms control irrelevant. He argued that conditions that allowed the INF Treaty to work were no longer present. First, the United States and Russia are no longer competing in a Cold War environment. Second, there is no military parity and mutual respect between the two countries. Lastly, there is a general lack of fear regarding the possibility of a nuclear calamity. As such, he assessed that a return to the arms control regime is unlikely. Russia no longer seeks military parity with the United States. Rather, it is satisfied with a minimally sufficient asymmetrical deterrence mechanism. More importantly, Russia does not believe that the arms control regime is the pillar of stability in U.S.-Russia relations. Mr. Gabuev agreed with the previous speaker that the introduction of new types of weapons, i.e., cyber weapons, artificial intelligence, and space-based systems, will further complicate efforts to build an arms control regime. He also pointed to the return of great power competition and the lack of mutual understanding among states to cooperate as deterrents to bilateral as well as multilateral arms control regimes. He concluded that discussions at the 1.5- and 2-Track levels must take place in order to deal institutionally with this modern-day problem.

Dr. Park Jiyoung concurred with the previous panelists that Northeast Asia is already engaged in an arms race. Korea, Japan, Australia, China, and Russia have continued to upgrade their military capabilities and, within the next few years, we may witness the Northeast Asian hemisphere being crowded with 400 or so invisible aircraft. Subsequently, this will trigger a race for technologies

to counter such invisible aircraft. With the collapse of the INF Treaty looming and with major non-proliferation regimes failing to curtail North Korea's nuclear program, the region is in dire need of an arms control architecture. Dr. Park added that North Korea's nuclear program has added another layer of complexity to the region's arms race, with relevant parties taking on different priorities. The United States has tried to halt the North's nuclear program but has enjoyed little success. China has been supportive of denuclearization even though its main objective has been to



reduce American presence in the region. South Korea, especially with the inauguration of President Moon Jae-in, has chosen to engage with the North. The September 2018 Inter-Korean Military Agreement was an extension of this engagement

strategy. The agreement received criticisms that it will provide North Korea with asymmetric military advantages over the South. However, Dr. Park stated that South Korea has been building up its own military capabilities, mainly by continuing to purchase American aircraft and arms.

Dr. Nicolas Regaud offered the French perspective on the North Korean nuclear issue. He argued that France, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has a direct stake in the resolution of North Korea's nuclear crisis. Despite efforts at the UN level, North Korea has made great progress and now poses a direct threat to European and global security, as well as to the global non-proliferation regime. Dr. Regaud warned that North Korea is not only an East Asian crisis but a European crisis. In addressing this issue, he urged European nations to contribute by strictly implementing the UNSC sanctions regime. In particular, he urged France and the UK to take part in air and sea activities to fight against North Korea's sanctions-busting initiatives. As French President Emmanuel Macron told Korean President Moon during their summit meeting in April, France is willing to provide technical expertise in disarmament to help resolve the North Korean crisis. In terms of the challenges associated with dealing with the North, Dr. Regaud stressed the importance of developing mutual trust between North Korea and the rest of the world. He also emphasized the need for North Korea to change its strategic calculus and to walk genuinely towards the path of denuclearization. He concluded by urging members of the UN to continue the path laid out by the UNSC, to exert maximum pressure on North Korea, and to urge China and Russia to take full part in the denuclearization efforts.

During the question and answer session, Mr. Kato Yoichi exercised his privilege as the moderator to invite Dr. Yao Yunzhu to speak about the Chinese view on arms control. Dr. Yao first addressed the popular perception that China was the reason behind the United States' decision to abandon the INF Treaty. She pointed out that the INF Treaty was fundamentally a Trans-Atlantic treaty, not a Trans-Pacific treaty. China was not a factor when the treaty was first concluded in 1987 and it is not the "official" reason why the U.S. has decided to withdraw. Therefore, there is no reason for China to bear the responsibility for the breakdown of the INF Treaty. In fact, Dr. Yao argued that China is opposed to the United States' decision because it firmly believes that the treaty is one of the most important pillars of the global arms control regime. She added that Chinese security concerns are peripheral, not global, in nature. In other words, China's security concerns revolve around the 14 borders that China shares with its neighbors. To include China in the discussion of the INF Treaty is, therefore, not fair and to ask China to give up 70-90% of its missile strike capabilities in exchange for nothing from the U.S. and Russia is not possible. She concluded by saying that China welcomes an arms control regime but only if all relevant nuclear powers are involved and include air-based as well as sea-based intermediate missiles.

SESSION 3

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 13:30-15:00

Technology Competition or Cooperation?

Moderator

Lee Dongmin
Dankook University

Speakers

Tai Ming Cheung
University of California, San Diego

Min Eun Joo
World Intellectual Property Organization Judicial Institute

Michael Sulmeyer
Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University

Yaacob Bin Ibrahim
Singapore Institute of Technology

Rapporteur

Peter Lee
Australian National University

Session 3 on “Technology Competition or Cooperation?” discussed the impact that emerging technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, quantum computing, and autonomous systems were having on East Asia’s geopolitical landscape. Rapid advances in cyber security capabilities as well as growing competition over intellectual property were also highlighted as important indicators of the shifting center of gravity towards East Asia, most visibly associated with the rise of China. Dr. Lee Dongmin, Associate Professor at Dankook University, opened the session by noting that these new technologies would dominate how states approached the Fourth Industrial Revolution and have major implications for international security.

Dr. Tai Ming Cheung, Director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California, San Diego, began his remarks by noting that U.S.-China rivalry today, while often described as representing a new Cold War, was far more complicated and comprehensive. In the past, inter-state competition in the defense and commercial spheres had been separate, but current U.S.-China competition now encapsulated both the Cold War geostrategic competition of U.S.-Soviet Union relations and the geo-economic competition of U.S.-Japan relations of previous decades. Dr. Cheung noted that China differed from either the Soviet Union or Japan in that it was a “techno-security state” which focuses on national security while using economic and technological capabilities in support of national security. Core features of the current Chinese model included a strong national security state; an advanced defense science, technology, and industrial base; and an integrated civil-

military economic base with significant investment in emerging technologies. Dr. Cheung observed that China was pursuing a “selective authoritarian mobilization model” with regard to a technology whereby Chinese officials were selecting key areas where they could deploy resources, such as AI, and promoting a top-down investment in contrast to the market-driven bottom-up process of technological development in the West. He concluded by stating that the U.S. and others needed to be much more targeted in dealing with China on these technologies.



Ms. Min Eun Joo, Director of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Judicial Institute, next outlined the current state of intellectual property rights and how it signified broader trends in technological innovation. Dr. Joo stated that intellectual property filings were a useful indicator of the changing geography of technological production and protection. Dr. Joo noted that of the 3.2 million national patent applications internationally last year, China accounted for 1.4 million, with the U.S. and South Korea coming a distant second and fourth, at 607,000 and 205,000, respectively. Similarly, she pointed out that 65 percent of patent applications now came from Asia, with China following closely behind the United States with 53,000 applications in 2017. Together, these trends were an important reflection of extraordinary geopolitical transformations and the shift from the West to the East. Regarding U.S.-China trade tensions and debates over intellectual property, Dr. Joo added

that one-third of the value of global manufactured products can now be sourced to “intangible capital,” a product’s branding and technology. These global elements of production have included the falling costs of cross-border trade, more open trade policies, and modern information and communications technologies. Dr. Joo added that states nonetheless continued to engage with existing institutions such as the World Trade Organization to protect their intellectual property rights. For instance, the United States had won 19 of the 23 cases it had filed against China at the WTO. Moreover, intellectual property theft was not simply an issue between the U.S. and China, but between a number of states. Finally, Dr. Joo noted that there was a growing trend towards more protectionist positions as technological change was disrupting production to be closer to the end consumers.

Professor Michael Sulmeyer, a senior fellow at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, next provided an overview of a specific case of technological competition in the domain of cyber-attacks.

From a national security perspective, the development and deployment of increasingly powerful cyber weapons represented the future battleground of competition. He outlined the concept of “indiscriminate destruction” in which cyber-attacks were not aimed at as specific targets but rather than causing maximum damage. One specific example of a cyber threat seeking indiscriminate destruction was the “NotPetya” cyber-attack attributed to Russian actors. Whereas the “Petya” ransomware attack sought to extort payments from users to unlock their computers, the “NotPetya” attack was designed to destroy any device it infected rather than extort its victims. While the initial target had been Ukraine, the code quickly spread around the world and crippled multinational companies, resulting in over \$10 billion in damage. Professor Sulmeyer noted that the attack galvanized an international response, led by ten countries to coordinate their policies through diplomats and at the inter-state level to try and prevent a reoccurrence of such an attack by reducing excessive risks.

Finally, Professor Yaacob Bin Ibrahim, a Professor of engineering at the Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT) and former Singaporean Minister for Communications and Information, focused on how data protection and cyber security were two key issues where technological competition could be shifted towards cooperation. Offering a Southeast Asian perspective on technological cooperation, Professor Yaacob emphasized that there was a lack of global consensus on the appropriate norms governing these changes and how states should behave. Current efforts were mostly voluntary and many companies operated across borders and multiple jurisdictions, meaning that there were very few international treaties targeting issues such as data protection. The lack of commonly agreed norms was also evident in the development of military technologies with states often pushing ahead on their own. On cyber security, Professor Yaacob noted that fostering responsible cyber norms was important and a key first step that needed to be addressed with building capacity among developing countries in terms of their cyber infrastructure as well as greater information sharing on threats. Finally, on the regulation of the internet and emerging technologies, he concluded by saying that there needed to be a proper discussion on what degree of regulation was required on emerging platforms such as social media and data protection among stakeholders.

During the discussion section, the speakers discussed how diplomacy could help mitigate state insecurity and unclear intentions over emerging technologies. Professor Sulmeyer outlined the “cyber security dilemma” and the interpretation of cyber capabilities as either offensive or defensive in nature and pointed out that it was very difficult to signal intentions in the cyber domain. On a question about how technological change could promote innovation and development in other regions, Dr. Cheung without adequate building blocks such as education and human capital then innovation would be challenging. Finally, panelists discussed how technological competition needed to be understood in the context of both national security and economic growth to also identify opportunities for cooperation.



PLENARY SESSION IV

Date | April 24, 2019
Time | 15:15-16:45

CVID or “Peaceful” Co-existence?

Moderator

Choi Kang

The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Speakers

Evans J.R. Revere

Albright Stonebridge Group

Thae Yong-ho

Former North Korean Diplomat

Yamaguchi Noboru

International University of Japan

Yao Yunzhu

Academy of Military Sciences,
People's Liberation Army


Rapporteur

Ben Forney


Kialo

The final Plenary session, “CVID or ‘Peaceful’ Co-existence?”, looked at the choices of South Korea and the international community to resolve the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Mr. Evans Revere opened the discussion with the acknowledgment that the world has given North Korea the opportunity to abandon their nuclear weapons program, but they have resolved to keep it. He stressed that any negotiations must involve the leader, Kim Jong Un, but after several attempts, Kim has signaled that he is not sincere about abandoning his nuclear capabilities in any meaningful way. The failure of the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi was due to North Korea’s disinterest in pursuing a real denuclearization deal. Mr. Revere argued that there is plenty of evidence that the regime plans to remain a nuclear power, as Kim Jong Un himself has stated in his speeches and announcements. Mr. Revere questioned whether the international community can live with a nuclear North Korea long-term, and whether the current level of sanctions is sufficient to pressure the regime into changing its behavior. Today, the trend from neighboring countries, including China, Russia, South Korea, and President Trump in the USA, is to ease pressure on the regime. Mr. Revere argued that this is not the path towards denuclearization, but acceptance of the status quo. Maximum or “massive” pressure is the better option, as that is the only way to squeeze North Korea’s economy and convince Kim Jong Un that only denuclearization will save his regime.

Mr. Thae Yong-ho analyzed the outcome of the Hanoi summit, claiming that the sudden collapse of the talks was surprising. As a result, the image of Kim Jong Un as an indefatigable leader



Choi Kang




Evans J.R. Revere



Thae Yong-ho



Yamaguchi Noboru



Yao Yunzhu

has been shaken. By following North Korean media coverage of the event, Mr. Thae argued that the outcome was only delivered to the North Korean people long after the fact and lacked the optimistic tone that had been present before the summit. This tone sought to present Kim as a resilient leader, despite the setback. However, the Hanoi summit was the first time during nuclear negotiations with the U.S. that North Korea’s reputation was severely hit. The failure of Hanoi also forced North Korea to make internal, structural changes to their leadership, which highlighted a

shift from military to civilian industries. Mr. Thae argued that Kim Jong Un's post-Hanoi strategy is to maintain North Korea's status as a nuclear power while easing sanctions. The first stage of this strategy is to present himself as a determined and unyielding leader to the North Korean people and receive support from China and Russia. New missile tests after the Hanoi summit were intended to showcase his strength both domestically and abroad. The second stage, coming later this year, will have Kim once again turn towards dialogue with the U.S. in exchange for partial alleviation of sanctions. Mr. Thae concluded by saying that President Trump is more concerned with a moratorium on

testing than actually denuclearizing North Korea, and as a result, the region is not safe yet.

LTG. Yamaguchi Noboru discussed potential long-term outcomes of coexistence with North Korea and acknowledged that the failure to achieve CVID is the most likely scenario, but whether there will be peaceful or confrontational co-existence remains unresolved. He emphasized the physical threat of North Korea's missiles, especially the mid-range missiles that threaten Japan, the short-range missiles that threaten South Korea, and the long-range missiles that threaten the United States. He argued

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CVID or "Peaceful"
Co-existence?



that North Korea is a bellwether for the existence of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. A message should be sent to North Korea and all rogue regimes that the pursuit of nuclear weapons will be met with resistance. LTG. Yamaguchi ended by warning of the threat perception gap that exists between countries and the role that all stakeholders can play to help resolve the nuclear issue.

Dr. Yao Yunzhu began by emphasizing that there are more than two choices when dealing with North Korea. She argued that China's goal is to peacefully denuclearize the Korean peninsula by maintaining the current positive momentum via diplomatic channels. This will bring about closer cooperation between North Korea and the international community. Further summits would be helpful to capitalize on Kim Jong Un's active diplomacy initiatives over the past few years. The international community should not assume that Kim Jong Un is going to try to pull the same tricks as his father to fool the international community. Dr. Yao stressed that there are different ideas of denuclearization between the varying countries, which need to be clarified. If the final goal is peaceful denuclearization, then there should be a results-based approach, whether through a large deal or a series of small deals. All parties involved must be willing to take risks if any progress is going to be made. Any plans must be mutually beneficial, which is why China supports step-by-step denuclearization. Dr. Yao praised the policies of President Moon and explained that China supports further summits and high-level meetings between the two leaders.


The panelists discussed the role of the ROK as a mediator between the U.S. and North Korea, with Mr. Revere arguing that the ROK can't be an effective mediator, as it is an ally of the U.S. He explained how Kim Jong Un's recent New Year's speeches were largely directed at South Koreans in order to improve inter-Korean relations at the expense of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Mr. Thae argued that South Korea needs to be more practical in dealing with North Korea by not making promises to Kim Jong Un that they cannot control. There was a lively discussion about the meaning of 'denuclearization', with Dr. Yao arguing that U.S. extended nuclear deterrence should also be removed




from South Korea. Mr. Thae then explained how North Korea has insisted that denuclearization should involve the elimination of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Dr. Yao emphasized that this is a policy issue, not a capability issue, by which she explained that institutionalizing a policy of non-nuclear deterrence from the U.S. would placate the DPRK and incentivize them to denuclearize. Mr. Thae pointed out that, from a historical perspective, the U.S. has a record of strategic reversals and withdrawals, which is why the North Koreans believe that an eventual removal of U.S. troops from South Korea is a possibility. The panel concluded with a discussion of North Korea's internal leadership shakeup following the Hanoi summit, with Mr. Thae arguing that the subsequent changes have forced Kim Jong Un to be more practical when dealing with the United States.

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
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
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
Total Participation in 2019 (number of persons)




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
Speakers by Category in 2019 (number of persons)




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
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
Total Participation by Category in 2019 (%)



Total Participation by Country and Continents in 2019 (number of persons)



Total Participation by Country and Continents in 2019 (%)





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