Session: Season 3
Date/Time: April 27, 2016 / 10:45-12:15
William Tobey, Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs, Harvard University
Abe Nobuyasu, Japan Atomic Energy Commission
Robert Einhorn, The Brookings Institution
Park Jiyoung, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Zhu Feng, Nanjing University
Although the world has made great strides in confronting, halting and deterring the proliferation of nuclear technology, material and know-how, the network of criminals, non-state actors and rogue nation states remains elusive and dangerous. Regional and international institutions are ill-equipped in resources and cumbersome in organizational size to render effective, agile and timely assistance to disturbing transfers of sensitive technologies. Do effective interdictions and interventions remain the sole purview of individual nation states? Is there a possibility of formulating an international treaty curbing state to state transfer of sensitive technology, materials and know-how akin to the NPT? What sort of legal, diplomatic and military tools are available to augment interdiction efforts?