Author: Melissa Hanham, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute

Moderated by Lee Jung Hoon, the session began with an overview of the wide array of issues that set these two types of states apart. Perhaps most pressing, are non-nuclear weapons state’s fears that their right to the peaceful use of nuclear power is being undermined and their belief that nuclear weapons states are not doing enough to meet their responsibility to disarm.

Etel Solingen used the foundation laid by her book Nuclear Logics to describe the phenomena of why some states choose to seek a nuclear weapons program. Dividing a state’s impetus for weapons into supply and demand, she catalogued both proximate and ultimate causes for these decisions. On the demand side, Solingen found that states were greatly motivated by domestic political economy in the decision making. Internationalizing states seeking favorable entry into the global economy were less likely to seek a weapons program than inward looking states. She also noted that increasingly states seeking weapons used nuclear weapons state’s lack of inertia on disarmament as a pretext for their decision. On the supply side, she saw the use of sanctions or positive inducements as a possible motivator to avoid nuclear breakout, however noted that inward looking state like North Korea which promotes a philosophy of self-reliance (Juche) are the most resistant and least vulnerable to such tactics. Despite the imperfections of such pressure, she found that the use of sanctions or inducement was better than no action at all.

Henry Sokolski relied on his government experience and the review of ten years of NPT history to track the evolution of the original intent of the NPT to where states stand today. He indicated that the points of greatest contention between non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states, such as the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, were in fact a divergence from the original intent of the treaty. Sokolski argued that the peaceful use of nuclear energy, was not an inalienable right but rather conditional to the state’s nonproliferation commitments. He further argued that members could choose to once again reinterpret or contextualize the articles of the NPT so as to compel states to assess the true costs and benefits of a civilian nuclear program.

James Walsh concluded the panel discussion by advocating that the debates which keep the NPT in deadlock should be redefined to focus on what states could agree on, while continuing to build institutions and norms. He founded these beliefs on his observations that the tensions between non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states are inherently multilateral and ultimately political. Walsh suggested ways to refurbish the political contract inherent in the treaty. For example, if a state was truly after a nuclear program to meet its energy demands, could their needs not be met with an alternative energy or cash equivalent? Once states reframe the debate to what they can truly agree on, such as the universal desire for nuclear safety and security, he feels that progress can be made to end the current stalemate.

* The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
* The views expressed here are panel overviews of the Asan Plenum. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the author or the institutions they are affiliated with.