



The Enduring Alliance:
Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of ROK-US Relations

Proceedings
June 24 - 25, 2013

THE ASAN INSTITUTE
for POLICY STUDIES



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GREETINGS FROM THE PRESIDENT

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the *Asan Washington Forum 2013*.

Korea is an icon of successful development. Yet, its success would not have been possible without the United States. By serving as an anchor and shield, for sixty years the ROK-US alliance has been the bedrock of Korea's prosperity.


Today, the alliance is more than a narrow interest-driven partnership. It is a true friendship that transcends presidents, opinion polls, or the occasional disagreement. After sixty years of success, the alliance is also ready to meet the challenges of the future: some old, some new.

It is in this vein that the Asan Institute for Policy Studies is proud to host the first *Asan Washington Forum*. Despite the importance that policy makers on both sides of the Pacific attribute to the alliance, there have been remarkably few opportunities in which experts can meet and share their views and insights.

This year's forum will gather more than 150 leading experts, policymakers, scholars and members of the media in Washington, DC to discuss the past, present, and future of the alliance and the key regional and global changes likely to shape it.

Thank you for joining us and we look forward to your intellectual contribution and fellowship throughout the Forum.

Sincerely,



Hahm Chaibong
President

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

ABOUT THE ASAN WASHINGTON FORUM



The *Asan Washington Forum* is a gathering of leading figures in Korean, American, and East Asian public affairs for a two-day, multi-session conference in Washington, DC. Organized by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, the Forum seeks to inform the policymaking discourse in the United States by bringing fresh insights to some of the most pressing challenges confronting the ROK-US alliance in the twenty-first century.

“The Enduring Alliance: Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of ROK-US Relations”

The Republic of Korea and the United States of America share a remarkable history forged over decades of shared struggles and triumphs. In May, President Park Geun-hye chose to make her first official overseas trip to the United States, reaffirming her commitment to the alliance and

its continued importance. Bilateral cooperation continues to deepen across a range of fields, with a raft of new agreements promising to unlock untapped economic and social potential. As America looks to Asia as the future of the global order, the ROK-US alliance will remain a linchpin of peace and security.

But no future is secure. North Korea’s belligerent behavior, China’s growing ambitions, Japan’s rightward shift, and a resurgent Russia all have the potential to destabilize the region. But threats to the alliance can also come from within. A disengaged America, tired by a decade of war, economic crisis, and domestic concerns, weakens the alliance. An introverted Korea, unwilling to share the burden of leadership or the cost of defense, also makes for a weak ally.

As the ROK-US alliance enters uncharted territory, this year’s forum will reflect on how Korean and American policymakers overcame the hurdles of the past and what they should do to prepare for the challenges of the future. It will ask how we can ensure peace and prosperity for this generation and those to come.



ABOUT THE ASAN INSTITUTE

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies was founded with a mission to become an independent think tank that provides effective policy solutions to issues which are critical to Korea, East Asia, and the rest of the world.

The Institute aims to foster wide-ranging and in-depth public discussions which are essential for a healthy society. By focusing on areas including foreign affairs, national security, public governance, energy, and the environment, it strives to address some of the major challenges that our society faces today.



The Institute addresses these challenges not only by supplying in-depth policy analysis but also by endeavoring to promote a global and regional environment favorable to peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

In addition to policy analysis and research, the Institute undertakes the training of specialists in public diplomacy and related areas in an effort to contribute to Korea's ability to creatively shape its own future.

DAY 1

June 24, 2013

Session 1 Sixty Years of the Alliance

Moderator Hahm Chaibong

Speakers Burwell B. Bell, William Cohen, Han Sung-Joo, Park Jin

Rapporteur Nadia Bulkin

Session 2 The Alliance and North Korea

Moderator David Sanger

Speakers Kim Sung-han, Michael O'Hanlon, Gary Samore
Walter Sharp, Yu Myung Hwan

Rapporteur Clare Lynch

Session 3 The Future of the Alliance

Moderator Choi Kang

Speakers Kil Jeong-Woo, Lee Chung Min, Mark Minton
Douglas Paal, Paul Wolfowitz

Rapporteur Nadia Bulkin

Session 4 The Alliance and the Future of East Asia

Moderator David Rennie

Speakers Graham Allison, Richard Bush, Kurt Campbell
Hahm Chaibong, Joe Lieberman

Rapporteur Clare Lynch

OPENING CEREMONY

Date | June 24, 2013
Time | 09:00-10:30



Opening Remarks

Chung Mong Joon

Honorary Chairman,
The Asan Institute
for Policy Studies

Good morning. Vice President Richard Cheney, Secretary William Cohen, distinguished guests and friends.

This morning, we are going to talk about Korea and our relationship with the US. Before I start to talk about this important issue, I want to tell you a joke.

A North Korean teacher asks his students, “Comrades, among all the economic systems in the world, which one is the greatest?” To which a student replies, “Well, it is a rather difficult question to answer.” The teacher quickly corrects the student: “What kind of answer is that? Very clearly there is only one answer! Our Juche self-reliance system! It is the greatest in the world, and it is destined to conquer South Korea, and take over the world!” After a bit of silence, the student replies, “Well, that is great, comrade teacher. But if we are too successful and end up conquering the world, then who are we going to ask for food aid?”

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korea-US alliance. According to Korea's traditional calendar, 60 years marks a full cycle of the zodiac, an occasion for celebration, reflection and renewal. Today, we are gathered here to remember, reflect, and renew our alliance. We remember the veterans of the Korean War who “answered the call to defend a country they never knew and a people they never met.” These words, inscribed at the Korean War Veterans Memorial, movingly capture the character and history of the alliance.

Americans and Koreans hardly knew each other. In terms of history and culture, we shared so little. In terms of political tradition and economic systems, no two countries could be more different. Yet, America's young men answered the call because they knew that they were not only defending Korea, but defending freedom, the ultimate human value. As yet another inscription at the memorial reminds us, they understood that “freedom is not free.” 1.8 million American men answered the call. 37,000 made the ultimate sacrifice. The Korea-US alliance was born of such sacrifices, consecrated by them.

In 1951, at the height of the Korean War, I was born in the southern port city of Busan. Had it not been for the US intervention, I would not be



here today. Thank you for coming to our rescue. I owe you one. All Koreans enjoying freedom today feel the same.

On such foundations, modern Korea was built. From the shattered ruins of the war, we have built our “city on the hill.” 60 years ago we were a country that had only experienced absolutism, colonialism, and authoritarianism. Today, we are the most vibrant democracy in Asia. 60 years ago, we were the poorest country in the world. Today, we are a model of economic development studied by many developing countries.

All this was possible because of the military security and political model that the US has provided. Yet, even as we remember the sacrifices and celebrate the success of the alliance, a moment's reflection shows us that our work is not yet completed. As Korea's national division continues, the Korean War has not ended.

North Korea has developed nuclear weapons. It claims itself to be a nuclear power and continues to threaten both South Korea and the US. North Korea's nuclear weapons represent the single greatest failure of the alliance. As Professor Graham Allison wrote in his book *Nuclear Terrorism*, "North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and a nuclear weapons production line promises to become the greatest failure in the nearly 230-year history of American foreign policy."

To South Koreans, North Korea's development of nuclear weapons is the greatest threat to our lives in our 5,000 years of history. That is why we need to reflect on the adequacy of the alliance structure and arrangements that can cope with this new, deadly challenge.

At the recent US-China summit, President Obama and President Xi Jinping agreed on the denuclearization of North Korea in principle. While we welcome this development, there also seems to be subtle differences in the threat perception among the three concerned countries—the United States, China and South Korea. For South Korea, our house is on fire; for China, it is a fire next door; and for the US, it is a fire across the river.

In South Korea, many people worry that the US and China are more concerned with non-proliferation than CVID, "complete, verifiable, irreversible, denuclearization." In other words, the US and China may be inclined to managing rather than solving the problem. In order to maintain peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula we need to put all options on the table. We need to think the unthinkable to prevent the unthinkable.

First, as a negative incentive measure, US tactical nuclear weapons that were withdrawn in 1991 should be re-introduced to South Korea as a part of the US nuclear umbrella. The presence of a counter-nuclear force may be the only thing that will convince North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal by making our deterrent posture more credible across the spectrum.

Second, the agreement between South Korea and the US to transfer wartime operational control to South Korean forces in 2015 should be nullified, as was recently called for by General BB Bell, the former commander of the US Forces in Korea.

Distinguished guests and friends, today, the world is changing. The traditional center of the world is moving from the Trans-Atlantic axis to the Pacific. The United States and China are at the center of this shift. Everyone is interested in the future of US-China relations.

In his recent visit to the US, President Xi called for "a new model of major country relationship." We hope that his remark signals a new era of cooperation between the United States and China. We also hope that the US and China will continue to work together for their mutual interests and the benefit of the international community. South Korea, as an ally of the US as well as a strategic cooperative partner of China, has the most to gain from the success, and the most to lose from the failure, in US-China relations.

For the US, we will remain a trusted ally even after reunification. It is time for us to start to discuss the desirable regional architecture in the post reunification era. For China, Korea has historically been a good neighbor and it will remain so for the future. The progress of the bilateral relationship between South Korea and China can serve the vital interests of the US in East Asia.

What is important is that the three countries can and should work together for universal values; peace, international norms, and human rights, for the peace and prosperity in East Asia. When we look at the sheer magnitude of the geopolitics of the vast Eurasian continent, the fact that a small country like South Korea, located at the tip of the continent, remains a free democracy is a miracle, a miracle in progress.

Distinguished guests and friends, the responsibility to continue this miracle into the future has now fallen upon our shoulders. South Korea has no greater friend in the world than America. South Korea did not come this far on its own. For 60 years, South Korea and the United States have been through thick and thin together. We have forged an alliance that defends more than just our national interests. It is an alliance that defends our shared values of freedom and peace.

As we celebrate the 60th anniversary of our alliance, I sincerely hope that this forum contributes to the beginning of the next 60 years of our friendship.

Let me conclude by saying "We Go Together, 같이 갑시다."

Thank you very much.

Keynote Address

Richard Cheney

Former Vice President
of the United States

I am delighted to have the opportunity to spend a little time with you this morning. I think it is clearly a historically significant event to mark the 60th anniversary of the ROK-US relationship. MJ talked about being born in 1951 in Korea. I have a memory from my early days in 1953 when I was 12 years old. We lived in Lincoln, Nebraska and my mother worked in the State Capitol Building as a secretary in the Health Department. But she insisted that my brother and I come down one day to the rotunda of the capitol there in Lincoln because there was a very special ceremony to recognize a young man who had grown up on a farm in rural Nebraska, Nebraska farm boy, but he was a sergeant in the United States Army and had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions in combat in Korea. It was one of those events that stands out from that period some 60 years ago in my mind, but it was an example, if you will, of the extent to which the nation was committed to the effort that was undertaken in 1950 to 1953 to defend South Korea that laid the foundation for the relationship that has been so important, I think, to both nations over those last 60 years.



I know how important it was from a military standpoint. I had the opportunity to visit Korea on a number of occasions as Secretary of Defense and that was one of our closest and warmest and I think most effective military-to-military relationships that we had any place in the world. What I wanted to do this morning is talk about some concerns I have that really deal with the broader context within which our relationship with South Korea must proceed. I am very concerned. The current state of affairs, not with respect to the United States and the Republic of Korea, but with respect to what I believe are the policies of weakness, if you will, on the part of the current administration with respect to how we address an enormously challenging set of circumstances. And those circumstances, in no small part, represented by North Korea and the danger that I think North Korea represents, not only for South Korea, but for the United States and the far broader problem that we have of the proliferation of nuclear technologies in various parts of the world.

If we think back to the circumstances that we faced in 9/11, in the immediate aftermath of that, one of our great concerns was that there would be a follow-on attack after 9/11; that it would be carried out by a terrorist using far deadlier weapons than airline tickets and box cutters, which is all they had on 9/11 and of course on that day, they launched an attack on the United States that was worse than the attack on Pearl Harbor: the loss of 3,000 American lives, destruction of the World Trade Center, major damage to the Pentagon, and would have taken out either the White House or the Capitol Building if it hadn't been for the passengers on Flight 93. So as we responded to that, one of the key decisions we made was that we were no longer when we dealt with terrorism dealing just with a law enforcement problem. But rather, we were at war. That an attack on the United States that destroyed the World Trade Center, damaged the Pentagon, killed 3,000 of our people wasn't a law enforcement problem. It was indeed an act of war. And following from that, and trying to adjust our strategies and develop the programs and capabilities we needed to guard against that next attack and contemplate the possibility that the next wave of attacks might involve chemical weapons, or perhaps biological weapons, or even a nuclear device.

We had intelligence at the time in the aftermath of 9/11 that the Al Qaeda organization was actively seeking nuclear capabilities. So it was a very

real threat, and I think it continues to be a very real threat today. And that as we look at the world and the set of circumstances that we're faced with now that indeed, the threat is growing in my mind because of the proliferation of nuclear technology to rogue states, or states that I would describe as rogue states, that it's a continuing problem. We made some progress with respect to those issues in the Bush administration, but we didn't always get it right. And if anything, the problem has spread, expanded, become more serious since then. My bottom line concern is that I don't believe this administration has the proper appreciation for the nature of the threat and I think there are policies that they've put in place or are contemplating that will make it more difficult for the United States to be able to do what we need to do because we're the only ones who can do it, deal with, head off, and prevent those threats from metastasizing, or becoming even more significant than they are already.

If you look at what we encountered in our concerns about nuclear proliferation, if you will, when we took down Saddam Hussein, obviously a controversial policy in the United States, but I believe absolutely the right one, we took down a regime that had previously produced and used weapons of mass destruction and a regime that had on at least two prior occasions had an active effort underway to develop nuclear weapons. The first one ended in 1981 when the Israelis destroyed the Osirak outside Baghdad and a second one in 1991, when we put a significant dent in the program during Operation Desert Storm. But when we eliminated Saddam Hussein, we significantly reduced, or certainly eliminated at that point, Iraq as a potential source for the proliferation of nuclear capabilities.

When Muammar Gaddafi saw that development in Libya, he stepped forward and surrendered his materials. He didn't want to be next so we received from him, still in US possession, the basic weapons design that he'd acquired, the centrifuge technology and one of the feed stock that he had acquired to develop his own nuclear weapons. After we took down that program, we then followed up by disabling, if you will, and putting out of business the black market network that had been developed by A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear weapon. And that program ended when Mr. Khan was placed under house arrest. Libya had been his biggest customer, but he had been dealing with others as well: with Iraq, with North Korea. So three major sources of proliferation were then elimi-

nated. That was one of our objectives, obviously, in what we were pursuing in that period of time.

But what we found as we went forward was evidence of the extent to which North Korea was directly involved in those developments in the Middle East. It wasn't just a regional problem in the sense that the North Koreans obviously tested their first nuclear device in late 2006. We discovered, even though they'd been involved directly with the United States, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan in the so-called Six-Party Talks, that during that whole period they had been actively and aggressively building in Syria a nuclear reactor using the technology they had up at Yongbyon. And in the spring of 2007, we discovered the fact of a nearly complete reactor at Al Kabar in eastern Syria, courtesy of North Koreans. The North Koreans, in effect, if there's a way to describe it, I think has been the most dangerous proliferators of nuclear weapons technology. So our problem, when we look at North Korea isn't just with respect to the Korean Peninsula, or even with respect to the region in Asia, it is the fact that they have already provided nuclear weapons technology, attempted to do so, to one of the worst terrorist sponsoring states in the world, Syria.

And today, we're obviously very concerned about developments in Syria and the administration wrestling with the question of how they should get involved or what efforts we should make in Syria, with respect to the conflict there. One of the things that everyone is deeply concerned about is chemical weapons because Syria had a significant stock of chemical weapons. But imagine how much worse that situation would be today if that North Korean-built nuclear reactor had not been taken out and destroyed by the Israelis in the fall of 2007. It would be a far more dangerous situation than it already is, and it is already a very difficult, complicated situation. We found during the course of our work, and obviously I'm only talking about what's publicly available, I don't have access anymore to classified information, but we also found that Mr. A.Q. Khan made public statements within the past couple of years that North Korea had bribed senior Pakistani officials to acquire uranium enrichment technology, which the North Koreans now have and are using. There's been an American scientist who had been an eye witness observer of the program in North Korea of some 2000 operating centrifuges producing highly enriched uranium of far more sophisticated technology than they

had with their old 1950s, British-era plant that relied on developing plutonium up at Yongbyon. So the North Koreans went to the Pakistanis, supposedly bribed senior Pakistani officials for that capability. When we were negotiating with them back during the Bush administration, they kept insisting they did not have a uranium enrichment program. They repeated that over and over again. Our State Department did not handle it very well, but obviously they did have a program, it was up and operating and they now are clearly producing more highly enriched uranium to develop more weapons.

The situation with respect to the proliferation continues to be dire. I haven't even talked about Iran yet. And that's front and center as a major concern obviously as well, too. North Korea has also helped, provided assistance in the area of the development of ballistic missiles to Iran and Iraq as well at various times in the past. We are rapidly approaching the point now where both North Korea and probably, shortly, Iran, will have nuclear capability, probably weapons sophisticated enough to be able to represent a significant threat able to miniaturize warheads enough to put them on the tops of ballistic missiles so that they become a very real threat from the standpoint of the neighbors in the region, and obviously potentially even the United States of America. If you consider that development and the continuing escalation, if you will, we find ourselves in a situation where frankly, I believe, the administration's policies are totally inadequate to address that emerging threat. Barack Obama, of course, recently announced that he's very interested in reducing the US nuclear inventory and our stockpile of strategic weapons. It's hard to tell at this point whether he means that's a unilateral move he plans to take, or whether it's going to be negotiated with the Russians. What it reminds me of, though, is a situation which, 30 or 40 years ago, maybe even 20 years ago when I was Secretary of Defense and we worked as the Soviet Union imploded, as the Warsaw Pact went out of business, we did find ourselves in a situation where the threat had diminished and we adjusted accordingly, both with respect to our strategic and tactical nuclear weapons as well as conventional forces.

But as I listen to President Obama talk, it's as though he's back in that time slot 20 or 30 years ago, when one of our major problems was our relationship with respect to the Soviet Union and the need to find ways



to reduce those inventories of weapons. But we did it. It's already been done. The problem we have today is that we are in fact faced with a growing possibility that we're going to have states like North Korea, probably Iran, possibly others, develop and deploy nuclear weapons, probably on missiles. That the extent that those two states increasingly become threats with sophisticated weapons systems, I think the temptation, the pressure, for their neighbors to develop their own capabilities is going to be enormous. That it will be a major spur, if you will, for example, in the Middle East, if Iran does in fact field that kind of capability. There are others out there who clearly have the capacity and/or the funds, the resources, to be able to acquire their own and we will see a spur, if you will, for their proliferation.

One of the things we did in the Bush Administration that we cared very deeply about, was we abrogated the ABM Treaty. We did it the first year we were in office so that we could move forward on developing defenses against ballistic missiles. And that was aimed specifically at the problems that we perceived with respect to North Korea and Iran and we did successfully build, deploy, and test anti-ballistic capability. We've got some missiles deployed both in California and Alaska. Unfortunately,

one of the first things the Obama administration did was to cap that program and they've just recently recognized that there is a significant threat there, so Secretary Hagel has indicated he's going to buy some additional missiles for that program.

The problem is, an important part of our approach was, that Poland and the Czech Republic would participate in the program. That we would deploy the radars in one state and the interceptors in another, but it would in fact set up a capability for us to be able to take down, destroy Iranian missiles, should they be launched at our NATO allies in Europe, or even potentially against the United States. Barack Obama came to office and he canceled that program in Poland and the Czech Republic because Vladimir Putin didn't like it. It was, I think, an egregious example of allowing the Russians to dictate to the United States what our relationships are going to be with our key NATO allies. And obviously the Poles and the Czechs, having taken the difficult step and agreed to that deployment, accepted the political controversy that it had entailed in some circles, all of a sudden found the rug pulled out from under them when the United States backed out of that commitment. But it also leaves in this case Europe, and potentially the United States, without defenses deployed where they would be most effective if the Iranians move forward with respect to their aspirations, obviously, to develop and field that capability.

We now find ourselves in a position where we are continuing to try to persuade the Iranians that the time has come for them to give up their capabilities, to try to persuade the North Koreans that they too should give up their capabilities. We've pursued that diplomatically. But the problem, again, has to do with what they perceive to be the US attitude with respect to national security policy. And at the same time that President Obama was in Israel with Prime Minister Netanyahu announcing that they were prepared to take whatever steps were necessary in order to be able to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities, the administration was announcing major cutbacks in the defense budget, made a decision, for example, in the U.S.S. Truman—one of our aircraft carriers scheduled to go out to the Gulf. We've been maintaining two carrier battle groups there now for some years—the Truman deployment was halted and the Truman is still tied up at the dock down at Norfolk, Virginia. And our carrier battle groups in the Gulf, which would obviously play a

key role were there to be any military action involving the Iranian nuclear program has been cut in half, simultaneously with more threats being issued by the president about what the Iranians may have in store if they don't listen to political wisdom.

The overall situation with respect to US military capabilities, I think, is headed in absolutely the wrong direction. The action that's been taken with respect to our defense budget, the so-called sequester process, unfortunately, has some support from Republicans, not all, but some who are of an isolationist bent of mind, but there's an excellent column written this morning in the Wall Street Journal by David Deptula, who used to be an Air Force 3-star and now teaches at the Air Force Academy, but when I was Secretary of Defense, he was one of our key planners in putting together the air war during Operation Desert Storm. And he talks about the no-fly zones that now exist, not overseas, but right here over the US military bases because so many of our squadrons have been grounded, pilots not getting the flying hours they need, the maintenance being allowed to pile up without action being taken, the consequences of the sequester that is now being imposed on the US military. Devastating. In my day, the standard was that our pilots had to get 30 hours a month of actual flying time to maintain their proficiency. Now, in some cases, some squadrons have been grounded completely. The U.S.S. Lincoln, an aircraft carrier I commissioned 25 years ago, is due now for its 25-year refueling and overall, and it's been tied up at the dock. It's not being refueled, it's not going through overhaul. It's an enormously valuable asset that is simply sitting there idle, and it looks like, because of the budget pressures, there will be no effort to do what ought to be done to extend the life of that carrier for another 25 years.

If we look at our overall posture, I think the United States has sent every signal that we're not serious. I think the kind of talk we saw with respect to Syria, that the President would "get really upset" if the Syrians used chemical weapons. Well now, apparently they have, so now we're wrestling with what kind of small arms we're going to provide to the Syrian opposition. But our withdrawal from Iraq without negotiating a stay behind agreement, the expected withdrawal from Afghanistan, the reduction of our military presence in the Middle East, the argument now that we're going to pivot to Asia strikes me as less of a strategic consideration

than that it's all budget driven. It is budget driven because of the sequester, but it's also budget driven because this president would much rather reduce defense spending dramatically, which he's doing. And as a result, we're going to find it increasingly difficult, I think, to have the kind of influence we would like to have and that our bold talk about nuclear proliferation is just that, it's just bold talk and nothing else. It's not backed up by anything of consequence. I worry very, very much that we are rapidly approaching the point where our friends and allies can no longer count on us, where they no longer trust us to be there when they need us in the event of a crisis, and when our adversaries and our enemies no longer fear us. And obviously, I'm a Republican, I'm a conservative, I didn't support Barack Obama, but I think the evidence is overwhelming that the United States' capacity in future years is being significantly diminished.

One of the final points—and then I understand we'll have the opportunity for some questions and discussion—after Operation Desert Storm ended in the spring of 1991, very successful, the first thing I did was pick up the telephone and call former President Reagan, who was then retired, living in California. And I thanked him for all that he had done in the 1980s to build up and improve the capability of the United States military, which is what made it possible for us to send half a million men and women half way around the world to liberate Kuwait, to do it with only 148 of our soldiers killed in action, to do it quickly and decisively because of the impact of the investment he had been willing to make in personnel, equipment, and in new technology in the 1980s. We had an absolutely first-rate military force when it came time to use it in 1990 and 1991.

The decisions that Barack Obama is making now in this administration aren't just about the capabilities he's going to have if there's a crisis tomorrow or next year or the year after that. He's making decisions that will limit the capabilities of future presidents, 10, 15, 20 years down the road and the kind of capabilities they'll have to respond to crises we know will emerge at some point. And his drive to reallocate resources away from the defense and national security arena and to spend it on domestic programs of various kinds, his unwillingness to recognize the long-term consequences of what he's doing to US military capability is very, very serious for our capacity as a nation, to keep the kinds of commitments to our friends in Korea and elsewhere around the world.

I'm deeply, deeply disturbed by what I see happening, and I will once again congratulate the Asan Institute. I think you did good work. I think it's very important, but I can't think of a better forum in which we need to address some of these kinds of concerns. And our friends that we work with around the world, often times, especially some of our Asian friends tend to be polite and we appreciate that, but there come times, too, when our friends need to be able to speak the truth to the United States about what the world looks like from your perspective if in fact we continue on the course we're on, which is going to dramatically reduce the influence and capability of the United States to alter, change, or redirect trends and events all over the world.

Thank you very much.

GALA DINNER

Date | June 24, 2013
Time | 18:40-21:00



Keynote Address

Madeleine Albright

Former US

Secretary of State

Good evening and greetings to everybody. I'm delighted to be here and I want to thank Dr. Hahm and the Asan Institute for inviting me. It is truly an honor to be part of a forum celebrating the 60th anniversary of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

I have to say in watching that video, it reminded me of where I was in June 1950 when the war broke out. We had just come to the United States in 1948 from Czechoslovakia and my father—who had been with the United Nations and had left because communists had taken over Czechoslovakia—said to me, “You always have to remember who your friends and enemies are, and we have to fight Communism.” So I grew up with that story and watching those pictures again and understanding the basis of our alliance meant a great deal to me.

I have to point out that my father went to teach at the University of Denver where the Graduate School of International Studies was named after him and Chris Hill is now the dean, so we are very connected. I would like to thank Senator Lieberman for voting for me for confirmation. Senator Mitt was not there.

Since 1953, there have been many twists and turns in the relationship between our two countries, but throughout our underlying friendship, it has been unshatterable. This enduring alliance has been a blessing to people of both sides of the Pacific while promoting prosperity and advancing the cause and peace in East Asia and across the globe. I hope and believe that it will continue for decades—even centuries to come. During my four years as America's Secretary of State, I had the pleasure of visiting South Korea many times. Although I no longer represent the United States, I



can say with confidence that America's commitment to the Republic of Korea's security remains beyond question. Two months ago Secretary of State John Kerry was in Seoul to reiterate that message and during his own visit last year, President Obama reinforced it.

I'm sure that I speak for most Americans—and especially those who have troublesome neighbors—when I say that we admire South Korea's steadiness, patience, and courage. In the past sixty years, there have been many moments of crisis when tensions on the peninsula increased and the possibility of war loomed. To cite one example, in the early 1990s, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and announced its plan to build nuclear weapons. At that time, I was America's ambassador of the United Nations and had to sit through a particularly vituperative and offensive speech from the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was just before my birthday and I was trying to figure out what to say without getting involved in the ugliness of the discussion. I said I would like to thank the representative of North Korea for making me feel forty years younger before my birthday by that disgusting speech from the Cold War. Since then, two more decades have elapsed but the rhetoric from Pyongyang is still the same and the



nuclear threat has become a good deal worse.

As many of you know, I am one of the few American diplomats—and here I exclude Dennis Rodman—who have negotiated directly with North Korea's leaders. I have promised never to play basketball if he promises not to go back. This was in October 2000 and my immediate purpose was to obtain a halt in the North's provocative missile programs. I was privileged to have conversations with President Kim Dae-Jung before I went in order to get a little bit of a better sense of what I was getting into. President Kim Dae-Jung described to me what it was like to deal with Kim Jong-il. I had in mind a much larger goal than dealing with the missile programs. It was to persuade Kim Jong-il to end his country's isolation and move toward a more normal relationship with the world. I met with him for many hours and we disagreed on almost everything. But I was encouraged that he at least seemed aware of the need for change. He spoke respectfully of South Korea, and he actually said that it would be possible for us to keep our troops there. He expressed a desire for better relations with the United States and because Communism had been exposed as a failure. He was also plainly searching for a

new economic model. It took me a while at the dinner that we had together for me to understand when he said that I needed a new Swedish model what he was really talking about. However despite having the powers of a dictator, he was afraid to run the risks the openness and reform might entail. So instead of pursuing a new economic strategy, he settled for a few, small experiments. Instead of addressing the world's concerns on the nuclear issue, he backed away from his commitments and continued to play the role of victim—insisting that his country was being treated unfairly.

To date, his son seems inclined to offer roughly the same combination of self-pity and bluster with similarly destructive results. It took years of effort and goodwill to build the Kaesong industrial park but only a few months of bullying and bad faith from Kim Jong-un to shut it down. In the past, the North was willing to discuss the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Now, its number one demand is to be recognized as a nuclear power, which is patently unacceptable. So the question arises: where do we go from here?

We know that in recent weeks, the North has expressed renewed interest in talking to the United States and to the South. This reflects a change in tactics, but that is something we have seen many times before. Under the circumstances, our leaders should pursue a diplomatic strategy that emphasizes cooperation not so much with North Korea as towards North Korea. We need the highest degree of coordination among policymakers in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, and to the extent possible, Beijing. We must speak with one voice reminding North Korea that it still has an opportunity to choose compromise over confrontation and real dialogue over repeated threats. It still has a chance to renounce nuclear weapons and thereby move away from a security policy based on fear to a strategy grounded in law. If it does make the choice, the potential rewards are many. If it does not, the DPRK will remain in the prison it has built for itself and the gap will continue to grow between the North's weakness and the South's prosperity and prestige. For here is the great contrast: sixty years ago, North Korea was in better shape than it is today while the South was devastated by conflict and dependent on foreign help with the population among the poorest in the world. But because of the Republic of Korea's commitment to innovation, discipline, and productivity, we have

witnessed in recent decades what many call the “miracle on the Han River.”

Today, South Korea boasts one of the globe’s largest and fastest growing economies. It’s a leader in exports, per capita income, and technological prowess. It is the first country to have graduated in status from recipient to donor in overseas aid. The Republic of Korea has also built a robust and competitive democracy for which its voters should be congratulated not only because they have done what certain others have failed to do, but it has also elected a woman president. Finally, I have to mention that South Korea’s soccer—or football team—has just qualified for the World Cup. But whether measured economically, politically, or athletically, the country’s rise is mirrored by the enhanced nature of its international standing. Three years ago, the Republic of Korea played host to a meeting of the G20 heads of state. Two years ago, Ban Ki-Moon was unanimously re-elected as the Secretary General of the United Nations. Last year, Seoul was the site of the second Nuclear Security Summit and earlier in 2013, South Korea began a two-year term on the United Nations Security Council. Meanwhile, a long overdue free-trade agreement between Korea and the United States had gone into effect. There can be no question that the Republic of Korea has moved to its rightful place on the center stage of world affairs and that the United States welcomes this development. Historically, we know that the United States and Korea viewed certain events differently, but we also know that our alliance has helped both countries to become stronger and to live in freedom and peace.

Looking ahead, it is vital that our cooperation continues on matters of security, diplomacy, and prosperity. The United States should never become an obstacle to reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula but neither should America ever abandon its ally. I’m confident that South Korea will do its part by further strengthening its democracy and upholding global norms. Meanwhile, both countries must and will remain resolute in dealing with the North. Neither threats nor empty promises can force us apart.

Since 1953 and especially in the past twenty years, East Asia has been a driving force in the economy. But it is also a place where tensions between individual countries persist. Even though bitter memories from the past have not yet been fully erased, the region is rushing headlong into the

future. This creates a climate of risk and an urgent need for sources of stability. It is essential, therefore, that ties between the United States and Korea remain firm so that future challenges, both foreseen and unforeseen, can be met.

So in closing, let me say that because of everything that is going on in the world, I am often asked whether I’m an optimist or a pessimist. My reply is that I am an optimist who worries a lot. I worry for all the obvious reasons, but I’m an optimist because I truly believe that free people working tougher can achieve whatever they set out to accomplish even in the most trying of circumstances. I also have faith in democracy and an abiding trust in the ideals that have sustained the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America for the past sixty years—the same ideals that have brought us together tonight. Over the years, our alliance has been tested many times and has never ruptured. We know we will be tested again, but have no doubt as we turn to face the future that it will grow in strength and purpose for generations to come.

Thank you very much.

SESSION 1

Date | June 24, 2013
Time | 11:00-12:00

Sixty Years of the Alliance

Moderator Hahm Chaibong, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Speakers Burwell B. Bell, Former Commander, US Forces Korea
William Cohen, Former US Senator and Secretary of Defense
Han Sung-Joo, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, ROK
Park Jin, Former Member, National Assembly, ROK


Rapporteur Nadia Bulkin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dr. Hahm Chaibong described the first session of the Asan Washington Forum as an opportunity to bring together the most experienced members of both governments involved in the Korea-US alliance. All four speakers gave the alliance a positive appraisal as having contributed greatly to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world as a whole, as well as helping to promote South Korean economic prosperity.

Mr. William Cohen noted that it was not a miracle but industry and dedication that gave South Korea the thirteenth largest economy in the world following the devastation of sixty years ago. General Burwell Bell argued that for the past sixty years, the alliance has been more resolute and absolute than any other security treaty in the history of the world. He noted that it has stood firm whether on the peninsula or worldwide. While Dr. Park Jin acknowledged some troubled times and frictions stemming from different views and misunderstandings, he too called the alliance one of the most successful in world history. He credited the ability of the United



Hahm Chaibong



Burwell B. Bell



William Cohen



Han Sung-Joo



Park Jin

States and South Korea to manage conflict in a productive, open, and transparent way.

Minister Han Sung-Joo noted that most of the original rationales for the alliance (checks and balances of major powers, supporting the US-Japan alliance, and deterring North Korea) have not changed. South Korea is now a showcase of democracy and development, having built up its own defensive capability and put US economic assistance to good use. Dr. Park added that according to *The Economist's* yearly democracy index, South Korea is the leading democracy in Asia (even ahead of Japan), and is responsible for the advance of democracy in Asia as a whole—a development for which he credited the alliance. While the global financial crisis was a source of concern to South Korea, he acknowledged that the alliance has protected South Korea from the brunt

of the crisis' impact.

Minister Han noted that the alliance has grown from a security alliance to a partnership underpinned by the common values of liberal democracy. He called the United States and South Korea partners for prosperity, stability, and democracy. He noted that South Korea is now America's seventh largest trading partner and its largest FTA partner. Dr. Park stressed that the fundamental bedrock of the alliance is respect for human life, human dignity, and human rights: values that will distinguish the Korea-US alliance from Korea-China relations. While democracy and the market economy are important aspects of the alliance, Park argued that the fundamental value that maintains the alliance is its humanitarianism. He argued that this humanitarianism is a "renewable energy" that can be carried over for the next six decades.



While Mr. Cohen acknowledged that the alliance has matured to include trade and democracy promotion, he considered the security relationship to be the most fundamental to the peninsula and the region. In this light, the decision to send B-2 bombers and F-22 aircraft to South Korea was an important signal to both South and North Korea (as well as China and Japan)—as if to say, “this is what we are prepared to send if Kim Jong-un doesn’t climb down this rhetoric.” Dr. Park also noted that South Korea still views peace and stability on the peninsula as its highest priority, and as such, dialogue should be used to attain denuclearization of North Korea.

Mr. Cohen predicted the alliance would endure as long as the United States remains committed to it. He argued that the US security commitment could be jeopardized by the US federal sequester and lessening internationalism among younger US policymakers. While US capacity was not yet weakened, if the current trend of the far-right and far-left linking hands with former internationalists continued, it would be a cause for concern. He hoped the United States would understand the consequences of cutting the budget in a mindless way that is not consistent with a strategic objective. He acknowledged that the United States needs to invest in infrastructure and education domestically, but called the idea that the United States can walk away from the world a folly, because the world would never walk away from the United States. Minister Han noted that this isolationism has existed in the US for centuries, but now may be reemerging in earnest.

In South Korea, Mr. Cohen saw a need to remind the younger generation of South Koreans that the alliance has helped South Korea achieve tremendous progress over the past sixty years. The number of Korean students studying in the United States was already large, but needed to be increased. Han agreed that an element of “nationalism,” particularly in the younger generation, was present in South Korea. General Bell supported South Korean nationalism as long as it recognized that the real threat faced by South Korea is an imminent threat in North Korea, and regional threats down the road. Thus, he suggested that South Korean leaders look for alliances that can be of assistance, and sell these alliances to South Koreans.

Because of the proliferation threat posed by North Korea, Mr. Cohen noted that the peninsular situation could be a global destabilizer. Bell emphasized that the United States could not signal any change in its commitment to the alliance, as such a signal would be misinterpreted by South Korea, North Korea, China, and Japan in a time of regional uncertainty (such as the game-changer of a belligerent, nuclear-armed North Korea, which he argued must be assumed to have nuclear capabilities, a rising China that is asserting itself regionally, Russia in the background, and age-old bickering between South Korea and Japan). Bell argued that the United States must tell all countries in the region that as long as it is welcomed by South Korea, it would be there to stay, as the peninsula represents vital interests for the United States.

General Bell also noted that the United States should help strengthen ROK-Japan relations to present a more unified front against a belligerent North Korea. He argued that there would be no challenge to peace and security in Northeast Asia if South Korea and Japan cooperate, but noted that North Korea tries to exploit a “split” between the two.

While Minister Han felt that the evolution of US-China and Korea-China relations would not fundamentally affect the alliance, Dr. Park suggested that strategic dialogue with China would be crucial to encourage North Korea to return to the negotiating table, especially as China increasingly sees a nuclear North Korea as a threat to its own interest in regional stability.

General Bell suggested that “leading from behind” could be dangerous, and therefore the United States must not transfer OPCON (wartime operational control) to South Korea as long as a nuclear North Korea and an unhelpful China remained in the picture. The potential OPCON transfer implies that someday South Korea would have the opportunity to lead forces in the event of war, and General Bell confirmed that the United States would support that. However, he explained that, for now, OPCON transfer was not a military doctrinal issue, but an issue of US strategic commitment. A nuclear umbrella would not appear to be enough if it could be misinterpreted as a US retreat of any kind. Dr. Park agreed that the currently successful OPCON mechanism should be respected and maintained as long as the North Korean security threat presented a very serious concern to South Korean national security.



Dr. Park also suggested a revision of the “123” nuclear agreement to allow South Korea to peacefully develop nuclear energy, both to support its commercial and industrial economic growth, and to present a clear contrast to North Korea. The revised agreement should be mutually beneficial, advanced, and transparent. He suggested it should be resolved in the next two years through constructive dialogue.

Minister Han predicted that the alliance would continue to be easier to manage when ROK leadership takes a more hardline stance toward North Korea compared to US leadership, rather than vice versa. He noted that the Korea-US alliance is in fact peculiar: its primary object is North Korea, which Minister Han called a part of the Korean nation, so any reconciliation between North and South immediately casts doubt on the usefulness and rationale of the alliance with the US. For now, however, the allies seem to be on the same page. He proposed that the goals of the alliance moving forward should be: 1) deterring war through strategic change in North Korea, laying the path for eventual reunification; 2) complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear situation; and 3) addressing non-traditional (as well as traditional) security threats.

SESSION 2

Date | June 24, 2013
Time | 14:20-15:20

The Alliance and North Korea

Moderator David Sanger, *The New York Times*

Speakers Kim Sung-han, Former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, ROK
Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution
Gary Samore, Harvard University
Walter Sharp, Former Commander, US Forces Korea
Yu Myung Hwan, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, ROK

Rapporteur Clare Lynch, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Mr. David Sanger began by noting that if the morning sessions established anything, it is that the Korea-US alliance is clearly stronger today than it has been for some time. Relations have improved during the Bush and Obama administrations, he said, but during this time North Korea has also conducted three nuclear tests, a series of missile tests, and appears to be entering a familiar cycle of nuclear tests leading to negotiations, then more provocations once negotiations fall apart. Given these circumstances, Mr. Sanger asked the panelists to consider how the alliance can make progress on North Korea without getting caught in this cycle all over again.

Former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Kim Sung-han began by drawing five lessons for the alliance from the past fifty years. First, he said that it is difficult to expect North Korea to give up nuclear weapons as long as the regime feels that these weapons are necessary for its survival. Second, Dr. Kim said, international unity must be maintained




David Sanger




Kim Sung-han



Michael O'Hanlon



Gary Samore



Walter Sharp



Yu Myung Hwan

and North Korea must not be allowed to drive a wedge between South Korea, the United States, Japan, or China. Third, he said that Chinese leaders increasingly believe that a nuclear-armed North Korea does not serve Chinese interests. While previously some leaders believed a nuclear North Korea was preferable to its collapse, Chinese leaders are now recalculating North Korea's nuclear capability and how this is impacting their relationship with the United States. Fourth, Dr. Kim noted that the permanent peace talks requested by North Korea should be preceded by progress on the Six-Party Talks. The alliance must remind North Korea that progress on peace regime talks is linked to progress on nuclear talks, Kim said, not the other way around. Finally, Kim concluded that the United States and South Korea should go beyond deterrence and defense to try to come up with ways to realize peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Responding to Mr. Sanger's query about the perceived passiveness of US policy on North Korea, General Walter Sharp, former commander of US Forces Korea, said that the United States has reached a point where it needs to force change in North Korea. Several steps will be necessary for this process. One is diplomatic discussions between the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China about what the reunified peninsula will look like and changed force configurations that will enhance the interests of all players, including China.

Track 2 forums including groups like ASEAN will add value. In addition, General Sharp said that the United States should be more vocally publicizing human rights violations in North Korea. This should include an effort to transmit information on human rights and democracy to the North Korean people and the military so that they can see the effect of sixty years of isolation on their country. Finally, the United States needs a stronger military plan in the event of another North Korean attack that will allow for a swift and strong response. This government-wide, alliance-wide approach, General Sharp concluded, will go beyond hoping for change in North Korea to forcing change.

Former ROK Foreign Affairs Minister Yu Myung Hwan added to General Sharp's assessment by analyzing the alliance's policy results. He characterized the policy response to North Korean militarization as relatively

complacent, lacking coherence, and zigzagging. Diplomatic strategy has failed to achieve demilitarization, he said, as the North Korean regime has lied again and again over the past forty years. From now on, Minister Yu suggested, the United States and South Korea should draw up a very detailed strategy to achieve reunification and designate this as a primary objective of the alliance. He added that as President Park visits Chinese President Xi Jinping, it would be an important task to convey to Xi that a unified, nuclear-free peninsula benefits China's strategic interests and that North Korea's continued nuclear development will cause strategic losses for Beijing. Minister Yu pointed out that as China grows bigger, North Korea's usefulness as a buffer zone is decreasing and it will soon become more of a liability than an asset. In closing, Minister Yu said that just as German reunification heralded the end of the Cold War, building an Asia-Pacific union in the 21st century will require the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Dr. Gary Samore echoed Minister Yu's statement that it is not feasible to expect denuclearization through diplomacy. Dr. Samore said that North Korea is capable of modifying its rhetoric to meet diplomatic criteria for resuming negotiations. But if disarmament is not an achievable near-term goal, the alliance should begin thinking about interim measures to constrain North Korea's nuclear program. The key will be establishing verification measures to check that the regime is abiding by its promises. In the long run, Dr. Samore suggested the alliance should hold out for a verified freeze on enrichment and fissile material production, with a full declaration of cooperation and intrusive inspections to verify. A more



achievable objective might be a delay in weapons testing, a benchmark that would be easier to check, and also more likely to gain Chinese support. He acknowledged that any deal with the regime was likely to fall apart in the long run, given the nature of the regime to cheat or renege on their promises, but said that such intermediary measures would help postpone realization of an operational inter-continental ballistic missile capable of hitting the United States.

Dr. Michael O'Hanlon said that the United States should bear in mind that the long-term goal with regard to North Korea is a broader dialogue on reform, including economic reform, that would move the state onto a path similar to Vietnam or South Korea. However, Dr. O'Hanlon said that current leader Kim Jong-un was not likely to adopt such a strategy given that he is a 30-year-old leader with only one and a half years in office and many decades of rule in front of him. This means, Dr. O'Hanlon said, that the alliance may have to start over with a decades-long strategy to convince Kim that reform is more appealing than presiding over a "basket case" country for half a century.

Dr. O'Hanlon continued that the alliance should enact policies that respond to North Korea provocations without adopting a confrontational attitude that would further alienate Kim. For instance, he suggested that if North Korea conducts another nuclear test, allied powers may want to impose temporary, time-limited sanctions, while keeping current indefinite sanctions in place. The alliance may also need to think more creatively about what terms they set for North Korea to denuclearize, as building some vagueness into the terms could help nudge the Kim regime onto a reform path, Dr. O'Hanlon said.

Given that Iran and North Korea are the biggest impediments in the move to a nuclear-free world, Mr. Sanger asked the panelists to assess which of the two regimes should be the primary focus of the Obama administration.

Dr. Samore said that from an analyst's viewpoint, the Obama administration should focus on Iran, because they do not have nuclear weapons yet and because using military force as a sanction in Iran is more feasible and less likely to trigger war. He also pointed out that the geostrategic consequences of Iran gaining nuclear weapons would be potentially devas-

tating for the United States, threatening both US interests and upsetting the regional balance of power. Minister Yu agreed, saying that North Korea is basically a weak country dependent on foreign aid and that the alliance should keep up pressure on the regime.

General Sharp disagreed with the framing of the question, saying that the situation should not be seen as an either-or, and that the Obama administration is capable of managing both situations at once. He highlighted that with a well-populated city 30 miles south of the border, 25 percent of the North Korean population struggling to find food, and 200,000 North Koreans in prison camps, vital US political and strategic interests are well served by dealing effectively with the North Korean nuclear issue. US leaders should not focus completely on Iran or let North Korea move ahead with its nuclear program, as this would lead to a much more dangerous situation in the future, General Sharp added.

Dr. Kim contributed his analysis of the Park administration, saying that President Park is trying to stick to two principles. First, he said, North Korean provocations will not be tolerated under any circumstances and, second, the regime must respect all previous agreements. This approach attempts to strike a balance between security and engagement. In response, North Korea has turned from the provocative behavior typical of the "sunshine period" to dialogue mechanisms.

If and when the Kim regime becomes more reform-minded, Dr. O'Hanlon said that they will have several historical examples to draw on. The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, Mubarak's deposal in Egypt, and the overthrow of communism in Romania will be negative examples of a liberalizing regime, he said, while successful reforms in Vietnam and China and voluntary denuclearization in South Africa provide positive models. As a young, third generation leader who must court generals who have held power for many decades, Kim Jong-un will need some time to plot his course, Dr. O'Hanlon continued.

SESSION 3

Date | June 24, 2013
Time | 15:40-16:40

The Future of the Alliance

Moderator Choi Kang, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Speakers Kil Jeong-Woo, National Assembly, ROK
Lee Chung Min, Yonsei University
Mark Minton, The Korea Society
Douglas Paal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Paul Wolfowitz, Former US Deputy Secretary of Defense

Rapporteur Nadia Bulkin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dr. Choi Kang began with the proposition that the United States and South Korea must think beyond North Korea toward future challenges. Speakers offered diverse perspectives on what these future challenges would be and how to meet them.

Dr. Kil Jeong-Woo listed potential threats to the cohesion of the alliance, so that the Korea-US relationship would not be the victim of complacency. Korean trade, tourism, and student exchange with China are larger than that with the United States. South Korea could thus be wooed by the fact that China appears to be taking a firmer stance toward Pyongyang in its efforts to determine its role as a leader in the international community. Furthermore, he noted that according to an Asan Institute poll, most South Koreans think the United States is mishandling Japan's rightward shift. Other potentially flammable issues include military burden-sharing, revision of the nuclear cooperation agreement, and certain provisions of the Korea-US FTA.



Professor Lee Chung Min added the challenge of navigating “down sides” to Asia’s spectacular rise, such as demographic shifts and environmental concerns. Professor Lee stated that the alliance was at a critical transition between unilateral dependence and a primary emphasis on security to a mutual convergence on multiple issues, even reunification. South Korea now stands out as a US ally, and must now face questions regarding its own power and responsibility for the peace in Northeast Asia. Ambassador Mark Minton likewise argued that Korea’s growing role in global governance (South Korea is now on the UN Security Council, and the UN Secretary General is Korean), along with growing transnational problems, necessitated increased cooperation through the alliance. Dr. Douglas Paal strongly supported the US pivot to Asia, but regretted an initial overemphasis on security leading to the mistaken impression in Asia that the pivot’s purpose was containing China. He hoped that the pivot would not swivel excessively back toward the Middle East, which would never have been abandoned in the first place. Fortunately, he noted that the alliance continues to enjoy bipartisan support, demonstrating a capacity for durability. He stressed that the United States would very much remain a regional player in Northeast Asia.

Professor Lee called the rise of China a potential speed bump, because nobody can be sure of what role China will play. He explained that South Koreans don’t vocalize their anxieties over the “China threat” because South Korea has actually been tested the most by China over the centuries. Though he was more positive about China’s role than he had been previously, the “new era” saw more divergence than convergence between the United States and China where security issues were concerned. Dr. Kil noted that there was evidence of growing Chinese compliance with UN sanctions on North Korea (such as a shutdown of Bank of China transfers to



Choi Kang




Kil Jeong-Woo



Lee Chung Min

North Korea), and a Chinese preference to work with reform-oriented North Korean leaders, such as Kim Jong-un's uncle-in-law—interpreted by some North Korea observers as a Chinese signal to North Korea's new leadership. Ambassador Minton described China as being in an excellent position to pursue its interests in Pyongyang if leadership changes take place. Dr. Paul Wolfowitz explained that China, which has the greatest potential to enable such a leadership change, is starting to realize that a nuclear North Korea is not safe for future generations. Dr. Paal stated that China will become more powerful, but not absolutely so—in contrast to the expectation that China would somehow surpass and eclipse the United States, and that countries in the region would have fewer foreign policy choices that were not appointed by Beijing. He stressed that South Korea is in the best position to take the lead on developing a regional security architecture that will engage China in a rules-based order.


As peninsular, regional, and world challenges blend together, Ambassador Minton stated that any action on North Korea must be conducted jointly, and with Japan's assistance. He provided the example of the difficulty of encompassing the North Korean threat of nuclear weapons without a larger geopolitical context. Dr. Wolfowitz also argued that the United States and South Korea must work with Japan to craft non-military responses to military provocations. As Korea prepares to take a greater leadership role in the region, Dr. Paal argued it should improve its relations with Japan. However, Professor Lee feared that ROK-Japan relations would not be able to improve due to enduring Japanese perceptions of history.



Mark Minton



Douglas Paal



Paul Wolfowitz

Dr. Wolfowitz blamed the North Korean regime's refusal to relinquish nuclear weapons on the failure of the deterrence policy, not the alliance itself. He also noted that the regime had made force too dangerous of an option. However, Ambassador Minton explained that Pyongyang is trying to accord itself the most favorable position vis-à-vis its neighbors to accommodate its fundamental weakness, in an attempt to preserve the regime. Since belligerence has not delivered desired results for either side, Ambassador Minton argued that Pyongyang may be ready to return to negotiations; in this case, the United States should also consider moving beyond deterrence to more flexible diplomacy in Pyongyang. For example, he suggested that the United States support a measure such as a North-South exchange program. The United States needs to help ensure that Pyongyang makes the right fundamental choice between regime survival and nuclear weapons development. He concluded that soft edges might be more appropriate for dealing with hard problems. This would not mean that the central deterrent role of the alliance would be diminished, or that denuclearization should not remain the alliance's highest priority. But he suggested other issues (including reunification) might overtake these efforts. Dr. Paal also argued in favor of *trustpolitik* as a well-balanced approach to North Korea. He noted that with every day that passes, North Korea's leadership becomes more out of step with the rest of the world.

By contrast, Dr. Wolfowitz called deterrence absolutely crucial, stating that the United States and South Korea need to determine a strategy for dealing with North Korean missiles, because these missiles would improve.

He suggested that while economic reform in North Korea could plausibly lead to a state that is more like China or Vietnam, it would be an enormous systemic change that could be a huge threat to the regime. As the regime's survival is inculcated with the belief that their leader is absolutely right, he felt that North Korea would not be able to reform without a regime change.

Ambassador Minton argued that in the future, the alliance must be expanded to a full bilateral diplomatic strategy. Upcoming problems for the alliance would include instability and regime collapse. Dr. Paal also argued that the alliance needs to be endowed with strength to deal with changing circumstances on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, Dr. Wolfowitz reminded the audience that patience with the alliance was necessary. He recalled that on the tenth anniversary of the alliance, South Korea was deemed a permanent economic “basket case” with no natural resources, too much corruption, and a military dictatorship with no plausible claim to a democratic future. Though the South Korean economic miracle and thriving democracy is taken for granted today, he argued that it has only been possible due to the commitment, perseverance, and

sacrifice made by Koreans and Americans throughout the alliance as well as the Korean War.

Regarding North Korea, Dr. Kil articulated the urge to try a new approach, including the engagement of peace mechanisms and turning arms treaties into peace treaties, given the current perception that existing diplomatic solutions have been exhausted. Ambassador Minton argued that US and South Korean strategy should start but not end with the well-tested alliance framework—it must move beyond a start-stop reflex that only benefits Pyongyang's interests. Deeper diplomatic immersion with Pyongyang would ensure that China is not the only outside player leveraged in Pyongyang (he argued that even North Koreans might be nervous about the current situation); it would also show that the United States has no vested interest in preventing reunification.

Dr. Paal also noted that a reunified Korea was in the best interests of the United States and the region, although he doubted that all perspectives in Korea or China would understand this; he suggested that China may try to dissuade reunification. However, Dr. Wolfowitz noted that while the Chinese might not like reunification at first, through dialogue China might eventually understand that reunification is for the good of all of Northeast Asia. Looking ahead, he argued that the alliance had to be maintained post-reunification to promote regional stability—but that this alliance would be very different.



SESSION 4

Date | June 24, 2013
Time | 17:00-18:00

The Alliance and the Future of East Asia

Moderator David Rennie, *The Economist*

Speakers Graham Allison, Harvard University
Richard Bush, The Brookings Institution
Kurt Campbell, The Asia Group, LLC
Hahm Chaibong, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Joe Lieberman, Former US Senator (I-CT)


Rapporteur Clare Lynch, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Mr. David Rennie introduced the session by asking the panelists to give a broad overview of the current status of the ROK-US alliance and of the East Asian region as if they were briefing leaders of the countries. He then asked the speakers to expand on things that could go wrong or what might go right in the region.


Former Senator Joe Lieberman began by highlighting the positive trends in the Korea-US alliance and in South Korea's development over the past sixty years. No country, he said, better embodies the changes in Asia from poverty to prosperity and from dictatorship to freedom than South Korea. He continued that the foundation for peace, freedom, and prosperity in the region is the alliance system that the United States built after World War II and sustained with like-minded democratic allies. The values and purpose of the Korea-US alliance, Senator Lieberman continued, have remained steadfast for decades, helping to uphold the liberal international order, safeguard freedom of navigation and free trade, and deter




David Rennie



Graham Allison




Richard Bush



Kurt Campbell



Hahm Chaibong



Joe Lieberman

aggression. The United States dependence on its regional allies has only grown stronger, he said, while the evident commitment of South Korea to the alliance has also deepened.

Meanwhile, North Korea symbolizes the ideologies of hatred, repression, and domination by force, Senator Lieberman said. He stated that three major challenges facing the alliance include the imperative for close cooperation to deal with the North Korea regime. The alliance must break out of the old pattern of rewarding Kim for his provocations, Senator Lieberman said, and the allies must also pay closer attention to human rights violations occurring on an unprecedented scale in North Korea. Second, Senator Lieberman said he was troubled by the way China is using its growing power and that the alliance must work together to craft policy toward China. Both countries welcome a strong and prosperous China, Senator Lieberman stressed, but want Beijing to become a responsible international actor that respects large and small neighbors and plays by the rules of the international order. He added that South Korea will play an important role in the future in bridging US-China

relations. Finally, Senator Lieberman said that the third challenge to the alliance will be defining the US role in the world. He warned that the US must summon diplomatic and military will to continue playing an active role in East Asia, lest it harm its allies by retrenching into international passivity.

Dr. Kurt Campbell echoed Senator Lieberman's concerns on North Korea, stating that North Korea represents not only an intractable set of nuclear proliferation issues, but also a horrific set of human rights violations that international powers have too often turned a blind eye to in the past. Dr. Campbell highlighted the role of high-level diplomacy in Northeast Asia and its use in addressing this and other delicate issues. The informal summit between President Obama and President Xi in California represents an important opportunity in this regard.

Dr. Campbell noted that Xi and other Chinese leaders are no longer shying away from describing China as a "great power." In terms of what this means for the United States and Korea, he said that leaders should enlist

China in a "21st century conversation" about the norms and values, legal frameworks, and peaceful operating systems that have created opportunities for successful development in East Asia. These underlying norms will be particularly important in solving vexing and sensitive territorial disputes, which Dr. Campbell sees as the most concerning issues in the period ahead. Finally, Dr. Campbell reiterated his support of the more active role South Korea is playing on the international stage, allowing it to transcend the historically paternalistic nature of the Korea-US alliance.

Dr. Graham Allison framed his analysis of the future of the alliance through what he described as the biggest geopolitical event of the era, the rise of China. Never before, Dr. Allison said, has a nation risen so far or so fast on so many different dimensions. Rather than analyzing this rise



in terms of Western aspirations or Western dialogue, Dr. Allison turned to Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, who relayed to him this on China. First, Chinese leaders are serious about displacing the United States as the preeminent power in Asia and they have a good chance of succeeding. Next, China is not willing to accept a subservient position in a Western-dominated international order, but expects other countries to be respectful of its growing power. Finally, because China's rise cannot be halted, the United States and Korea will have to find a way to live with the emergence of a new major power and a new global balance of power in thirty to forty years.

Dr. Richard Bush expressed agreement with Dr. Allison that the revival of China as a great power is the most important trend of this generation. The future of Asia will be determined by how countries cope and adjust to China's rise, he continued. Chinese leaders' discussion of a "new pattern of great power relations" is a reflection of their attempt to come to grips with this, he said. The United States now has a chance to shape China's choices and trajectory in a way that is agreeable to Beijing's end goals, which is reason to be optimistic about the future. Much will depend on the domestic trajectory of the two countries.

The ROK-US alliance will be a major factor in determining the future of East Asia, Dr. Bush said. Assuming the two countries can keep their economic houses in order and maintain unity and coherence in the relationship, the alliance, more than any other, can contribute to maintaining a prosperous and peaceful Asian future.

Pulling back, Dr. Hahm Chaibong tackled the Korea-US alliance from a historical perspective. For most of its history, Dr. Hahm said, the alliance was a defensive measure to hold back the seemingly inevitable march of communism across Eurasia. In this context, the democratization of tiny South Korea should be seen as a miracle. An important reason to celebrate the alliance is that the values it defended, that South Korea inculcated and institutionalized, have become mainstream enough to allow the United States and Korea to start a rollback, he said.

Dr. Hahm noted that North Korea is one glaring exception to this trend of democratization and prosperity. East Asia, with emerging powerhouses



including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, is by far the most economically dynamic region in the world. But if one were to take a satellite photo of the region and draw a circle around Northeast Asia, one finds the epicenter is actually at Pyongyang, Dr. Hahm said. With this blockage, he speculated, how much more dynamic might the Northeast Asian region be if North Korea was persuaded to liberalize and open up? Given the Chinese Politburo's track record of economic management, Dr. Hahm said that reforms in North Korea should be seen by Beijing as an economic opportunity rather than a potential source of instability.

Senator Lieberman added that now is an opportunity to have a rational conversation with Chinese leaders on North Korea. He said that he would ask President Xi whether he found it easier and more profitable to deal with President Park of South Korea or Kim Jong-un. Dr. Campbell stated that the challenge for South Korean diplomacy is to advance the concept that there is only one Korea and one unified Korean people, and to deny this is to deny the people's fundamental and intrinsic rights. Dr. Hahm added that although it would be difficult to rationally engage China on regime change in North Korea, now is the time to press this issue.

While North Korea and the Taiwan Strait will continue to add tension to the region, Dr. Campbell said in the immediate future he is most concerned about territorial island disputes. He would like to see Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe focus more on modernizing his economic and security policy and less on historically sensitive territorial claims. Dr. Campbell said that as a close friend and ally, the United States will have an important role in communicating its desire for stability.

Dr. Allison agreed that territorial disputes by nature are extremely emotional, volatile, and dangerous, and a single rogue actor, sunken ship, or downed plane might create a potentially catastrophic situation. The United States must balance its interest in the region with the perception gap between it and Asian powers such as China, who look askance on the longstanding US role as arbiter of security in the Western Pacific.

Session 1 The Ambassadors' Dialogue: Challenges for the Alliance

Moderator Choi Kang
Speakers Han Sung-Joo, Christopher R. Hill, Thomas C. Hubbard
Rapporteur Olivia Enos

Session 2 Public Opinion: Alliance, Security, and Nukes

Moderator J. James Kim
Speakers Charlie Cook, Kim Jiyoung, Bruce Klingner, William Tobey
Rapporteur Andrew Kwon

Session 3 Dealing with a Nuclear North Korea

Moderator Shin Chang-Hoon
Speakers Lee Chung Min, Michael O'Hanlon, Bennett Ramberg
Yamaguchi Noboru
Rapporteur Maureen Brown

Session 4 Dealing with North Korea's Human Rights

Moderator Baek Buhm-Suk
Speakers Roberta Cohen, Frank Jannuzi, Kil Jeong-Woo, Marcus Noland
Rapporteur Olivia Enos

Session 5 The Virtual Alliance

Moderator Walter Lohman
Speakers Michael Auslin, Bong Youngshik, Nishino Junya
Rapporteur Jara Kim

Session 6 Korea between the US and China

Moderator Hahm Chaibong
Speakers Choi Kang, Thomas J. Christensen, Bonnie S. Glaser
Gilbert Rozman, Zhao Quansheng
Rapporteur Vriddhi Sujan

SESSION 1

Date | June 25, 2013
Time | 09:00-10:20

The Ambassadors' Dialogue: Challenges for the Alliance

Moderator Choi Kang, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Speakers Han Sung-Joo, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, ROK
Christopher R. Hill, Former US Ambassador to ROK
Thomas C. Hubbard, Former US Ambassador to ROK

Rapporteur Olivia Enos, The Heritage Foundation

As the alliance has developed, it has primarily consisted of military relations. But panelists agreed that the future of the alliance is in economic cooperation. Dr. Choi Kang began by framing the discussion from the perspective of President Park Geun-hye's newly inducted plan for a comprehensive strategic alliance between the United States and South Korea. President Park's strategy is intended to expand the present relationship to include economic and military ties between the two nations.


Minister Han Sung-Joo agreed. He argued that there were five key challenges for the alliance: 1) domestic politics and domestic sentiments, 2) issues that exist between the US and ROK in relation to the alliance, 3) budget, 4) alliance structure, and 5) vision for the alliance. He suggested that from the Korean perspective, the ROK-US alliance was a strange one because it evolved out of a desire to oppose North Korea. Post-Korean war, Minister Han argued that anti-American sentiment was more popular in Korea because they felt that in some way their destiny had been shaped by US involvement in the region. According to Minister Han, this opinion



Choi Kang



Han Sung-Joo



Christopher R. Hill



Thomas C. Hubbard

has largely dissipated, but North Korean provocations continue to serve as a distraction from traditionally nationalistic Korean sentiments.

The ebb-and-flow of relations on the peninsula either leads to a decrease or an increase in nationalistic opinion that indirectly impacts perceptions of the ROK-US alliance. Minister Han noted that, "one-third of the Korean population is already against the alliance, the other third can be swayed one way or the other based on the state affairs, and the last third is firmly and consistently in favor of the alliance." The wariness of the Korean population, when combined with a more recent political trend in the United States toward isolationism, Minister Han argued, could contribute to domestic political challenges in Korea.

According to Minister Han, issues that relate to the alliance include dealing with North Korea, trilateral relations between Japan and Korea, and Korea's relationship to China. Minister Han argued that issues with North Korea contributed to a growth in the alliance, particularly since the United States



and South Korea have largely been on the same page in dealing with North Korea. Minister Han believed that trilateral relations with Japan were a tenuous subject for the United States—especially since treaty obligations to both nations require a certain level of discretion with both Japan and Korea. Finally, military cooperation in the Yellow Sea, naval activities, and Korean priorities in their relationship with China contribute to ambiguity in the ROK-US relationship.

Budget challenges, according to Minister Han, were relatively self-explanatory. Balancing budget obligations with alliance cooperation has always been a challenge. How much a country allocates toward its alliance is often indicative of its priorities. Determining how much each country could spend respectively toward alliance cooperation remains an issue. The structure of the alliance is another potential challenge for ROK-US cooperation. Minister Han noted that whether the planned transfer of wartime operations and control should take place as scheduled at the end of 2015 remains undetermined. If it is to be accomplished, Minister Han wondered what the practical implications would be for the joint forces. Would it diminish the effectiveness of joint forces?

Finally, Minister Han believed that a more robust vision should be created for the future of the alliance. He believed that this should include economic cooperation. He hearkened to NATO and the robust development that has taken place to continue to strengthen NATO despite the fact that the Soviet threat is no longer imminent. He felt that the same model should be employed in Korea, keeping in mind the threat that North Korea poses to the peninsula.

Christopher Hill noted that when he served as ambassador, many were commenting on the frayed relationship between the two nations. But the health of the alliance was far better than it was portrayed. The same was true today. According to Ambassador Hill, the emergence of Korean democracy in the 1980s and 1990s led to a unique and more developed form of diplomacy in the region. Korean goods have penetrated the global market and have begun to have influence in thought and public diplomacy. He argued that the late development of the Korean democracy meant the easy integration of social media into diplomacy. As Korea has become a global player, US diplomacy expanded to court both the government and the people of Korea.

Ambassador Hill asserted that the visa-waiver program was a great step forward in the US-Korea relationship. He said that the diplomatic acknowledgement of the necessity of a visa-waiver program for Korea was integral to the growth of the relationship. According to Ambassador Hill, the visa-waiver program was a visible expression to the Korean people of US respect for their country and another outcropping of American diplomacy's engagement with the people of Korea. On the flip-side, the KORUS free trade agreement meant a lot to the United States and reaffirmed Korea's desire to deepen relations with the United States. Congressional response to the trade agreement offered promise to the people of Korea of future engagement with the United States.



Ambassador Hill saw the greatest challenges to the ROK-US relationship as North Korea and trilateral relations with Japan. Ambassador Hill said, “I think the US got itself into a tough position when we appeared to be a force trying to keep the Korean people apart.” Thus, he was implicitly arguing for reunification on the peninsula. Ambassador Hill felt that the challenges faced by rocky Korea-Japan relations were one of the greatest diplomatic struggles for the alliance. The solutions to problems on the Korean Peninsula were multi-partnership and multilateral discussions such as the Six-Party Talks. It was imperative that the United States, Korea, and China be able to talk together face-to-face.

Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard echoed Ambassador Hill and Minister Han’s concerns regarding relations with Japan and North Korea. He contended that the United States recognized and understood the depth of Korea’s concerns with Japan. In fact, the United States arguably shares some of Korea’s concerns, particularly as they relate to the “comfort women” problem. However, Ambassador Hubbard said that, “To expect the US to go beyond neutrality [on issues with Japan] is probably setting up a litmus test that it won’t pass.” Since the United States has treaty obligations to both Japan and Korea, they are walking a fine line that requires much discretion in dealing with the two nations. Ambassador Hubbard expressed surprise that so many Koreans viewed China’s rise as the greatest threat to the ROK-US alliance. On the contrary, he expected that North Korea was viewed as the single greatest threat, particularly since both Korea and the United States have a mutual interest in seeing China rise to power peacefully and constructively and North Korea’s actions have been nothing if not belligerent in recent months. For Ambassador Hubbard, North Korea remains the most significant threat to the alliance.

Ambassador Hubbard had several constructive suggestions for future cooperation. First, it was in the mutual interest of Korea and the United States to renew the bilateral nuclear accord. He felt that in renewing the accord, the US would both send the message that it respects Korea, while maintaining US security interests in keeping the peninsula nuclear free. He also felt that greater emphasis should be placed on the positive strides made in the signing of the KORUS free trade agreement. More US businesses needed to take advantage of the many benefits of the free trade agreement. Finally, Korea should increasingly engage in negotiations for



the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a productive way of developing the ROK-US alliance. Ambassador Hubbard felt that it would be a shame for Korea if they did not join in the negotiations early on.

The future for the ROK-US alliance is positive. Expansion beyond military and security cooperation offers great promise for increasing the partnership. North Korean provocations do not have to serve as a divisive issue for US engagement with South Korea, and future resolution to trilateral tensions between Japan, the United States, and Korea would offer a more positive environment for negotiations. Finally, all panelists agreed that a comprehensive and solid partnership would include both military and economic engagement; then, and only then, could the burgeoning alliance between South Korea and the US be truly realized.

SESSION 2

Date | June 25, 2013
Time | 10:30-11:40

Public Opinion: Alliance, Security, and Nukes

Moderator J. James Kim, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Speakers Charlie Cook, The Cook Political Report
Kim Jiyeon, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Bruce Klingner, The Heritage Foundation
William Tobey, Harvard University

Rapporteur Andrew Kwon, Korea Economic Institute

Mr. Charlie Cook began by expressing his admiration for Korea's transformation into an economic powerhouse and twentieth century success story. To demonstrate, Mr. Cook used the quote "Not your grandfather's Korea" to highlight the scale of change that the ROK has experienced in the last 60 years. The ROK is important to the United States at both the foreign and domestic policy level. At a bilateral level, deepened economic ties over the last 60 years have allowed ROK-US relations to become a more comprehensive partnership that has expanded beyond its previously military-centric nature. At a domestic level, Korean Americans now constitute an increasingly influential minority that not only stands at approximately 1.7 million but also constitutes an important part of the "Tapestry of America."

It is for this reason that Mr. Cook believes that the ROK-US relationship can weather key realities of the US domestic environment. Particularly, in the context of public opinion in the United States, the ROK must under-



J. James Kim



Charlie Cook



Kim Jiyeon



Bruce Klingner



William Tobey

stand that the United States has been through the longest continuous period of war in its history. To demonstrate, Mr. Cook highlighted that the length of US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan is longer than the civil war, World War I, and World War II combined. As such, there is a contradiction in current polling in regard to Korea and the idea of conflict. Despite support for Korea in the event of war, there is a correlative decrease in the enthusiasm for such an engagement. Continuous war has fatigued the US psyche on conflict, a fact compounded by the considerable waste in treasure and blood.

Dr. Kim Jiyeon next discussed the results of a comprehensive annual poll conducted by the Asan Institute. The most recent 2012 poll included a segment on the ROK-US alliance. Dr. Kim noted that the poll is indicative of the highest approval rating for the United States in recent memory, standing at approximately 92 percent. This data continues to be reinforced by answers to questions that highlighted continued support for the alliance after unification (which stands at 70%) and the perception that the US is currently the most influential state with an average score of 8.7 (out of 10). This is in contrast to the score of China in the same section, which stands at an average score of 6.6 (out of 10). However, Dr. Kim warned that not all is as it seems. Dr. Kim looked to average scores on similar questions based on hypothetical future scenarios. In terms of most influence, polls suggest that China will be the most influential country in 10 years with a score of 8.2 (out of 10). In turn, US influence sees a drop to 7.9 (out of 10). Perhaps more striking are polling numbers that suggest 60 percent of older respondents desire closer relations with China as a default diplomatic model.



Among the greatest concerns raised by policymakers both in the United States and the ROK is the perception of lackluster youth support for the ROK-US alliance. Dr. Kim noted that polls in fact suggest the opposite. Individuals between 20-30 years old are among the strongest supporters of the alliance, standing at approximately 95 percent. In turn, 80 percent support the continuance of the alliance after unification. As for the question posed over the stance to China, polling suggests that those 20-30 years old are in fact more likely to stand with traditional allies (i.e. the US) in contrast to the 50-60 age segment. To continue, based on a Stanford experiment utilizing a hypothetical soccer match, 80 percent of the 20-30 age segment voted for the US against China.

Overall, polling suggests a more complex political landscape than what would initially be expected. Dr. Kim believed that the data suggests an electorate which holds a much more complex and nuanced set of beliefs. Particularly in the case of the younger population, a picture is being painted of an increasingly hawkish and security conscious segment that is contrastingly more socially liberal and equally more open to creating a more multifaceted platform for US-Korea relations.

Mr. Bruce Klingner warned about the caveats of polling. Though he noted the usefulness of these instruments to assess situational moods, polls do not provide analysis of long-term strategic prospects. In fact, Mr. Klingner warned that polling is often proof of how fickle the electorate is and thus capable of skewing the reality of a situation. To demonstrate, Mr. Klingner noted several key examples in recent memory. First was percep-

tion of the Sunshine Policy. Mr. Klingner noted that support for the policy stood at only 17 percent following the end of the Kim Dae-jung presidency. However, he noted that support for the policy surged following the death of two teenage girls during US exercises in 2002. Second was polling data in the aftermath of the *Cheonan* sinking. Despite 70 percent of people believing the DPRK was complicit in the sinking, it was matched by an equal 70 percent who did not believe the results of the investigative report. Mr. Klingner concluded that polling was important. However, he believed that facts often so easily extrapolated from polling is underscored by concurrently contradictory perceptions or driven by external shocks. He concluded with the line that “Consensus is the absence of leadership,” surmising that leadership should be the primary driver of policy acceptability not public opinion.

Mr. William Tobey sought to address some of the caveats of polling highlighted by Mr. Klingner. He asserted that the disadvantages of polling can be balanced by principles displayed by leadership. To support this point, Mr. Tobey cited his work with President Reagan, who decided against listening to some of the loudest voices of public opinion on issues on issues critical to nuclear security. He also noted that if anything, public

opinion in light of how the North Korean issue should be treated or is perceived should be heeded. That would help to steer public perception rather than be driven by it. Rather than, considering following polling that supports the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weaponry, Mr. Tobey argued that domestic effort should be made to reemphasize the ROK inclusion under US extended deterrence. In turn, public perception would be further swayed if the ROK made more tangible efforts, particularly in the realm of defense technology such as missile defense systems, and pushing the US government to lift further restrictions on its missile program. Given the increasing pessimism following 20 years of failure, Mr. Tobey argued that these are things that the ROK and United States can consider when devising alternative strategies that not only strengthens the alliance but also sustain public perception.



SESSION 3

Date | June 25, 2013
Time | 11:50-13:00

Dealing with a Nuclear North Korea

Moderator Shin Chang-Hoon, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Speakers Lee Chung Min, Yonsei University
Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution
Bennett Ramberg, Foreign Policy Consultant
Yamaguchi Noboru, National Defense Academy of Japan

Rapporteur Maureen Brown, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

Professor Lee Chung Min set out to dispel three of the “great myths” regarding the North Korean nuclear problem. The first myth is that North Korea had no intention of developing nuclear weapons and if they did then they would relinquish development for the right price. This idea has already been proven false by North Korea’s nuclear tests and unwillingness to limit their nuclear development. The second myth is that if North Korea has nuclear weapons then the only reason is to protect itself from persecution from the United States. However this is no excuse for North Korea’s refusal to abide by the terms of agreements banning or reducing nuclear weapons. The third myth is that all options to put an end to nuclear development in North Korea are still on the table. Professor Lee explained that this statement is not true because certain options, such as force, would only incite North Korea and bring the threat of war.

Professor Lee expressed serious doubts that any reforms concerning nuclear weapons will come about due to Kim Jong-un’s rise to power. In fact, Professor Lee opined that the present North Korean leader’s power



Shin Chang-Hoon




Lee Chung Min



Michael O'Hanlon



Bennett Ramberg



Yamaguchi Noboru

will only decrease as the years pass. He added that the United States will be hard pressed to resolve the problem of nuclear power in North Korea if their attention is diverted to other nuclear critical countries such as Iran or Afghanistan. Countries such as these may also prove to be critical teachers to North Korea. Professor Lee also emphasized the need for China’s involvement in this issue. A nuclear neighbor could prove disastrous to China. Professor Lee suggested addressing nuclear weapons from a holistic perspective and posited that the United States and Japan need to create a concrete plan or roadmap to accomplish this task.

Professor Lee argued that North Korea’s ability to undertake reforms has nothing to do with other countries but only with whether Kim Jong-un really wants to reform. However, if the world gives North Korea de facto

recognition then it would trigger negative effects for many other countries, especially for Japan and South Korea. Professor Lee also pointed out that the president of China will have to realize that a nuclear North Korea will hurt China's own interests. He added that China has already made some indications towards this realization by stating publicly that it is prioritizing denuclearization.

Dr. Michael O'Hanlon offered a more hopeful approach to disarming North Korea. Dr. O'Hanlon suggested that grand bargaining is the most effective solution. While he admitted that it is unlikely that Kim Jong-un will sign a grand bargain tomorrow, he insisted that the negotiations will work and the sooner they are started the better. Dr. O'Hanlon also promoted the use of sanctions, trade, and humanitarian aid to encourage an end to nuclear expansion. While the idea of "buying the same horse twice" was raised, Dr. O'Hanlon optimistically stated that this has not occurred. He argued that with each transgression on the part of North Korea, the United States has modified its tactics. He also commended the continued humanitarian aid given to the people of North Korea, for even though the government may try to use aid for their own purposes, the people that might be helped should not be punished.

Dr. O'Hanlon proposed that countries should use trade to bring about a change in North Korea's nuclear proliferation. He believes that the use of Chinese trade to influence North Korean leaders would be especially effective. Dr. O'Hanlon added that it is necessary to take an optimistic,



forgiving approach to this issue. He argued that while firmly adding sanctions to our relations with North Korea, we should make them temporary so as to give North Korea the opportunity to improve. He added that we need to hope that Kim Jong-un will become at least somewhat reformist in order to maintain his power and position.

Dr. O'Hanlon also explained the differences between North Korean and Pakistani nuclear development, stating that North Korea's extreme oppression towards its own people and belligerence towards South Korea has resulted in little tolerance of its nuclear weapons program. He admitted that the Pakistani regime has many flaws but points out that Pakistan is not as hostile to its own people, which results in a meaningful distinction between the two countries. Dr. O'Hanlon also argued that Pakistan's status in the world should encourage North Korea to scale back on nuclear power, military, and treat its people better. It should give North Korea hope that it can improve its relations with other countries.

If North Korea mounts warheads on missiles that can reach South Korea and Japan, Dr. O'Hanlon stated that hopes to convince North Koreans that there is nothing to gain from bombing its neighbors. He believed that laying out a strategy of reform for North Korea without expectations or a timeline of when things must occur will be the most beneficial approach. He also suggested trying to induce Kim Jong-un to stop making more nuclear weapons even if he doesn't give up his current ones. Dr. O'Hanlon saw even a reduction in nuclear weapons as a victory with North Korea.

Dr. Bennett Ramberg disagreed with Dr. O’Hanlon and expressed disbelief that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons. He stated that no negotiations, incentives, or punishments will induce North Korea to end proliferation. He pointed out that there are only two cases in which countries gave up nuclear weapons: South Africa and some eastern European countries that were part of the Soviet Union. Dr. Ramberg added that the only reason these countries relinquished nuclear weapons was because they felt safer without the weapons than they did with them. However, this is not the case with North Korea. Dr. Ramberg argued that North Korea uses nuclear weapons as a security blanket and a way to support the regime. He also explained that when he uses the term “arms control” he refers to anything that reduces the probability of war.

Dr. Ramberg next laid out three different options for dealing with nuclear North Korea. The first option is to recognize the state of North Korea and to offer unconditional diplomatic relations. He admitted that this option could result in several harmful possibilities including legitimizing a nuclear state next to South Korea, allowing the North Korean government a sense of victory, and undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, he also pointed out that this option could reflect reality, provide diplomatic recognition, reduce the isolation of North Korea, and encourage communication during a crisis. The second option Dr. Ramberg presented is to leave North Korea alone to “stew in its own dysfunction” and instead let China be responsible for propping up the government. This option is a response to the repeated failures of all efforts with treaties and sanctions. It is also at the opposite end of the spectrum from a military strike against North Korea, which is impossible because it will only incite a nuclear war. Dr. Ramberg argued that this option allows us to eliminate illusion and deal with reality. The third option Dr. Ramberg posited is to return weapons to South Korea to use as an insurance policy against North Korea. This last option will curb South Korea’s desire for its own development of nuclear weapons to protect itself. However, it will also increase tensions with North Korea, raise objections from China, and undermine President Obama’s nonproliferation policy. Dr. Ramberg argued that while the first option seems tempting, it will only result in North Korea using diplomatic relations as leverage. Ultimately, he believes that the second option is the most effective.



Lt. Gen. Yamaguchi Noboru, emphasized that the denuclearization of North Korea should always remain an ultimate goal. He pointed out that their nuclear weapons pose many dangers including the physical destruction of North Korea’s neighbors. He also added that nuclear weapons are especially dangerous in the hands of people with such an extremist philosophy. He pointed out that North Korea is already isolated because of their behavior and sanctions and he worries that isolating the country as Dr. Ramberg suggested may only further provoke them into using these weapons. Lt. Gen. Yamaguchi also acknowledged the Japanese abductees and the growing middle class within North Korea, but stated that these issues are not the whole picture and cannot solely determine Japan’s policy with North Korea.

SESSION 4

Date | June 25, 2013
Time | 13:50-15:00

Dealing with North Korea's Human Rights

Moderator Baek Buhm-Suk, Kyung-Hee University

Speakers Roberta Cohen, The Brookings Institute
Frank Jannuzi, Amnesty International USA
Kil Jeong-Woo, National Assembly, ROK
Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Rapporteur Olivia Enos, The Heritage Foundation

Arguably one of the worst human rights crises of the modern day, North Korea continues to operate its gulag-like prison camps, and commit massive human rights violations against its own people. In recent months and years, the regime in North Korea has continued to violate the dignity of its people. Dr. Baek Buhm-Suk, noted that Shin Dong-hyuk—the only person born in a North Korean prison camp known to escape—has put a face and a name on the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. His testimony has brought to light the atrocities that occur daily in the North Korean gulags and has placed a spotlight on the plight of North Korean refugees worldwide. The recent return of nine North Korean children from Laos to North Korea has also shed light on the lack of standards in place to deal with refugees. There is also recent evidence that North Korea has been cracking down on its border even more. In collaboration with China, the regime has cut down on the number of defectors by half. Without clear solutions to the problem, North Korea will continue to abuse its people unabated.

Ms. Roberta Cohen believed that now is the time for the international community to address North Korea's human rights crisis. With nearly 200,000 people estimated to be in the prison camps, and documented atrocities occurring within the penal system in North Korea, Ms. Cohen said this was evidence in demand of a verdict. Testimony from the labor camps, including prisoners, prison guards, and others from inside North Korea have built up enough evidence to make the claim of prison camps certain. Satellite images have only made it more real. While the prison camps are undeniable, there are other aspects of the human rights crisis that are less verifiable. The number of deaths and individual events of abuse and torture are harder to prove. Despite the fact that the international community has clear evidence of prison camps at its disposal, little practical action has been taken. Resources are limited and few people are willing to write about the crisis.

Ms. Cohen was encouraged that a commission of inquiry was opened by the UN, but she felt that the commission was not an end in and of itself. She believed that the commission would face problems. Due to the fact that individuals' acts of violence, torture, and other nefarious actions of the Kim regime are more difficult to prove, she feared that the process




*Baek Buhm-Suk**Roberta Cohen*

could get sidetracked. Ms. Cohen was also concerned about China's return to the UN Human Rights Council. She encouraged Japan, the EU, and the United States to maintain their stalwart support for the commission. Finally, she felt that international actors should not be so afraid to address human rights issues with North Korean officials directly. She felt that the 60th anniversary of US-South Korea relations should kick-start growth in the two nations' partnership in the fight against human rights abuses in North Korea.

Mr. Frank Jannuzi agreed with Ms. Cohen that any solution to human rights issues in North Korea should include a full-throated comprehensive strategy designed to change the agenda. The human rights crisis in North Korea is arguably the most horrific situation occurring in present times. In addition to the prison camps, there are major food security and public health problems in Korea. "The difficulty of this task must not be allowed to be an excuse for inaction." But it is possible to address the North Korean officials openly and directly regarding human rights issues. When Amnesty International visited North Korea in 1995, they had honest and open discussions with officials in Korea and Mr. Jannuzi noted that these could and should be replicated.

Mr. Jannuzi noted that despite the fact that there are many human rights declarations, many of which North Korea is party to, human rights violations continue. Mr. Jannuzi argued that a calculated strategic patience approach is vital. Mr. Jannuzi was in favor of building and implementing a Helsinki-like accord. He believed that it would be the most effective way to engage the DPRK on security, economics, and human rights.

*Frank Jannuzi**Kil Jeong-Woo**Marcus Noland*

It is time to go beyond bilateral talks and expand them to multilateral engagement. Mr. Jannuzi also felt that a frontal assault, similar to the approach policymakers take with nuclear weapons, is the right way to attack the human rights issue. This should encompass a flank attack that is blunt and attempts to change the mindset of both the people and the government of North Korea by engaging with a multifaceted strategy of engagement.

Dr. Kil Jeong-Woo noted several misconceptions when it comes to South Korea and its willingness to address the North Korea regime. The first misconception he identified was the accusation that South Korea is afraid of a massive inflow of North Korean refugees or that the South Korean government might be concerned about jeopardizing negotiations between the two Koreas. His response to the latter was that there hadn't been a serious dialogue between the two Koreas for the past six years. This means that there was nothing to jeopardize relations because talks between the two countries were non-existent. Dr. Kil also noted that most people believed that the biggest opponent to the refugees was China. Dr. Kil felt that Vietnam and even Laos were more belligerent in their lack of support for Korean refugees. He argued that most of the refugees had to pass through Chinese borders in the first place to get to third countries in Southeast Asia. While he felt that China could be more aggressive in calling out human rights issues in North Korea, he also felt that China was not the primary culprit.

Finally, Dr. Kil praised the South Korean government's resettlement practices for North Korea refugees. As home to over 25,000 refugees he felt that they were providing proper support. However, he believed that

the South Korean government should do more to ensure the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act. It has been eight years since the bill was first introduced, noted Dr. Kil, and the fact that it has not yet passed reflects the fragility of inter-Korean relations. Dr. Kil concluded by asking, “Are the people of South Korea prepared to live with a refugee population?” The 25,000 defectors that reside within South Korea now are relatively small in comparison to the flood of refugees that might result from reunification. Many defectors have found it difficult to assimilate into Korean culture, noted Dr. Kil, and South Koreans must do more to make it easier for them. He supported the intervention of international NGOs, religious organizations, and civic organizations to take up the reins and help Korea to prepare for unification.

Dr. Marcus Noland felt that policymakers must view the Korean crisis as requiring two layers of policy. He equated human rights issues in North Korea with an iceberg: 10 percent is above the surface (refugee policy) and 90 percent is under the surface (policy that can only be implemented within North Korea). In other words, there were direct policies achieved through diplomatic means, and indirect policies that don’t require the compliance of the North Korean government. Dr. Noland gave practical examples of potential future policies to directly address human rights issues. He suggested that on the US-end it was critical that the United States create a more robust North Korean Human Rights Act. He also recommended solutions such as establishing a refugee hotline, providing scholarships to refugees, and engaging with North Korea economically. Dr. Noland felt that the United States held the key to pressure North Korea

into protecting the rights of its people through economic engagement with the business community. Since the United States is wealthy and North Korea is seeking investment, economic engagement would allow the United States to place strings on its investment to leverage gains in human rights.

Dr. Noland contended that the most important contribution the United States could make to the human rights crisis was to address the issue with China. This included forcibly communicating to China that we view North Korean defectors as refugees—something Dr. Noland argues that Obama should have brought up in his recent meetings with Chinese officials in the wake of the North Korea-Laos defector crisis. And Dr. Noland contended that beyond this, the United States must push for a legal regularization that would permit defectors to stay in China under protected status for a limited amount of time.

Every panelist agreed that North Korea was a unique situation. Unlike Burma, the people of North Korea are not exposed to the outside world. This means they aren’t asking questions about their healthcare, their lifestyle, their treatment. They have nothing from the outside world to compare the oppressive North Korean regime to. And finally, people in the DPRK have no means of communication to the outside world. Without swift and decisive action against the North Korean regime for human rights issues, the people of North Korea will continue to suffer. As many of the panelists noted, a robust and comprehensive strategy that requires a response from the North Korean regime is vital.



SESSION 5

Date | June 25, 2013
Time | 15:20-16:30

The Virtual Alliance

Moderator Walter Lohman, The Heritage Foundation

Speakers Michael Auslin, American Enterprise Institute
Bong Youngshik, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Nishino Junya, Keio University

Rapporteur Jara Kim, Korea Economic Institute

Mr. Walter Lohman began the session by pointing out how the session titled, “The Virtual Alliance,” somewhat encapsulates the current situation in which the alliance among the United States, Japan, and Korea, cannot be spoken of as a whole and Japan is often the unspoken member. Questions were raised on the purpose of such an alliance—suggesting that it may be China that the three countries are allying over—and the strategic rationale in not only the short term—contingency on the Korean Peninsula—but also the long term.

Dr. Michael Auslin began by discussing the US perspective regarding the virtual alliance. His view towards the alliance is that it should not have been as difficult as it is turning out to be today given that Korea and Japan are allies that closely mirror each other in many aspects. He voiced that the alliance could have been celebrated for the fruitful dynamics of the members, which is currently not the reality. There is room for improvement as to what Washington can do on this issue, although acknowledging the regular trilateral discussions currently in place, which, despite coming across as vague, meant that there is such a mechanism and an



Walter Lohman



Michael Auslin



Bong Youngshik



Nishino Junya

understanding that Washington should do better.

Regarding the purpose, he noted that the trilateral alliance from the US perspective is about the future of Asia and it is most natural that the two leading liberal nations in East Asia such as Korea and Japan should serve as the drivers for building future peace, prosperity, stability and liberal norms in the region. When such an alliance could have been in place 15 or 20 years ago, what really has happened is that now that China is catching up, the United States is trying to figure out the alliance structure and fit it into ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, which is a waste of time. He suggested that Washington should have a serious heart-to-heart discussion with both countries as to where the relationship should go for deeper trust-rooted cooperation, though

admitting this is not a solve-all. Also, he concluded that if the United States were to continue investing to build leverage with the two countries over the next 60 years for achieving greater goals, he is less optimistic as he does not see this initiative taking place.

When questioned by Mr. Lohman as to what the alliance is about beyond the Korean Peninsula and why it is needed in addressing China, Dr. Auslin stated that there is more to the alliance than just China, such as jointly promoting democracy and liberal society as best practices, which Korea has more recent experience with than Japan. On the economic side, he suggested maritime-oriented trade and TPP as issues that can be worked on with the trilateral alliance.

Dr. Bong Youngshik cautioned that the bilateral alliance between South Korea and the United States is taken for granted to some extent, and if we were to regard it as a prelude to a higher level of regional security architecture, this may not be easily achieved although there is emerging consensus among Korean observers that the alliance can achieve more than the prevention of war. He posed a pessimistic view as to whether the ROK-US alliance can be upgraded into a virtual alliance with Japan.



First, he pointed out that from a realistic viewpoint, a country cannot rely on another country's security commitment. Quoting a book by J. J. Suh, *Bound to Last*—"in the history of modern international politics, only five percent of all kinds of security alliance last more than five years,"—he mentioned that it is the norm that such commitments are terminated, and the longevity of the ROK-US alliance is a rare case. Also, he pointed out that only 10 years ago, such celebration was a taboo due to anti-American sentiments in Korea, and we will never know what can happen in the timespan of the next decade.

After noting that the supply side—the technical feasibility—and the demand side—desirability—should be observed, he presented optimistic findings on the latter by citing Korean public survey results. According to the survey, 67.6 percent of respondents named the United States as a desirable leader whereas 26.4 percent chose China, and 65.9 percent of respondents replied that China was not a desirable leader. In regard to Korea's partner country, 85.5 percent chose the United States. When asked about the ROK-China relationship, around 11 percent agreed it was good, around 17 percent found it bad, and 71 percent replied it depended on issues and circumstances. Additionally, it was found that Korean citizens found the EU as a possible partner for forging a value-based partnership rather than China. With respect to the possibility of expanding the scope of the bilateral ROK-US relationship, the increasing and diverse challenges posed by North Korea will help South Korea expand the scope of its missions. Yet, he made a less optimistic conclusion than the previous speaker that the future of the ROK-US alliance will have enough potential to become a stepping-stone to a multilateral security institution in Northeast Asia such as NATO, and there should be more tangible evidence to back this rationale.

When questioned by Mr. Lohman about the kind of alliance he pictured when involving China, he responded that China is becoming a welcoming and persistent voice in the multilateral security dialogue.

Dr. Nishino Junya commented that among the bilateral alliances constituting the virtual alliance, the ROK-Japan relationship is the weakest link and analyzed the involved factors: North Korea, China, and the effort of both countries to improve the relationship.

Regarding the first factor, North Korea has been a driving force behind the relationship between the three countries since the Korean War. A security treaty between the United States and Japan agreed that Japan supported the operation of US forces on the Korean Peninsula, and the US forces stationed in Okinawa played a critical role in dealing with North Korea threats. After the Cold War, North Korean provocations were the highest priority in Japanese security policy, thus leading to security cooperation. But there have been recent difficulties between Korea and Japan, such as the stemmed Intelligence Sharing Agreement in 2011 due to critical public opinion in South Korea. There is also a growing perception gap in dealing with North Korea. There is a growing perception in South Korea of viewing North Korea as the same ethnicity, whereas Japanese citizens have expressed strong anger regarding the abductee issue. The two countries are also experiencing differences in how they address China. Japan is pursuing beefed up security capacity in its southern part of Japan in response to expansion of Chinese military. It is also trying to strengthen security cooperation with other democracies.

The Abe administration intends to strengthen the alliance with the United States, enter the TPP negotiation, and make the most out of the US rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific in its security agenda. Korean President Park Geun-hye is pursuing proactive relationship building with China with the recognition that cooperation with China can help deal with the North Korean issues. For Korea, China is not only an important trade partner, but also a major stakeholder in the future of the Korean Peninsula. Also, China is a signatory to the armistice agreement of 1953. Given these facts, it would be difficult for President Park to seek improved relations with China without easing the tension between China and Japan, and one of the ways to do this is reducing trilateral cooperation.

As for the improvement of the ROK-Japan bilateral relationship, the speaker expressed that historic matters should be discussed in a cautious manner. The recent trend shows that on the civil level, there are growing exchanges and mutual understanding between the two Koreas, but this is not the case on the political level. The speaker noted that Japanese leaders should understand that Korean leaders, particularly President Park, must endure a great deal politically due to the historic memory of South Koreans, and suggested that it seems that Prime Minister Abe has now recognized the



sensitivity of the comfort women issue after the harsh criticism against inappropriate statements, but recently the administration supported those statements. Dr. Nishino suggested that the South Korean government should keep these in mind when approaching the Japanese and have a summit meeting as soon as possible.

When asked about the role that the United States can play at a time when the Japan-Korea relationship may as of today be experiencing a downward spiral with the changing circumstances, Dr. Auslin expressed his agreement with the notion of a downward spiral, and that what the United States can do is to be honest and suggest that Korea and China discuss the options they have without the United States. Dr. Bong noted that there is a tendency that Asian allies of the United States can afford not to upgrade their bilateral relationship because they have to consider the opportunity cost: budget size, allocation, security priority, and comparison of Japan and China as partners. Also, such an upgrade is associated with merging national identity with the partner country, and with the memory of Japan's colonial rule of Korea deeply embedded in Korea, Dr. Bong was somewhat pessimistic. He later raised the question of US partial involvement in resolving the Dokdo issue.

When asked whether track 1.5 dialogue can help, Dr. Nishino expressed that encouraging trilateral dialogue is very important, but they should be cautious because it could be a negative signal to China, and the US-China relationship is important in this respect. Regarding the misunderstanding that the driving force of Japanese security is a nationalistic issue, he voiced that although Prime Minister Abe has a conservative mindset, the ordinary citizens are willing to contribute to the international community. Additionally, Abe mentioned historic issues negatively in April, but within one month he had to amend his statement, which shows the balance in Japan. Dr. Auslin added that track 1.5 works under the conditions that: 1) there is a very committed relationship already in place, and 2) the agenda is something that the governments are already committed to.

SESSION 6

Date | June 25, 2013
Time | 16:50-18:00

Korea between the US and China

Moderator Hahm Chaibong, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Speakers Choi Kang, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Thomas J. Christensen, Princeton University
Bonnie S. Glaser, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University
Zhao Quansheng, American University

Rapporteur Vriddhi Sujan, George Washington University

This panel was about the complex diplomatic relationship between Korea, the United States and China. One of the central themes of the discussion was how Korea is walking a fine line as it increasingly faces simultaneous pressure from both the United States and China on how it should be conducting its approach to foreign policy initiatives. A possible outcome of this precarious situation is for Korea to shift alliances to only one of the superpowers and isolate the other. Given Korea's geographic proximity to China as well its economic dependence on China, there is concern that Korea will in the future move closer towards China, while distancing itself from the United States. The talks between South Korea and each of the major superpowers was a main point discussed in this panel as the panelists explored the importance of these relations and how each superpower could use its relations with South Korea to influence North Korea as well as the other superpower. Ideally, a consensus among the panelists is that if China and the United States can cooperate on the topic of South Korea, they would be able to keep North Korea from isolating



Thomas J. Christensen



Bonnie S. Glaser



Gilbert Rozman



Zhao Quansheng



Hahm Chaibong



Choi Kang

itself from the international community and taking drastic measures involving nuclear weapons.

Dr. Choi Kang talked about bilateral relations between China and Korea; China and the United States; and Korea and the United States. He then discussed how each of these sets of bilateral relations has an impact on multilateral relations between the three countries. Furthermore, US diplomatic alliances with other countries, especially those in the Middle East will also affect its respective relations with China and Korea.

Professor Thomas Christensen emphasized the importance of US-Korea relations when talking about US-China relations. He said that the way with which the United States deals with Korea can be greatly destructive or constructive for its alliance with China. This can also be looked at through another angle. For example, in 2006, when China started putting pressure on North Korea, there were positive externalities on US-China relations. China's influence in the region is extremely important and thus the United States has to be on China's good side if it wants to preserve itself as a strategic global player in Asia. One example of a bad year for US diplomacy with China was 2010 as China was seemingly enabling North Korean belligerence and there were public critiques of China trying to colonize South Korea. Professor Christenson noted that some tend to perceive South Korea passively in both the US and Chinese approaches to North Korea, but the reality is that if there is to be advancement on talks with North Korea, it is crucial that South Korea be considered as well.



Another way to pressure North Korea could be to isolate North Korea completely. There is apprehension in the United States of North Korea isolating itself from the United States and China, yet North Korea also is cautious of this happening and is reluctant to do so as it would do more harm than good. China is also reluctant to isolate North Korea. Thus, while China would ideally like to pressure North Korea when the time seems right, it is walking a tight rope because it does not want to pressure it too much as it risks losing North Korea's support altogether.



Ms. Bonnie Glaser discussed how she understands why Korea, especially South Korea, feels dependent on China and looks towards it as a regional ally. In fact, she notes that many countries have China as their primary trading partner, but experience conflicts of interest because they maintain the United States as their close security ally. The premise to this dilemma is that the United States and China have a zero-sum relationship and thus a positive relationship with one (the US or China) automatically means a negative relationship with the other. In fact, Glaser argues that when it comes to the topic of the Korean Peninsula, there is a great deal of overlap in Chinese and US interests and their relationship in this regard is not at all zero-sum. Furthermore, it is important for the United States to sustain its good relations with China as this will be key to the US approach to North Korea. South Korea should thus not feel as if it has to choose between China and the United States but rather look at its relations with both countries as important in different contexts. While China maintains itself as South Korea's main trading partner and has a lot of leverage for this reason, US investment in South Korea is still substantially larger than that of China. It is evident that both of these relationships should be equally important to South Korea.



Professor Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University emphasized in his summary of the issue that Chinese relations with South Korea can be used as leverage for Chinese relations with North Korea and the United States. He also said that he is not fearful that China will improve its relations with South Korea and isolate the United States. This is primarily because if China improves relations with South Korea, it means that it is also improving constructive relations with North Korea, which closely aligns with US interests as well. Professor Rozman also touched upon Japan's role in all of this and stated that it will be interesting to see whether China can use Japan strategically in these talks. A strategy for China is to isolate South Korea from both the United States and Japan, thus placing pressure on the United States and Japan to change their strategies towards North Korea. Japan is perhaps more vulnerable to this approach due to its regional interests, however it is still questionable how long China would be able to sustain such an approach.

Professor Zhao Quansheng from American University pointed out that South Korea needs to divide its foreign policy approach into four dimensions: strategic, political, economic and cultural. It should think about its bilateral relations with the United States and China in each of these dimensions but it should also consider the implications they will have on multilateral relations. Professor Zhao reiterated the point made by most of the panelists that the United States needs to put itself in the shoes of South Korea and cannot expect it to isolate China because it is a strategic regional ally and an extremely close trading partner. Rather, South Korea has to act according to the strategy that best reflects its own national interests.

Another issue that was touched upon in this panel is the topic of trust, or lack thereof, between Beijing and Seoul in the matter of communication strategy. The panelists agreed that in order to improve overall relations, there needs to be better communications between the two countries so that they can learn to trust each other and start working towards a strategy that is mutually beneficial.

An interesting question that was posed by a member of the audience was whether China's strategy towards Korea is currently changing or if it will change in the foreseeable future. The panelists all felt cautious about a change in China's position towards Korea. Over the past couple of months, there has been a significant shift in the Chinese domestic debate regarding Korea, however, whether or not this will influence the Chinese government's policy is yet to be determined.

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