Author: Kelsey Hartigan, National Security Network

Eliminating nuclear weapons will be a long and protracted process?one that poses both challenges and opportunities. Moderated by Bruce MacDonald of the United States Institute of Peace, the Disarmament panel dealt with the strategic, political and verification issues that must be resolved if states are to move to a world without nuclear weapons. The panel focused on the near-term issues that must be addressed now that the United States and Russia have concluded the New START accord as well as the long-term obstacles to denuclearization, including the eventual threat of rearmament if zero is reached.

The panel began with a discussion of why states acquire nuclear weapons. A large part of the rationale stems from insecurity and fear. Therefore, as MacDonald made clear, it is essential for future nuclear reductions to be accompanied by a corresponding lessening of major political tensions, especially as the levels get lower and additional countries are brought into the process. If the two features get decoupled, serious issues will undoubtedly arise. MacDonald suggested we think about this as being like a circus act: A woman riding two horses, with a leg on each horse cannot let either animal get too far ahead of the other, or she’ll fall off. Nuclear stability and nuclear reductions are similar to the two horses- neither can get too far ahead or behind throughout this process. Given this, current political realities and state conflicts may well slow the pace of major reductions substantially below New START levels.

MacDonald outlined four phases for future reductions:

1. Twilight of bilateral arms control: Going from New START at 1550 strategic warheads to a successor Comprehensive Nuclear Arms Treaty (C-NAT) at about 1000 strategic warheads plus additional restrictions on tactical and non-deployed nuclear weapons. If it is possible to achieve significant reductions in this round, the next round has to be multilateral.

2. Dawn of multilateral arms control: From ˝C-NAT I˝ to a lower level of about 500 warheads total, including tactical and non-deployed weapons, and involving other nuclear powers. The problems of multilateral arms control are immense at this phase.

3. End of the world levels: From ˝C-NAT II˝ to a lower level of 50-100 warheads. At this phase, levels approach the point where nuclear war would be horrendous, but it wouldn’t necessarily mean the end of the world because levels would be so low.

4. Zero: From ˝C-NAT III˝ to zero. In order to get to this point, there would have to be a fundamental transformation in international relations. Even if that happens, significant verification challenges will still exist.

Phase 1 negotiations are likely to take a lot longer than New START. The challenges are endless: states will have to come to an agreement on contentious issues like missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear weapons. The U.S. and Russia will also have to consider how reductions will impact their security relations with other nuclear powers and at what point these powers will join the arms control process. Other issues like verification, alliance dynamics, and regional security issues must also be dealt with, which will clearly take time. The bottom line, MacDonald suggested, is that it will be incredibly difficult to reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. But we have to try.

Corey Hinderstein of the Nuclear Threat Initiative focused on how states might verify dismantlement and compliance when moving to zero. She focused on the importance of establishing a robust verification system?a long-term task which must begin immediately given the scope of what is involved. According to Hinderstein, the international community already has a strong technical basis from which it can draw. Lessons learned by U.S. and Russian negotiators as well as IAEA inspectors will be particularly valuable. She suggested that all states, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, rethink classification standards and focus on developing the ability to verify initial baseline declarations, among other things. Hinderstein suggested six parameters from which discussions about verifying nuclear disarmament should take place:

1. Recognizing different stakeholders. While arms control has traditionally focused on the United States and Russia, the discussion about stakeholders has shifted. All states have a stake in moving to a world free of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states have a large role that cannot be underestimated. There seems to be a greater understanding that such states cannot stand on sidelines.
2. Rethinking classified information. Hinderstein suggests that the standards by which information is deemed classified is based on outdated assumptions. Previously protected information could just be shared, which would be easier and less costly than developing expensive systems to safeguard information that no longer needs to be classified.
3. Determining compliance and noncompliance. The IAEA makes a judgment about a state’s intentions and seeks to identify whether a country attempted to hide certain information. This is a judgment of intent. States must decide if the IAEA should play such a role or if the IAEA should simply detect and report violations without making such judgments.
4. Utilizing a systems-based approach to verification. No verification measure is infallible. States will need to construct a system of systems to maximize the effectiveness of the regime.
5. Thinking outside the box. We need to think creativity about verification. Societies will have a role in verification- people with no official status could report violations; industry will also play a role but more rigorous analysis of these functions is needed.
6. Dealing with existing stocks. States will need to develop the ability to verify initial baseline declarations and declared nuclear materials.

Masood Khan, Pakistan’s Ambassador to China, discussed both regional and international dynamics and the need to resolve outstanding conflicts before one can take meaningful steps in disarmament. Khan also highlighted current stalemates in Conference on Disarmament and other international forums and the need to build a new global security architecture if nuclear weapons are to be eliminated. He suggested that U.S. President Barack Obama revived the concept of Global Zero, but that it must become a multinational endeavor going forward and that all states must find the political will do deal with the challenges posed by deep nuclear reductions.

Andrew Pierre of the United States Institute of Peace discussed theater missile defense and the Phased Adaptive Approach and how missile defense cooperation between Russia and NATO might fit into the next round of arms control negotiations. The United States and its European allies want to counter growing the missile threat from Iran. Pierre noted that this means that the U.S. wants to have, in dealing with Iranian missile threat, some type of cover for Europe as a whole. The Phased Adaptive Approach widened the approach taken by the Bush administration so that under the new system, there will be 440 interceptors in Romania and Poland and 43 ships mainly in the Mediterranean by the year 2020. The Russians are very concerned with this plan and believe it will threaten their strategic capabilities. Such discomfort has existed since Ronald Reagan unveiled the Strategic Defense Initiative.

While the SM-3 deployment that is scheduled for the beginning phases are less of a concern, Russians defense officials believe that the system could eventually counter Russian ICBMs. In fact, Russia’s Foreign Minister has already requested a written guarantee that any missile defense system developed by the United States or its allies will not threaten Russia. Ongoing discussions with Russia about building a cooperative missile defense system have made limited progress, but appear stuck on the question of integration. Collaboration is desirable for everyone looking at the issue. But, Pierre warned, the U.S. does not want a single, integrated system. One solution to this apparent stalemate could be to share missile launch information through a joint data information center. The U.S. would likely prefer this approach, which would give the U.S. access to Russia’s Northwest radars that are aimed toward Iran. Pierre suggested that a potential deal involving shared missile defense information is not just good for missile defense, but could also unlock the door to dealing with tactical nuclear weapons as well as both deployed and non-deployed weapons. Such an agreement could be part of whatever replaces New START, though this presents several problems given the disparity between the number of Russian and Western tactical nuclear weapons.

Should an agreement on missile defense and non-deployed weapons be reached and the time is ripe to move toward the next phase of nuclear reductions, other nuclear powers would have to be drawn into the negotiations. Pierre suggested that should the focus shift to multilateral arms control, Great Britain and France would be the most likely to participate. Pierre was later asked why China would be excluded from the last phase. He suggested that it would be ideal if China was involved, but current political realities seemed to indicate that this would not be the case. Others suggested that we should not give China this kind of “free pass.”

John Park, also of the United States Institute of Peace examined how deterrence changes as arsenals are reduced and what impact such reductions might have on alliance dynamics. Based on findings from Track 1.5 and 2.0 Dialogue, Park focused on the situation in the Korean Peninsula and how current realities complicate the prospects for a world without nuclear weapons. He suggested that 2010 was a reality check for the Global Zero movement and that the political conditions that currently exist between the North and South indicate that the threat environment is unlikely to change in the near future. Park noted that in the wake of the Chenoan sinking and island shelling, the U.S. reaffirmed its nuclear guarantee, which seemed to highlight the disconnection between the concept of global zero and the reality on the ground. Regional conflicts such as this will have to be resolved before the world moves to zero, as Bruce MacDonald noted in his opening comments. This will have a spillover effect on alliances as well, which would likely be realigned in a world where international relations are fundamentally different.

MacDonald closed by noting that the challenges are endless. States must effectively deal with tangential issues such as missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapons as well as bigger picture issues like how to maintain strategic and crisis stability as numbers become dramatically lower. All of this suggests that deep reductions and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons will require more than a numbers-based analysis?it will necessitate a fundamental shift in international relations, which is clearly a long-term challenge.

* The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
* The views expressed here are panel overviews of the Asan Plenum. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the author or the institutions they are affiliated with.