Author: Caroline S. Reilly, Princeton University

Panel moderator Leonid Ryabikhin, Executive Secretary of the Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Arms Control, opened the session by calling on the participants to comment on the meaning and implications of the New START Treaty for the United States and Russia.

The first speaker, Vladimir Ivanov, an assistant professor at the EastWest Institute, began by remarking that he believed the treaty evidenced an evolution in Russian strategic thinking, from the concept of mutually assured destruction based on massive retaliatory strike to a more nuanced, sophisticated concept of deterrence based on a variety of strike capabilities in a nuclear conflict. He also noted that the treaty negotiations seemed to indicate that numerical parity is no longer as important to Russia as addressing structural differences in U.S. and Russian strategic forces. Given that Russia currently possesses a smaller number of delivery vehicles than the limit mandated by New START, retaining strategic parity, Professor Ivanov concluded, would require Russia to embark on a considerable expansion of its current inventory of delivery vehicles, an endeavor which Moscow might not be willing to undertake given the current economic climate. Finally, Professor Ivanov called on the U.S. and Russia to increase the transparency of calculations made by both sides regarding the size and mix of capabilities necessary for maintaining the “minimum level of deterrence.”

Next, General Jonathan George (ret.) of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory described the extent to which the New START treaty was more symbolic in nature than a substantive agreement driving a new future. The symbolism however, is not insignificant – the consideration by the U.S. and Russia to address nuclear posture and stockpile size is critical to international security. On the issue of ballistic missile defense (BMD), he explained that while the U.S. has no intent to use the planned BMD system against Russia, he understood Russian concerns and recommended the U.S. provide a great degree of transparency about the Phased Adaptive Approach as it progresses. With respect to tactical nuclear weapons, General George recommended that Russia facilitate U.S. understanding of their reliance on this capability so that the two countries can work through the issue and move forward.

Finally, Elbridge Colby, a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, explicated his thoughts on the future of U.S.-Russia arms control. Mr. Colby believed the next bilateral agreement should not focus on reductions per se, but rather on achieving force postures that ensure strategic stability based on assured second-strike capabilities. While Mr. Colby believed the U.S. nuclear force posture is increasingly stable in this regard, Russia’s heavy reliance on MIRVed, silo-based ICBMS is troubling. On BMD, he did not anticipate the U.S. to agree on strict limits but applauded U.S. efforts to allay Russian concerns and improve the possibility for BMD cooperation. In closing, Mr. Colby described some actions the U.S. could take to maintain effective deterrence during future arms control efforts, such as the provision of additional funding for the modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad and the exploration of nuclear earth penetrating weapons.

* The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
* The views expressed here are panel overviews of the Asan Plenum. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the author or the institutions they are affiliated with.