Future of the ROK-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

The ROK-US nuclear energy agreement, which was signed and revised in 1972 and 1974, will expire in March 2014. Since the agreement, the Republic of Korea’s nuclear status has been elevated to that of an international exporter/supplier of nuclear power plants. The current ROK-US nuclear energy agreement only allows nuclear material supplied to the ROK to be altered into a form acceptable to both parties. However, the ROK is considering closing its nuclear fuel cycle because it believes that potential buyers are hesitant in purchasing power plant technology from the country because of the limitations that are imposed by the agreement. Negotiations between the two countries for a new bilateral cooperation agreement will continue throughout this year and will have broad bilateral, regional, and global implications. This panel will explore the legal, technical, strategic, political, environmental, and economic issues that relate to the ROK-US nuclear cooperation agreement

Nuclear Dominos in Northeast Asia

Amongst the dangers of North Korea’s entry into the nuclear club, it has been argued that more states in the region might also want to go nuclear. This could lead to the failure of broader efforts of the international community to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Considering the current nonproliferation regime will a nuclear domino effect actually take place in this region? What measures can be taken to prevent this from becoming a reality? Which state will be the most prospective candidate to go nuclear in Northeast Asia?

Building Global Nuclear Security Architecture

The heads of states and international organizations that participated in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit agreed to support the objectives of existing international nuclear security instruments in order to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. The leaders voiced support for the universality of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. They also acknowledged the importance of UNSCR 1540 and 1577, and IAEA documents such as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, as well as other relevant international initiatives. Are these measures sufficient for promoting and strengthening the global nuclear security architecture or do we need comprehensive and holistic approaches? If different approaches are needed, what steps can be taken to initiate or support such measures?