Author: Dawn Verdugo, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute

Dr. Vladimir Ivanov began the session with a discussion on how the new START treaty demonstrates an evolution of Russian strategic military thinking beyond a posture of Mutually Assured Destruction. This evolution is based on a growing gap between capabilities of the United States, NATO countries and the Russian Federation. During negotiations, Russia discussed this and other important concerns. First, Russia explicitly expressed concerns over possible deployment of a U.S. global missile defense system. Second, Russia is concerned over the United States’ re-loading capacities, which Russia would like to limit. The third concern centers upon the potential U.S. deployment of conventionally-equipped strategic launchers. Not touched upon in this treaty, but an important contributor to the overall global strategic balance, is the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (NWs). Yet Russia will likely continue to refrain from discussing this issue until U.S. tactical NWs in Europe are removed. He ended by noting that in future strategic arms control negotiations, a multi-national effort will be appropriate, and that tactical NWs will need to be discussed.

General Jonathan George postulated that the new treaty is more symbolic than substantive, but notes its critical importance in demonstrating mutual goals of achieving a prosperous and secure global future. He then reflected on the differences between two concepts: capabilities and intent. Intent is easily changed, capabilities are not. Unlike 30 years ago, the United States and Russia are no longer immediate threats to the other. But we cannot blindly disregard our continuing shared capabilities. He understands the logical Russian concerns over U.S. missile defenses, in spite of the fact that the United States has no intent to use them against Russia. Additionally, the United States must be try to understand Russia’s perceived need for and reliance on tactical NWs. Increased transparency on the intent for these systems could allay each side’s concerns. Like Dr. Ivanov, he concluded that future treaty negotiations must address more multi-national approach. He added that next round negotiations must also consider non-deployed stockpile NWs, and those awaiting dismantlement.

Eldridge Colby (speaking in place of Paul Hughes), concluded the session by hypothesizing on issues to consider in future arms control negotiations. He predicts that the near-term negotiations will continue to be bilateral, as multilateral candidates are not yet ready. Continued reductions, rather than nuclear abolition, should drive future arms control. Goals of strategic stability and security of NWs and nuclear materials should also be prominent objectives. He maintains that each side should be encouraged, through arms control, to have postures with an assured, devastating 2nd strike capability in order to maintain deterrence. However, he notes that while the United States can take steps that demonstrate good faith in not trying to hinder Russia’s deterrent (for example, with proposed missile defense programs), that it’s Russia’s responsibility to increase its survivability. He concluded noting that overarching goals for future arms control activities should include theater range NWs, increasing security of nuclear materials, and maintaining an effective deterrent.

* The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
* The views expressed here are panel overviews of the Asan Plenum. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the author or the institutions they are affiliated with.